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I. INTRODUCTION
The stock market collapse of 2001-02 devastated the U.S. capital
markets and wreaked havoc on the lives of millions of American
investors. 3 Over the past several years, a steady drumbeat of scholars
have laid blame for large portions of the market crash at the feet of
Congress and its shortsighted deregulatory legislation of the mid-1990s. 4
Specifically, these critics have exposed the “Republican Revolution”
Congress (the 104th Congress) 5 and its passage of several congressional
3. See Justin Lahart, The Crash of 2002: Dow Hits Lowest Level in Nearly Four
Years as Crisis of Confidence Worsens; J&J Latest Casualty, CNN MONEY, July 19,
2002, available at http://money.cnn.com/2002/07/19/markets/markets_newyork/index.
htm; see also Kate Berry, Global Crossing Top Brass May Get Off Hook in Civil Suits:
Will Justice Be Served?, L.A. BUS. J., Aug. 25, 2003, at 1 (explaining that a
consequence of market collapse “[f]ormer employees, shareholders and bondholders of
Global Crossing Ltd. are nearing a broad settlement of all civil litigation filed against
the bankrupt telecommunications firm, its co-founder, Gary Winnick, and 32 former
officers and directors.” In addition, “[t]he amount of the potential settlement represents
a fraction of the money lost by investors and employees when Global Crossing filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in January 2002.”); infra notes 96, 156 (describing
the value loss of the capital markets in the wake of the 2002 crash).
4. See andré douglas pond cummings, “Ain’t No Glory in Pain”: How the 1994
Republican Revolution and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Contributed to
the Collapse of the United States Capital Markets, 83 NEB. L. REV. 979, 1044-59
(2005); see also Ernest E. Badway & Jonathan M. Busch, Ending Securities Industry
Self-Regulation As We Know It, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1351, 1358-76 (2005); Jeffrey T.
Cook, Recrafting the Jurisdictional Framework for Private Rights of Action Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 621 (2006); Joseph F. Morrissey, Catching
the Culprits: Is Sarbanes-Oxley Enough?, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 801 (2003);
Joseph M. Schwartz, Democracy Against the Free Market: The Enron Crisis and the
Politics of Global Deregulation, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1097 (2003); Stuart A. Shorenstein
& Lorna Veraldi, Symposium: Are New Media Really Replacing Old Media? Broadcast
Media Deregulation and the Internet: Defining The Public Interest In Terms of
Regulatory Necessity, 17 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 45, 60-61 (2003); Jacqueline
Lang Weaver, Can Energy Market Be Trusted? The Effect Of The Rise and Fall of
Enron On Energy Markets, 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 11-16 (2004); William S.
Lerach, Plundering America: How American Investors Got Taken for Trillions by
Corporate Insiders: The Rise of the New Corporate Kleptocracy, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 69, 76-85 (2002).
5. cummings, supra note 4, at 980. The Republican party swept into power in
1994:
This election sweep shifted control of the Congress from the Democrats to the
Republicans for the first time in forty years. The still-faintly-echoing mantra that
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enactments, including the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (“PSLRA”), 6 the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998 (“SLUSA”), 7 the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 8 and the
Commodities Futures Modernization Act (“CFMA”) 9 amongst others, as
responsible in part for the crushing collapse of 2002. 10

reverberated in the halls of the Capitol as those newly elected congresspersons took
their revolutionary seats was that of ‘deregulation.’ As a cornerstone of its 1995
agenda for change, the ‘Revolution Congress’ made deregulation, particularly
deregulation of corporate America, one of its primary objectives. Indeed the
Revolution Congress’s leadership felt that the nearly sixty years of ‘big government’
reign, namely federal regulation, as initiated by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
and buttressed by the United States Supreme Court since 1937, had finally run its
course and the time for complete regulatory rollback and reversal had arrived. Many
of the Revolution Congress’s leaders believed that extensive federal regulation - of all
industries - was an evil that necessarily had to be eradicated.

Id. at 980-83.
6. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737 (1995).
7. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
112. Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
8. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
9. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763 (2000).
10. See cummings, supra note 4, at 1029 (stating that “the bubble burst in a spate
of malfeasance, fraud, and deceit. One enduring legacy of the PSLRA and 1990s
Revolution Congress deregulation will be the market crash of 2002. ‘Simply put,
Congress reduced the incentives against committing fraud.’”) (citing Abner J. Mikva,
Share and Shares Alike: Now Let’s Fix the “Reform” of our Securities Laws, LEGAL
TIMES, Apr. 8, 2002, at 50); see also Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1101. Professor
Schwartz writes:
The deeper, radical truth is that Enron epitomizes the dangers of the speculative ‘free
market’ mania that has resulted in deregulation and the gutting of the public sector in
favor of the fool’s quest for short-term profit. The other side of speculative profit is
speculative bust, the costs of which fall on small investors and workers rather than on
corporate executives routinely rescued by government bailouts and ‘golden
parachutes.’

Id.; Reed Hundt, Ten Years Under the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 58 FED. COMM.
L.J. 399, 400 (2005). Hundt suggests that:
Regulatory policy flip flops at the FCC in 2001 and 2002 played a big role in the
outcome. Strategic blunders by AT&T, corruption at MCI, and wise moves at (then)
SBC and Bell Atlantic were more important than any rule of law in determining the
outcomes. But at all times, the more likely result was not the tottering seesaw balance
imagined by some in Congress but a winner-take-all result in which either the local
firms or the long-distance firms emerged after competition as winners, measured by
return to shareholders and economic profits.

Id.
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While the media and politicians have increasingly and almost
singularly blamed dishonest corporate insiders for the market crash of
2002, 11 mounting evidence has shown that far more than simple “bad
apple” executive corporate fraud was at play during the historic
collapse. 12 Studies have shown that the PSLRA, SLUSA and other
deregulatory initiatives in the mid-1990s enabled an environment that
almost invited the fraud that spun out of control in the corporate fiascos

11. See Robert Sheer, Bush Overplays the Terror Card, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2002,
available
at
http://www.robertscheer.com/1_natcolumn/02_columns/062502.htm
(providing that “[w]hen even Martha Stewart is ethically suspect and her company’s
stock has plummeted—though not quite to the depths of Enron, Global Crossing, Tyco,
Dynegy, Wal-Mart and Rite Aid—it is time to return to the wisdom of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, the Depression-era president who saved capitalism from itself”); see also
Amy Feldman, Surviving Sarbanes Oxley, INC. MAG., Sept. 2005, available at
http://www.inc.com/magazine/20050901/surviving-so.html
(“Everyone
knew
accounting problems were rampant. From 1997 through 2004, approximately 2,160
companies corrected errors in their financial statements, according to Glass Lewis &
Co., a San Francisco-based research firm. Clearly, plenty of companies needed to take
a second look at their books.”); Francine Knowles, Faith in Corporate America
Crumbles, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 27, 2002, at 6 (“And the scandals continue to wreak
havoc on investor confidence in stocks, particularly given that some sectors of the U.S.
economy remain weak . . . .”); Kevin Maney, WorldCom CFO Driven to Win: Once
Respected, Scott Sullivan Is Now at the Center of Controversy, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug.
27, 2002, at 39 (“WorldCom fired CFO Scott Sullivan in late June after the accounting
misdeeds were unearthed.”); see generally Catherine E. Vance & Paige Barr, The Facts
and Fiction of Bankruptcy Reform, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 361, 365 (2003)
(“Corporate and accounting reforms stem, of course, from the scandals that came to the
public’s attention beginning with the collapse of Enron.”); 148 CONG. REC. S7350-04,
at S7360 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Schumer) Senator Schumer stated:
They were talking about the Ken Lay’s, Bernard Ebers’ [sic], the Andrew Fasdow’s
[sic] of the corporate world. White collar criminals who ran giant corporations and
used tricky gimmicks to rob investors of not only their hard money but also their
confidence in the strongest and fairest markets in the world. They are the investment
giants: Enron, Arthur Andersen, Adelphia, CMS Energy, Reliant Resources, Dynegy,
Tyco International, and now Xerox and WorldCom[;] . . . [i]t is no secret that greed
played a major role in our markets rapid decline and slow demise.

Id.
12. See Ho Young Lee & Vivek Mande, The Effect of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on Accounting Discretion of Client Managers of Big 6
and Non-Big 6 Auditors, 22 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY, Mar. 2003, at 93-105; see
also cummings, supra note 4, at 1003-04; Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1097-98
(describing the corporate scandals of the late 1990s and early 2000s as far more than
“political insider trading” but part of a “starker systemic reality” influenced largely by a
“global neo-liberal model of deregulation”).
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of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, ImClone and Global Crossing. 13
Unquestionably, corporate executives like Bernard Ebbers, 14 Kenneth
Lay, 15 Scott Sullivan, 16 the Rigas family, 17 Dennis Kozlowski, 18 Martha
13. See Lee & Mande, supra note 12, at 99-105 (documenting the instantaneous
decrease in audit quality of the Big Six accounting firms following adoption of the
PSLRA as evidenced by the prevalence of increasing discretionary accruals); see also
cummings, supra note 4, at 988-89: cummings stated that:
The success of the Revolution Congress in discarding or eliminating significant
segments of federal regulation from crucial industries was accompanied
simultaneously by a wild bull market that saw the U.S. market indicators soar to
record heights never before attained. The late 1990s and early part of 2000 saw
unabashed speculation that the U.S. capital markets could potentially continue the
meteoric climb that had become almost expected by U.S. investors.

Id.; see also Morrissey, supra note 4, at 855. Professor Morrissey writes:
[T]he PSLRA and the SLUSA combine to force plaintiffs in securities fraud cases to
bring their suits in federal court and to follow strict pleading requirements. Further,
discovery is limited until after motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment
are adjudicated - making it difficult for plaintiffs to establish the facts necessary to
fulfill the strict pleading requirements. In addition, recovery possibilities are limited
both for the plaintiffs and for their attorneys, while penalties for defendants are
reduced. These provisions were supposedly designed to limit strike suits from
plaguing corporate America. In fact, the evidence shown indicates that corporate
America is and, even at the time the PSLRA was passed was, suffering far more from
fraud, deception and lack of ethical fiber than it is or was from strike suits.

Id. (emphasis added).
14. See Associated Press, Ebbers Sentenced to 25 Years in Prison, July 13, 2005,
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8474930 (explaining that “Ebbers was
convicted of overseeing the $11 billion WorldCom fraud—much of it a pattern of
chalking up expenses as long-term capital expenditures, which are classified as assets”).
15. See Paul Davies & Kara Scannell, Guilty Verdicts Provide ‘Red Meat’ To
Prosecutors Chasing Companies, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2006, at A1; John R.
Emshwiller, Will Enron Probe Spawn Further Criminal Cases?—Flush With
Conviction Victories, Prosecutors Have Possible Targets But May Be Set to Wind
Down, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2006, at C1; Gary McWilliams & John R. Emshwiller,
Executives on Trial: Lay Defends His Business Practices at Enron Trial, WALL ST. J.,
May 3, 2006, at C4.
16. See Jennifer Bayot & Roben Farzad, WorldCom Executive Sentenced, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2005, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res
=F30A1EF73F5A0C718DDDA10894DD404482 (“Federal Judge Barbara S. Jones
sentenced Scott D Sullivan, former chief financial officer who acknowledged his
leading role in WorldCom’s $11 billion accounting fraud, to five years in prison.”).
17. See Roben Farzad, Jail Terms for 2 at Top of Adelphia, N.Y. TIMES, June 21,
2005, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FA0A1FFA385F0C
728EDDAF0894DD404482.
18. See Associated Press, Ex-Tyco CEO Kozlowski found guilty: Kozlowski, former
finance chief face 30 years if appeals fail, MSNBC.com, June 17, 2005, available at
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Stewart, 19 Jeffrey Skilling, 20 Richard Scrushy, 21 Sam Waksal 22 and a
host of other bad corporate actors deserve significant blame for ushering
in the market collapse of 2002; but now, evidence has shown that these
executives existed in a deregulated corporate environment that very
nearly green-lighted their ribald behavior. 23
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8261018 (“[A] jury convicted [Dennis Kozlowski] and
another executive of looting the company of $600 million.”).
19. See Krysten Crawford, Martha: I Cheated No One, CNN MONEY, July 20,
2004, available at http://money.cnn.com/2004/07/16/news/newsmakers/martha_
sentencing/?cnn=yes (“[Martha Stewart] was sentenced to five months in prison and
two years’ probation Friday for lying to investigators about her sale of ImClone
Systems stock in late 2001.”).
20. See Associated Press, Status of High-Profile Corporate Scandals, Mar. 15,
2005, available at http://www.latimes.com/business/investing/wire/sns-ap-corporatescandals-glance,1,62511.story?coll=sns-ap-investing-headlines; see also Bloomberg
News, Skilling says Enron evidence ‘insufficient,’ CHI. TRIB., June 21, 2006, at 4; John
R. Emshwiller et al., Lay’s Legacy: Corporate Change—But Not the Kind He Expected,
WALL ST. J., July 6, 2006; Simon Romero, A Verdict Interrupted, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
2006, at C1.
21. Richard Scrushy was controversially acquitted by an Alabama jury of
accounting fraud in July 2005. See Business Digest, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2005,
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/health/article-page.html?res=9A05EFD81230
F937A25754C0A9639C8B63. Scrushy was convicted of paying bribes in order to
secure for himself a position on an Alabama regulatory panel. See Valerie Bauerlein,
Scrushy Is Convicted in Bribery Case, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2006, at A3, noting:
HealthSouth Corp. founder Richard M. Scrushy was convicted of paying $500,000 in
bribes in return for a spot on a state regulatory panel, a victory for the federal
government a year and a day after it failed to pin a massive accounting fraud at the
health-care company on him.

Id.
22. See Chris Adams, ImClone Ordered Two Shredders The Same Month Probe
Started, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2002, at C10; Leslie Eaton, The Ghost of Waksal Past
Hovers Over the Stewart Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2004, at C1; Holman W. Jenkins
Jr., Business World: Lies of the Post-Bubble, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2002, at A17; Peter
Loftus, ImClone Plans to Go It Alone, Saying Takeover Bids Too Low—Analysts See
Darker Side, Calling Stock Overvalued Amid Competitive Threats, WALL ST. J., Aug.
11, 2006, at A14; Andrew Pollack & David Cay Johnston, Former Chief of ImClone
Systems Is Charged With Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2002, at C1; Matthew
Rose, Martha, Martha, Martha—With Her Name Emblazoned On All Her Wares,
Stewart Could Put Company at Risk, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2002, at B1; Ben White, Hill
Panel Seeks Records On ImClone Stock Deals, WASH. POST, July 24, 2002, at E01.
23. See cummings, supra note 4, at 1038 (describing how many opponents
predicted that passage of deregulation legislation would lead corporate malfeasors to
perpetrate fraud):
The California State Association of Counties on Friday elected a new president—San
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While many of the corporate executives noted above have been
sued, indicted, prosecuted and even found guilty in some instances,24
Congress continues to escape significant and meaningful blame for its
role in enabling the market fiasco of 2001-02. 25 In light of the guilty

Mateo County supervisor Mike Nevin—whose first action was sending a letter to
President Clinton opposing the Securities Litigation Reform Act. CSAC, a nonprofit
corporation that promotes the interests of California’s 58 counties before the state
legislature and Congress, contends the [PSLRA] will severely hinder local
governments’ ability to recover losses related to securities fraud . . . . The letter to
Clinton was signed by 106 county and other local government officials . . . . ‘Local
governments are victims of securities fraud; they need access to the courts to recover
their losses,’ [said Steve Szalay, executive director of CSAC]. Orange County, on
behalf of 187 independent California governments, is suing to recover about $1.5
billion on the grounds that the investments made on its behalf were unsuitable and
violated the California constitution and statutes. This bill makes it very difficult for
local governments and taxpayers to recover their losses in securities fraud cases, and it
will give wrongdoers a green light to commit more fraud, Szalay said.

Id. (emphasis added) (citing Joe Bel Bruno, California Counties Ask Clinton To Veto
Securities Bill, The Bond Buyer, Dec. 5, 1995, at 11).
24. Davies & Scannell, supra note 15, at A1; Emshwiller, supra note 15, at C1;
McWilliams & Emshwiller, supra note 15, at C4; Associated Press, Count by Count,
N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2006 at C1; Megan Barnett et al., Not a Good Thing, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Mar. 15, 2004, at 55; Ken Belson, Ex-Chief of WorldCom Is Found
Guilty in $11 Billion Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005, at A1; Aimee Deeken, Stewart
Sentenced to Five Months in Prison, MEDIAWEEK.COM, July 16, 2004; Jayne O’Donnell
& Greg Farrell, Ebbers guilty on all 9 counts, USA TODAY, Mar. 16, 2005, at 1A; Mark
A. Stein, From Top of the Corporate World to Appeals Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 27,
2006, at C2; Chad Terhune, Executives on Trial: Scrushy Avoids Perjury Retrial,
Officially Ending Criminal Case, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2005, at C3; Chad Terhune &
Dan Morse, Why Scrushy Won His Trial And Ebbers Lost, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2005,
at C1.
25. See Robert Kuttner, Cant and Recant Milton Friedman’s Latest Research on
the Federal Reserve Challenges Key Assumptions of a Very Prominent Economist:
Milton Friedman, THE AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 2006, available at http://www.prospect.org
/web/page.ww?section=root&name= ViewWeb&articleId=10795. Kuttner writes:
[S]elf-regulation obviously failed investors in the multiple insider-trading, selfdealing, and stock promotion scandals of the late 1990s that in turn led to the stockmarket bubble.
Insiders ripped off investors by cooking corporate books,
misallocating trillions of dollars of investment capital. The misrepresentations went
on for a decade. But as Friedman sees things, it was the market that ultimately
brought down Enron and the rest, not Eliot Spitzer or the SEC. And what of the
industry lobbying that led the Republican Congress, as part of the Contract with
America, to weaken the laws that allowed defrauded investors to sue and virtually
invited abuses?

Id.; see also Jeff Madrick, Economic Scene; Bush is talking tough on corporate ethics,
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verdicts handed down in the Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling Enron
prosecution, 26 some commentators are even suggesting that this chapter
in U.S. history, marking the capital market collapse of 2002, should now
be closed. 27 In so arguing, such commentators continue to perpetuate
but where is the regulatory bite?, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2002, at C2 (“At bottom,
President Bush’s speech on Tuesday reflects the belief that the current corporate
scandals are merely the handiwork of a few bad apples.”); David E. Sanger & David E.
Rosenbaum, Corporate Conduct: Washington Memo; White House Moves to Limit
Corporate Scandals’ Fallout, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2002, at A1. But see Robert L.
Borosage, Conservatives Created the Corporate Scandals, NEWSDAY, July 10, 2002
(claiming that Newt Gingrich’s “Contract With America,” aimed at securities reform in
1995, shielded outside accountants and law firms from liability for false corporate
reporting, making it more difficult for shareholders to bring suit against fraudulent
reporting and consequently a flood of corporate misstatements followed soon
thereafter); Gary D. Halbert, Is There A Bottom In Stocks?, PROFUTURES, July 26, 2002,
available at http://www.profutures.com/article.php/69/ (blaming Congress for the
recent accounting scandals and the market failures of 2001 and 2002); Editorial, Not
Just Bad Apples, WASH. POST, May 26, 2006, at A20 (noting that “bad apples” were not
the only reasons for the market collapse).
26. See John R. Emshwiller et al., Symbol of An Era: Lay, Skilling Convicted of
Fraud, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2006, at A1; see also Showdown With the Crooked ‘E,’
WASH. POST, May 28, 2006, at F02; Alexei Barrionuevo & Kurt Eichenwald, The
Enron Case That Almost Wasn’t, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2006, at C11; Editorial, And
Justice For All, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at A20; Carrie Johnson, Enron Leaders
Found Guilty; Massive Fraud Pinned to Lay, Skilling, WASH. POST, May 28, 2006, at
A01; Nathan Koppel & Peter Lattman, The Enron Verdicts: Reversal Could Be Long
Shot, Legal Experts Say, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2006, at A9.
27. See Brooke A. Masters & Carrie Johnson, White-Collar Crime’s New
May
26,
2006,
at
D01,
available
at
Milestone,
WASH. POST,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/25/AR200605250194
0.html?referrer=emailarticle (“The fact that significant and highly credible companies
engaged in misconduct of the rankest sort, pulling the wool over the eyes not just of
investors but of analysts, journalists and regulators, is a very sorry chapter in our
history, and one that deserves the right type of burial.”) (statement of Harvey Pitt,
former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission); see also Editorial,
Guilty as Charged; Lay, Skilling Convicted in Enron Collapse, CHI. TRIB., May 26,
2006 at 3 (“The jury’s verdicts help to close a notorious chapter in the history of
America’s publicly traded companies . . . . Appeals aside, the end of the trial will mark
the end of a dark era.”) (statement of Rep. Michael Oxley); see also Editorial, . . . And
the Beltway Version, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2006, at A10 (“Some are calling [the] Enron
verdicts the end of the corporate scandal era . . . .”); Shaheen Pasha & Jessica Seid, Lay
and Skilling’s Day of Reckoning, CNNMONEY, May 25, 2006, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2006/05/25/news/newsmakers/enron_verdict/index.htm
(asserting that the verdicts for Lay and Skilling mark “the end of one of the most
scandalous chapters in the history of corporate America”); see generally David
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the myth that this dark scandal-ridden hour in U.S. history is attributable
still to only a few overreaching corporate executives. 28 This argument
continues to perplex in light of mounting evidence to the contrary.29
Strong evidence exists that the deregulatory hysteria that gripped
the Revolution Congress—and its shortsighted enactments—is in part
responsible for the corporate malfeasance that rocked Wall Street in
2001 and 2002. 30 This ripe-for-fraud corporate environment existed
because a flurry of deregulatory activity by Congress in the mid-1990s
set out to eliminate the regulatory environment that existed nationally
Callaway, Endgame begins in Enron scandal, MARKETWATCH, Oct. 3, 2002, available
at http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx?guid=%7BE7C6145C-7D1843C2-9629-26B36D5FE06D% 7D&print=1&siteid=mktw. But see R. Jeffrey Smith,
Lobbying Firm Underreported Income, WASH. POST, July 6, 2006, Page A04, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/05/AR2006070501
656_pf.htmlaff (describing how the Enron verdict does not conclude an era of corporate
scandal and deception); David Greising, Reform is Alive and Well, CHI. TRIB., May 26,
2006, at C1. But see Gretchen Morgenson, Are Enrons Bustin’ Out All Over?, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 2006, at C1 (forecasting that other scandals are likely to occur despite
the Enron verdict).
28. See Geoffrey Colvin, The Key To Healing Our Psyches? Justice., FORTUNE,
Feb. 9, 2004 at 56 (declaring that “[w]ith the right trials and the right outcomes, we can
finally put them behind us and move on”); Editorial, The Enron Verdicts . . . , WALL ST.
J., May 26, 2006, at A10 (“We think these convictions of individuals—some 30 in the
Enron case alone—will do more to deter future corporate crime than anything in
Sarbanes-Oxley. At the same time, the U.S. economy has snapped back nicely, meaning
that assertions of widespread corporate fraud back in 2001 and 2002 were way
overblown.”) (emphasis added). But see Gretchen Morgenson, The Big Winner, Again,
Is ‘Scandalot,’ N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2006, at C1. Morgenson writes:
Same stuff, different year. That’s one way to look at 2005, the fourth consecutive
year in which corporate chicanery loomed large. But while business titans’
transgressions may have lacked creativity last year [2005]—there was unusual hubris,
greed, and accounting tricks to prop up stock prices—at least the cast of ‘Scandalot
2005’ involved a few new characters . . . .
Greed was on display throughout 2005 as throngs of executives pocketed pay
that was even greater than the previous year’s. To hear them talk, they deserved the
amounts because—are you sitting down?—they enhanced shareholder value. Never
mind that many of their companies’ stocks ended the year lower than where they
began it.

Id.
29.
30.

See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
See cummings, supra note 4, at 1028. Strong evidence indicates that both
accounting firms and telecommunication companies took advantage of the deregulated
economy to defraud and deceive millions of investors and ruin hundreds of thousands of
employees. See Lee & Mande, supra note 12, at 99-105; see also Schwartz, supra note
4, at 1097.

2007

STILL “AIN’T NO GLORY IN PAIN”

477

since the New Deal and the Great Depression. 31 Congress passed the
PSLRA in 1995, the Telecommunications Act in 1996, the SLUSA in
1998, and the CFMA in 2000. Each of these legislative enactments
played a sizeable role in creating an environment that fulminated in
“Enronitis” 32 and the market crash of 2002. 33
Specifically, recent legal scholarship has harshly criticized the
PSLRA as a primary progenitor of the 2002 market crash. 34 The
31. See cummings, supra note 4, at 993-94 (“President Roosevelt, the New Deal
Congress, and the drafters of the 1933 Securities Act believed that required disclosure
of pertinent and crucial business information, including profits, debts, earnings, and
potential profitability, would give the investing public protection and—perhaps most
importantly—knowledge.”).
32. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Enronitis: Why Good Corporations Go Bad, 2004
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 773, 774-75 (2004) (“Enronitis. (n., neologism derived from
Enron, a large company that went bankrupt amid allegations of market manipulation,
phony accounting, looting, and other corporate misbehavior.)”). Professor Greenwood
goes on to offer two meanings for the definition of Enronitis:
1. A malfunction of corporate governance in which top managers become
extraordinarily wealthy while misleading shareholders, creditors, employees and the
general public about the company’s prospects and practices, eventually resulting in
share price collapse, loss of jobs, and, in extreme cases, the corporation’s bankruptcy.
Thought to have characterized a non-trivial portion of the American corporate
economy in the “bubble economy” around the turn of the twenty-first century. Often
accompanied by sudden collapse of the reputations of seemingly upstanding corporate
citizens who turn out to have been routinely lying, not only to shareholders, but to
their own board members, employees, tax authorities, etc. . . . .
2. A malfunction of corporate governance in which corporations in the pursuit of
profit, manipulate markets, deceive consumers, create unsafe or polluting conditions,
lobby to change the regulations meant to keep them operating in socially productive
ways, commit human rights violations abroad or otherwise act in anti-social,
dangerous, or socially inefficient manners. Particularly referring to instances in which
corporate actors justify the firm’s anti-social behavior or anti-republican political
interventions by appealing to the norm of profit maximization.

Id. at 794.
33. See cummings, supra note 4, at 1029-33; see also Morrissey, supra note 4, at
804-07; infra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
34. See cummings, supra note 4, at 1032. Professor cummings states:
[T]he removal of specific regulatory protections gave corporations and firms carte
blanche control over the information that they revealed to investors with no fear of
reprisal or disincentive for dishonesty. The PSLRA (1) “raised the burden of proof for
lawsuits against corporations that mislead shareholders—weakening an important
deterrent against corporate fraud;” (2) may have “made accounting firms and law
firms ‘sue proof’ for aiding and abetting securities fraud;” (3) provided “protection for
baseless earnings projections,” particularly enabling Silicon Valley and the dot-com
industry to explode and then collapse based on artificial value; and (4) sent a strong
signal to the U.S. capital markets and the global economy that “neither the regulators

478

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF
CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. XII

PSLRA essentially made it significantly more difficult for victims of
investor fraud to sue corporations and the corporate executives that foist
such fraud on the unsuspecting investing public. 35 In an effort to curtail
perceived lawsuit abuse and investor strike suits, Congress debated and
enacted the PSLRA over a President Bill Clinton veto in 1995.36
Whether the PSLRA met its intended goal of curtailing lawsuit abuse
has been the subject of much academic debate. 37 That the PSLRA made
nor Congress has been looking out for investors.

Id.; see also Lerach, supra note 4, at 88-89 n.61. Lerach writes:
As the court noted in In re OfficeMax Securities Litigation, in dismissing a lengthy
and very detailed complaint alleging substantial financial falsification of the
company’s books; “The Court notes that it is the PSLRA, and not this Court, that
imposes such high pleading standards upon Plaintiffs. While this Court has certainly
found in earlier opinions that those pleading requirements are not insurmountable,
they nonetheless remain high, even inordinately so. While recent events have called
into question the passage of the PSLRA—with its attendant protections for
corporations, their officers, and their auditors—it remains the law by which this Court
must be guided when assessing the adequacy of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.”

Id. (quoting “In re OfficeMax Sec. Litig., No. 1:00-CV-2432, slip op. at 12 n.2 (N.D.
Ohio July 26, 2002)).
35. See cummings, supra note 4, at 1032-33.
36. See id. at 1034-35. Professor cummings states that:
President Clinton vetoed the PSLRA, returning the legislation with stark warnings that
the Act would have a deleterious effect on the securities markets and on U.S.
investors. President Clinton’s veto was motivated in large part by the Revolution
Congress’s efforts to place unprecedented pleading standard requirements on victims
of securities fraud, while promulgating numerous provisions that foreclose securities
fraud plaintiffs from gaining access to their constitutionally assured day in court.

Id.
37. See generally Morrissey, supra note 4, at 826-27; Michael A. Perino, Did the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 929-36
(2003); Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter, 108 HARV. L. REV. 438, 439 (1994);
Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711, 713-15 (1996); Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on
Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465, 1476-99 (2004); Stephen J. Choi, Jill
E. Fisch, & A.C. Pritchard, Symposium: Mutual Funds, Hedge Funds, And Institutional
Investors: Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869 (2005); Shaun
Mulreed, Comment, Private Securities Litigation Reform Failure: How Scienter Has
Prevented The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 from Achieving Its
Goals, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779 (2005). According to recent studies, filings of
securities fraud class actions have dramatically dwindled in the past several years. See
Joseph A Grundfest, The Class-Action Market, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2007, at A15,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article_print/SB117082270114300590.html (“[F]ew
policy makers or scholars seem aware that a highly controversial component of the
litigation market—the class-action securities fraud litigation business—is shrinking
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it exceedingly more difficult for defrauded investors to bring securities
fraud class action claims is now clear. 38 Congress, in effectively
removing this deterrent, provided a clear avenue for corporate
executives to engage in wildly dishonest behavior with little fear of
professional or legal repercussion. 39
Curiously, several leading architects of the PSLRA are currently
under indictment for other questionable and even illegal conduct
occurring after passage of the PSLRA. 40 Some argue that the politicians
faster than a polar icecap.”). Grundfest bases his claim that securities fraud litigation
has shrunk dramatically on:
[D]ata collected by Stanford Law School and Cornerstone Research, the number of
companies sued in plain vanilla class-action fraud claims has averaged about 193 per
year from 1996 through 2005, not much different from pre-reform levels. But
halfway through 2005 filing activity took a sharp drop, and in 2006 only 110
companies were named as defendants in securities-fraud class actions . . . . A closer
look at the data suggests that the decline is even more remarkable because 20 of these
lawsuits allege options backdating activity. Backdating is a one-time event, and if we
subtract these 20 cases we arrive at a ‘core’ litigation rate of 90 companies per year.

Id.; see also Jonathan Peterson, Critics Fear SEC Chief is Seeking to Limit Investors’
Ability to Sue: Cox Says He Wants to Prevent ‘Abusive Litigation.’ But Recent Events
Raise Questions About His Intentions, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2007, at 1. The L.A. Times
reports that:
The discussion of investor lawsuits is taking place at a time when the number of such
cases has been falling steadily. According to Stanford University and Cornerstone
Research, 110 cases were filed in 2006, down from 178 filings the year before.
Overall, the 2006 figure was 43% below the 10-year average of 193 cases, researchers
said last month.

Id. But see Stephen J. Choi & Robert Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers:
Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1496-97
(2006) (claiming that securities class action filings have not decreased in the decade
following passage of the PSLRA).
38. See supra notes 34, 36 and accompanying text.
39. See Lerach, supra note 4, at 103-04, stating:
While the recent arrests or indictments in ImClone, WorldCom, Enron, Adelphia, and
RiteAid have made a lot of headlines, I must remind you that, of the billions and
billions of dollars of highly questionable, if not illegal, insider-trading profits of
corporate insiders that have been exposed in recent years, so far as I know, not one
dollar has yet been disgorged! Remember—when crime pays, you get a lot of crime.
Simply put, the behavior of many—not just a few—corporate executives has been
abominable.

Id.
40. Former Republican House leader Tom DeLay, a vociferous advocate of
deregulation and proponent of the PSLRA, was indicted on charges leading to his
ultimate resignation from the House of Representatives. See Bill Dawson & Carl Hulse,
DeLay Quietly Surrenders to a Texas Sheriff, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2005, at A19; see
also Editorial, The DeLay Indictment, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2005, at A22; Anne E.
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currently under indictment engaged in much of the same wildly
dishonest behavior that the 2002 market crash corporate executives
did. 41 Recently resigned and indicted Congressman Tom DeLay was an
Kornblut, How a Tested Campaign Tool Led to Conspiracy Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
29, 2005, at A26; Mark Leibovich, News Flash; DeLay Indictment Hits the Hill Like An
Energizing Bolt of Lightning, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2005, at C01; Philip Shenon,
DeLay Goes on Radio and TV to Proclaim Innocence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at
A26; R. Jeffrey Smith & Jonathan Weisman, DeLay’s Felony Charge Is Upheld; But
Texas Judge Dismisses Some Conspiracy Counts, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2005, at A01.
Former Congressman DeLay is not alone in his indiscretions. See Brody Mullins,
Federal Influence-Peddling Inquiry Casts Wider Net—Four Lawmakers’ Dealings With
Lobbyist Are Studied; Low Threshold for Bribery?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 2005, at A1.
The Wall Street Journal notes that the:
Prosecutors in the department’s public integrity and fraud divisions—separate units
that report to the assistant attorney general for the criminal division—are looking into
Mr. Abramoff’s interactions with former House Majority Leader Tom DeLay of
Texas, Rep. Bob Ney (R., Ohio), Rep. John Doolittle (R., Calif.) and Sen. Conrad
Burns (R., Mont.), according to several people close to the investigation.

Id.; see also Philip Shenon, Trial Nears for Ex-Official Tied to Lobbyist, N.Y. TIMES,
May 22, 2006, at A17 (“The testimony could be uncomfortable for members of
Congress and others who have been closely tied to Mr. Abramoff, especially for
Representative Bob Ney, an Ohio Republican whose former chief of staff is expected to
testify for the government.”); Joel Haveman, Ney Gets 30 Months in Corruption Case,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2007, at 19 (“DeLay, once one of Washington’s most powerful
Republicans, . . . resigned from the House last year because of ethics controversies
[while] DeLay is fighting charges in Texas that he violated state campaign finance
laws.”); Philip Shenon, Ex-Congressman Is Sentenced to 2 Years in Abramoff Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2007, at A8 (“Former Representative Bob Ney, the only member
of Congress to admit guilt in the Jack Abramoff lobbying scandal, was sentenced Friday
to two and a half years in prison . . . .”); Valerie Sullivan & Jack Torry, Ney Ordered to
Report to W.Va. Prison on March 1, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 11, 2007, at A8;
Associated Press, Abramoff Reports to Prison in Md., CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Nov. 16,
2006, at A7 (“[Jack Abramoff] will serve a six-year sentence for a fraudulent Florida
casino deal. . . . From prison, Abramoff is to continue cooperating with the Justice
Department, helping explain how he manipulated government decisions and who else
was involved.”); Evan Thomas, Decline and Fall, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 20, 2006, at 60.
41. See Dan Balz, Troubled Year Gets Worse for the GOP, WASH. POST, Sept. 29,
2005, at A01; see also Ralph Blumenthal & Carl Hulse, Court Upholds 2 of 3 Charges
Faced by DeLay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2005, at A1; Editorial, Hammer Time, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 29, 2005, at A18; Editorial, Tom DeLay Behind the Curtain, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
29, 2005, at A32; Glen Justice, With Indictment, a Fund-Raising Machine Will Slow,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at A28; Philip Shenon & Carl Hulse, DeLay is Indicted in
Texas Case and Forfeits G.O.P House Post, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, at A1; R.
Jeffrey Smith & Christopher Lee, DeLay Booked in Houston on Money-Laundering,
Conspiracy Charges, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2005, at A05; Robin Toner, For
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Republicans, a Swelling Sea of Troubles, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, at A1. With the
indictment of DeLay and a sea of additional charges of malfeasance, Democrats in
Washington, D.C. have appointed the credo of “a culture of corruption” to the
Republican leadership. See John M. Broder, Lawmaker Quits After He Pleads Guilty to
Bribes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005, at A1 (“‘This offense is just the latest example of
the culture of corruption that pervades the Republican-controlled Congress, which
ignores the needs of the American people to serve wealthy special interests and their
cronies,’ said Congresswoman Pelosi.”); Holli Chimela, A Vulnerable Republican, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 9, 2006, § 14NJ, at 6 (“Ms. Stender is one of nearly a dozen women whom
Democratic leaders here are rallying behind in an effort to convey the need for change
and to offer an alternative to what they describe as the Republican ‘culture of
corruption’ and the ‘good old boys in Washington.’”); Raymond Hernandez, Democrats
Try to Tie Upstate Congressman to Washington G.O.P. Scandals, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,
2006, at B5 (“The Democrats who have attacked Mr. Sweeney in newspaper interviews,
news releases and a satirical Internet advertisement are arguing that his actions reflect a
larger culture of corruption that has enveloped Washington under Republican rule.”);
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Democrats Sense Chance In Ohio for ‘06 Elections, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 3, 2005, at A16 (“[Mary Jo] Kilroy decried the Republican ‘culture of corruption’
and called Congress a ‘rubber stamp.’”); Jonathan Weisman & Jeffrey H. Birnbaum,
Scandals Alone Could Cost Republicans Their House Majority, WASH. POST, Nov. 2,
2006, at A01 (“For more than a year, Democrats have tried to gain political advantage
from what they called ‘a culture of corruption’ in Republican-controlled Washington.
Republican campaign officials insist the theme has not caught on with the public, but
even they concede that many individual races have been hit hard.”); Kate Zernike,
Democrats Vote to Force Jefferson Aside, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2006, at A28 (“The
entire Republican caucus condoned, enabled and benefited from the culture of
corruption, and that is what I will continue to rail against.”) (statement of former
minority leader Mrs. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA)). As predicted, the culture of GOP
corruption led to a stunning rebuke from U.S. voters in the historic 2006 mid-term
election wherein majority power swung to the Democrats for the first time in twelve
years. See Dick Armey, End of the Revolution, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2006, at A14 (“If
there was still any doubt, the Republican Revolution of 1994 officially ended Tuesday
night with the loss of at least 28 seats and majority control of the House of
Representatives.”); see also David D. Kirkpatrick, Senate Passes Vast Overhaul In
Ethics Rules, NY TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at A1. Kilpatrick notes:
Interpreting the results of the Nov. 7 election as a reaction to corruption scandals
when Congress was under Republican control, the Senate has joined the House in
adopting broad new rules that go beyond the proposals Republicans introduced last
year, the ones that Democrats campaigned on, or the extensive changes House
Democrats recently passed.

Id.; Lyndsey Layton, Hill Pensions for the Convicted May End; House Passes Bill to
Deny Payments in Future Cases, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2007, at A04. Layton states:
For at least a decade, Congress has been kicking around bills to block pensions for
convicted lawmakers. . . . [T]he issue resonated following last year’s influencepeddling scandal involving convicted lobbyist Jack Abramoff and the midterm
elections, when the Democrats grabbed corruption as a campaign theme and used it to
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integral part of the deregulation movement that gripped Congress
following the historic 1994 election. 42
Several scholars have now written that the PSLRA was a politically
motivated, shortsighted, and poorly executed Congressional
enactment. 43 The PSLRA has been criticized for a variety of reasons,
with scholars and politicians even calling for its reversal. 44 Congress, in
win control of Congress.

Id.; Molly McDonough, D.C. Firms Gear Up for a New Congress: With Prospects for
Increased Oversight, Lawyers Scramble to Prepare, ABA J., Dec. 15, 2006, available
at http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/d15memo.html.
42. See cummings, supra note 4, at 1072 n.7 (“DeLay led the stampede to free
corporations from virtually all regulations . . . . [He] was so anxious that ‘he could not
wait to start on what he considered the central mission of his political career: the demise
of the modern era of government regulation.’”) (citing Michael Weisskopf & David
Maraniss, Forging an Alliance for Deregulation: Rep. DeLay Makes Companies Full
Partners in the Movement, Wash. Post, Mar. 12, 1995, at A1); see id. at 1072 n.10
(stating that “Representative DeLay was so eager to begin his deregulatory crusade that
‘even before the new Congress convened . . . [he] assembled a coalition called ‘Project
Relief.’ The Project brought together more than 100 groups (and their lobbyists) behind
a very narrow cause: stopping federal regulations of business.’”) (citing Weisskopf &
Maraniss, supra note 42, at A1).
43. See cummings, supra note 4, at 1037-39. cummings writes that:
Despite a veto from President Clinton, strong opposition from state and local
governments and municipalities, serious opposition from dozens of editorializing
newspapers and magazines, stout opposition from leading Congresspersons with
expertise in the corporate arena, a sharply worded letter of opposition signed by the
Attorneys General of eleven different states, heavy opposition from the AFL-CIO,
grave opposition from the Fraternal Order of Police, and somber warnings of future
capital market devastation, the Revolution Congress passed the PSLRA, with a
significant assist from corporate executives and their lobbyists. The market crash of
2002 has undoubtedly curbed any joy felt in the corporate world at the time the
PSLRA was enacted. Certainly, no glory can be found in the PSLRA when the pain
of employee and investor losses from the market collapse of 2002 is so fresh.

Id.; see also Morrissey, supra note 4, at 800; Lerach, supra note 4, at 76-85; Lee &
Mande, supra note 12, at 93-105.
44. See cummings, supra note 4, at 1065; see also Shareholder and Employee
Rights Restoration Act of 2003, H.R. 636, 108th Cong. (2003) (legislation originally
introduced to reverse many of the PSLRA provisions); Morrissey, supra note 4, at 85556; Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation:
Dealing with the Meritorious as well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055,
1080-93 (1999). Professor Ramirez argues that:
Any argument in favor of the PSLRA garners no support from the record of the
securities industry over the past ten or fifteen years. Although empirical evidence on
this score is hard to come by, most commentators agree that the business of issuing,
selling, or buying securities has not advanced to such an ethical and fair level that
traditional regulatory strictures should be relaxed. In fact, many believe the contrary
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the wake of the market crash of 2002 and despite harsh criticism of the
PSLRA, refused to address the larger problems ushered in by that
legislation and other deregulation. Instead, Congress hurriedly passed
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which failed to address many of the problems
perpetuated by the PSLRA. 45 Today, the PSLRA continues to shield
bad corporate actors from legitimate shareholder class action claims, and
remains an obstacle to corporate fraud enforcement activity.
In recent months, the Bush administration and the SEC have
surprised U.S. investors and investor protection advocates by mounting
a campaign to further curtail securities class action lawsuits. 46 This
investor affront has been quietly perpetuated 47 despite mounting
to be the case.

Id. at 1089.
45. See cummings, supra note 4, at 1059-65 (“In a typical rush to legislate, the
107th Congress, still teeming with hundreds of holdovers from the Republican
Revolution and devotees of the arguably failed ‘Contract with America,’ passed the
toothless and too-weak Sarbanes-Oxley Act in startlingly rapid fashion.”).
46. See Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Seeks to Curtail Investor Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
13, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/13/washington/13sec.html?
hp&ex=1171429200&en=9115f646a6caae56&ei=5094&partner=homepage
(“The
Securities and Exchange Commission has begun to take steps . . . to protect
corporations, executives and accounting firms from investor lawsuits that accuse them
of fraud.”). The N.Y. Times reports that critics of this new deregulation movement are
“alarmed”:
Institutional investors and some analysts expressed alarm at the developments, noting
that the number of shareholder lawsuits was declining significantly. “It is clear from
these actions that this is a commission intent on reversing seven decades of
rulemaking, by Democrats and Republicans, that have protected investors and
opposed shielding auditors . . . .”

Id. (quoting Lynn E. Turner, a former chief accountant at the SEC); see also Peter
Lattman, The SEC: Peeling Back Post-Enron Investor Protections?, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL ONLINE, WSJ.com, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/02/13/the-secpeeling-back-post-enron-investor-protections/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2007).
47. See Labaton, supra note 46 at C1 (“Last Friday, the commission filed a littlenoticed brief in the Supreme Court urging the adoption of a legal standard that would
make it harder for shareholders to prevail in fraud lawsuits against publicly traded
companies and their executives . . . .”). Labaton further reports that:
The S.E.C. brief in the case, Tallabs Inc. v. Makor Issues and Rights Ltd., said that the
appeals court set too low a threshold and that the law required investors to show by
evidence ‘a high likelihood’ that the defendant possessed the intent to violate the law.
The brief, which was also signed by the Justice Department, said judges ought to
weigh any facts that provided for an innocent explanation of the conduct of the
company and its executives.

Id.; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7,
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., No. 06-484 (7th Cir. Feb. 9, 2007). In a
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evidence that the PSLRA allowed significant investor injury and
continues to positively injure U.S. investors and workers. 48 Further, the
Treasury Department is trending toward attempted elimination of certain
Sarbanes-Oxley protections in the name of capital formation, 49 based on
brief filed in this case, the SEC and the Department of Justice argues that the 7th Circuit
misinterpreted the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standard:
Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 in order
to curtail abusive practices that undermine the beneficial purposes of private securities
litigation. As part of that effort, Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to require that a securities fraud complaint “state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the requisite state of mind.”
The court of appeals erroneously diluted that requirement by holding that a securities
fraud plaintiff need only “allege[] facts from which, if true, a reasonable person could
infer that the defendant acted with the required intent.”
Before the enactment of the Reform Act, numerous lower courts, applying
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, held that it was insufficient for a
securities fraud plaintiff merely to allege state of mind generally, and some courts
held that a securities fraud plaintiff was required to allege facts that gave rise to at
least a reasonable inference of the requisite mental state. The Second Circuit,
however, went further and held that a securities fraud plaintiff was required to allege
facts that gave rise to a strong inference of scienter. In enacting the Reform Act,
Congress intended to impose a uniform and heightened pleading standard that built
upon the Second Circuit’s ‘strong inference’ terminology.
In evaluating whether a plaintiff has alleged facts that “giv[e] rise” to a “strong
inference” of scienter, a court should determine whether, taking the conclusion that
the defendant possessed scienter follows from those facts . . . . The standard applied
by the court of appeals in this case does not appear to differ materially from the
“reasonable” inference standard that it (and other courts of appeals) had applied
before the enactment of the Reform Act. Congress plainly rejected that approach in
favor of a more demanding standard. In determining whether an inference of scienter
is “strong” for purposes of the Reform Act, a court will necessarily have to consider
whether the facts alleged in the complaint leave open a range of non-culpable
explanations for the defendant’s conduct.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
48. See supra notes 13, 34.
49. See Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation,
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, Nov. 30, 2006 (on file with author). The
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation concluded that:
[F]our factors are responsible for loss of U.S. competitiveness to foreign and private
markets: (i) an increase in the integrity of and trust in major foreign public markets
resulting from more transparency and better disclosure; (ii) a relative increase in the
liquidity of foreign and private markets, thus making it less necessary to go to the U.S.
public equity capital markets for funding; (iii) improvements in technology, making it
easier for U.S. investors to invest in foreign markets; and (iv) differences in the legal
rules governing the U.S. public markets and the foreign and private alternatives.
There is little public policy can do to reverse the impact of the first three factors . . . .
There are opportunities, however, to make adjustments to our regulatory and litigation
framework so that public markets are less burdensome. . . . The average costs of
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arguments that U.S. regulation is forcing capital formation out of the
U.S. markets and onto more attractive foreign markets. 50 Perhaps most
surprising in this new movement toward even further regulatory rollback
is the curious refusal of rollback proponents to engage the growing
research and still emerging scholarship finding that the market
devastation of 2001-02 has been inextricably linked with the failed
[Sarbanes-Oxley] Section 404 in 2004, its first year of implementation, were $4.36
million for an average company. Although these costs are down, new entrants into the
U.S. public markets still will face these large initial costs. These costs can be
especially significant for smaller companies and foreign companies contemplating
entry into the U.S. market. . . . Companies are attracted to list in the market that
provides them the best valuation—that is, the best multiple of their cash flow (or
earnings). The magnitude of this multiple is determined by two factors: (i) the cost of
capital and (ii) the risk that current and/or future cash flow will be reduced by marketspecific regulatory actions. Recent studies have shown that the U.S. markets have a
cost of capital advantage. But the positive difference in the multiples has declined in
recent years, especially relative to developed markets. Excessive regulatory costs and
risk of litigation are the most likely causes of this decline.

Id.; see also Anita Hawser, The Cost of Compliance, GLOBAL FINANCE, Jan. 1, 2007,
vol. 21, issue 1. Hawser reports:
Steve Bartlett, president and CEO of the Financial Services Roundtable (FSR), which
comprises representatives from 100 of the largest financial services companies in the
United States, summed up the general disdain for the rule, stating, “Section 404 [of
SOX] compliance costs remain high, and its certification requirements are diverting
management time and talent from running the company.” The FSR has called for the
revision of Section 404 and for the SEC to conduct a more comprehensive study of
the costs associated with Section 404 compliance. In a November speech, US
Treasury secretary Henry Paulson added further salt to the wound, drawing links
between SOX and what he depicted as the declining fortunes of US capital markets,
which he said “face significant challenges.”

Id.
50. See supra note 49 and accompanying text; see also Geoffrey Colvin, Keep
America’s Edge, FORTUNE, Dec. 25, 2006, at 99. Colvin reports:
The premise is simple: America’s capital markets are the envy of the world but are
losing their preeminence. Non-U.S. companies are increasingly listing their stocks,
IPOs, and otherwise raising money elsewhere. For the sake of the U.S. economy, we
need to fight back and make our capital markets more attractive.

Id.; Deborah Soloman and Kara Scannell, Financial-Rule Overhaul Hits A Nerve,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2006, at C3 (“[B]usiness groups and former regulators urged the
Securities and Exchange Commission and Congress to move forward with several of
the suggestions, saying existing rules and laws are handicapping U.S. financial
markets.”); Dale A. Osterle, The High Cost of IPOs Depresses Venture Capital in the
United States, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 369-80 (2006) (arguing that although
“[t]he fundamental reason for the small number of IPOs is, of course, the reluctance of
public investors to buy IPO stock” due to the technology bubble burst in 2000, “[t]he
higher ongoing costs are a significant bone of contention, particularly with the
implementation of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002”).
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deregulation of the mid to late 1990s. 51
The failed deregulation of the mid-1990s was handcrafted by the
104th Congress. Likely giddy with its success in passing the PSLRA in
1995, the Revolution Congress in 1996 turned its attention to
deregulating the telecommunications industry. Congress enacted the
Telecommunications Act in that same year. Following the 2002 crash,
scholars pointed out the PSLRA’s deleterious impact on the U.S. capital
markets that led to the devastation of investor confidence and employee
life savings. The Telecommunications Act turned out to be just as
injurious to U.S. investors and workers as has the PSLRA.
To further perpetuate its deregulatory agenda, Congress passed the
Commodities Futures Modernization Act in 2000. Here, rather than
deregulate a safely regulated corporate trading area like it did with the
PSRLA and the Telecommunications Act, Congress refused the
opportunity to regulate a trading area very much in need of regulatory
oversight. 52 The CFMA failed to place careful regulatory oversight onto
the over-the-counter trading of commodities and futures. 53 This
decision to refuse to regulate commodities futures trading proved
problematic, as energy commodities trading ran amok at the turn of the
century, allowing the fraudulent commodities trading engaged in by
Enron and other corporate malfeasors. 54
This article will examine the role that the Telecommunications Act
and the Commodities Futures Modernization Act played in the market
collapse of 2002 (together with PSLRA and SLUSA). 55 First, Part II
will briefly examine the recent Enron guilty verdicts against Lay and

51. See Labaton, supra note 46 (“‘This administration [George W. Bush] and this
agency [SEC.] are very pro-business and anti-investor.’”) (quoting Lynn E. Turner,
former chief accountant of the SEC). Further, securities law professor Jill Frisch stated
that:
[A]fter reading the brief, one has to wonder if the S.E.C. is now on the side of the
defense bar. . . . This does not read like an S.E.C. brief since it does not articulate
anything about the commission’s experience in the area. It reads, instead, like a
litigant’s brief.

Id.
52.
53.
54.

See infra notes 196-198 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part II.B; see also ENRON: THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM
(Magnolia Pictures 2005).
55. Careful examination of the PSLRA and SLUSA have been undertaken
previously. See cummings, supra note 4, at 1059-65. Further painstaking review of the
PSLRA and SLUSA are beyond the scope of this article.
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Skilling and will detail corporate commentators’ misguided call for
closing the book on the scandals that erupted in 2001 and 2002. Further,
Part II will illuminate the recent appeals from Wall Street to roll back
regulations promulgated in Sarbanes-Oxley and new SEC efforts to
further hinder plaintiff class action securities lawsuits. Part III will
introduce the Telecommunications Act and describe how the Act
changed and deregulated the telecommunications industry. Part III will
also describe the arguments made in opposition to, and the forces that
opposed, passage of the Telecommunications Act and the warnings
echoed by such opposition. Part IV will describe the CFMA and explain
how the Act changed commodities trading. Part IV will also discuss
how passage of the CFMA allowed the fraudulent commodities trading
that enabled Enron, Global Crossing and Adelphia, among others, to
engage in the deceptions that each did. Part V will propose regulatory
efforts that Congress needs to consider and enact in order to bring calm
and investor protection back into these frontier-like trading arenas.
II. CLOSING THE CHAPTER?
This article begins with an examination of Enron and the trial of its
executives. More than five years after Enron’s spectacular fall from
grace, evidence continues to emerge detailing its astonishing fraud. As
detailed below, such examination is appropriate because Enron’s
deception needed the newly deregulated environment created by both
the Telecommunications Act and the CFMA in order to spin its deceit.
Absent passage of the Telecommunications Act and the CFMA, it is
very unlikely that Enron could have woven its trail of fraud, deceit and
ultimate damage. In a much publicized Houston, Texas federal
securities fraud trial, Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, the former Chief
Executive Officers and architects of the Enron Corporation, and the
principal progenitors of Enron’s downfall, were found guilty for their
rolls in capsizing the once proud company. 56 Curiously, Skilling and
56. See Johnson, supra note 26, at A01; Associated Press, Guilty as Charged; Lay,
Skilling convicted in Enron Collapse, CHI. TRIB., May 26, 2006, at 3; Alexei
Barrionuevo, 2 Enron Chiefs are Convicted in Fraud and Conspiracy Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 2006, at A1; Kim Clark & Marianne Lavelle, Guilty As Charged!, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., June 5, 2006, at 44-45; Sheila McNulty & Ben White, Lay and
Skilling guilty in Enron case *Former Executives Could Spend Rest of Lives in Prison,
May 26, 2006, FIN. TIMES (London), at 1; Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling are Also
Found Guilty of Conspiracy in a Scandal that Brought Down the Company and Cost
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Lay defended themselves against the alleged securities law violations
and fraud charges in a unique and risky way.57 Lay and Skilling’s
defense team, rather than argue that the former CEOs’ were unaware of
the fraud and violations, argued that they simply did nothing wrong, and
that the company was vibrant until outside forces torpedoed it. 58 Lay
and Skilling preferred to blame Andrew Fastow, Enron’s former Chief
Financial Officer, for all of the corporate malfeasance that led
company’s implosion. 59 The jury, while admitting that they quite liked

Investors Billions, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at 1; Cathy Booth Thomas et al., The
Enron Effect; The Bosses Take the Fall for a Criminal Corporate Flameout. What has
Changed, and Why it Will Never, Ever, Ever Happen Again. Maybe, TIME, June 5,
2006, at 23.
57. See Gary McWilliams, Enron Defense Is Set to Present ‘No Crime’ Tack,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2006, at C1. The Wall Street Journal reported that Lay and
Skilling’s defense attorneys offered an unusual defense theory:
As the prosecution rested its case yesterday against former Enron Corp. top
executives Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, the defense is gearing up to present its
argument that essentially no crimes occurred at the one-time energy giant, which
collapsed into bankruptcy in 2001.
Defense attorneys, who are scheduled to begin their case when the trial resumes
on Monday, signaled before the proceedings began at the end of January [2006] that
they planned to argue the Enron was a vigorous and growing company that was felled
by outside forces.
Such an approach is unusual in the recent annals of big-time corporate-crime
cases.

Id.
58. See John R. Emshwiller & Gary McWilliams, Lay Says ‘Classic Run on Bank’
Ruined Enron, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2006, at C1. Emshwiller and McWilliams report
that, during the Enron trial, Kenneth Lay:
[B]lamed Enron’s December 2001 collapse on deceitful underlings, hostile stock
traders and damaging news coverage by The Wall Street Journal. Those forces
collided to provoke what he called a ‘classic run on the bank’ that set the stage for the
company’s bankruptcy filing. He also portrayed himself as a man still somewhat
stunned by his fall from a pinnacle where he used to rub shoulders with world leaders
and other corporate titans.

Id.
59. See Peter Elkind & Bethany McLean, Judgment Day; Poster Boys for
Corporate Corruption, Former Enron CEOs Ken Lay and Jeffrey Skilling are Finally
Getting Their Day in Court: The Trial in Houston Will be a Milestone in American
Business History, FORTUNE, Jan. 23, 2006, at 58 (“Like Skilling, Ken Lay has presented
himself publicly as both clueless and blameless. And like Skilling, he has insisted that,
except for Fastow’s criminal misdeeds, there was nothing really wrong at Enron.”);
Jury Hears That Skilling Fretted At a Meeting, ‘They’re On to Us,’ WALL ST. J., Mar. 3,
2006, at C1 (“In his opening arguments, Michael Ramsey, Mr. Lay’s lead attorney,
dismissed Mr. Fastow as a ‘crook,’ a ‘liar’ and a ‘pitiful guy.’”); John R. Emshwiller &
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Lay and Skilling and believed both to be very smart men, 60 still found
the defendants’ stories and defenses implausible. Both men were found
guilty of violating federal securities laws and engaging in outright
fraud. 61
Skilling and Lay, facing the prospect of long-term
imprisonment, predictably planned to appeal the guilty verdicts. 62
Gary McWilliams, Lay Says ‘Classic Run on Bank’ Ruined Enron—Ex-Chairman Uses
Debut on Stand To Depict Charges as ‘Ludicrous,’ Blames Fastow, Media, Traders,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2006, at C1; Susan Schmidt, Fastow Silent on His Role, but
Others Aren’t, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2002, at A01; James B. Stewart, Common Sense:
Enron Defense Wins the Award For Year’s Worst, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2006, at D3.
60. See Matt Krantz & Greg Farrell, How Jurors Reached the Decision, USA
TODAY, May 26, 2006, at 3B (Juror Wendy Vaughan “came to the trial having had
‘admired’ former CEOs Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling. ‘I thought they were brilliant.’ She
said she ‘wanted very, very badly to believe what they were saying.’”); Bethany
McLean & Peter Elkind, The Guiltiest Guys In The Room: In the End, Ken Lay and Jeff
Skilling Couldn’t Escape Their Own Lies—And That’s Good For Corporate America,
FORTUNE, June 12, 2006, at 26 (“Rather than demonize Skilling and Lay—or even the
company—they correctly viewed the two CEOs as gifted, albeit flawed, men.”); see
also Allan Turner, Enron Juror Learns to ‘be Truthful’; He Warns a Class Not to
Become Corrupt Working in Corporate U.S., HOUS. CHRON., June 10, 2006, at B1.
61. See Greg Burns, GUILTY; Why the jury didn’t believe Lay and Skilling in fraud
case, CHI. TRIB., May 26, 2006, at 1; Enron’s Lay, Skilling Found Guilty, Face Prison,
MEGAWATT DAILY, May 26, 2006, at 1; see also Vikas Bajaj & Kyle Whitmire, ‘I
Didn’t Know’ Did Not Sway Houston Jury, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at A1; John R.
Emshwiller, Gary McWilliams & Ann Davis, Symbol of an Era: Lay, Skilling Are
Convicted of Fraud—Jurors Reject Defense Claim That Enron Was Clean; Question of
Credibility—Two ‘Very Controlling People,’ WALL ST. J., May 26, 2006, at A1; see
also ‘How Could They Not See It?’; Jurors say they became convinced that Lay and
Skilling had to have known about the fraud that was occurring at the company they ran,
L.A. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at 14; Carol Rust, Defendants Sunk by Their Testimony,
Wash. Post, May 26, 2006, at A01.
62. See Nathan Koppel & Peter Lattman, The Enron Verdicts: Reversal Could be
Long Shot, Legal Experts Say, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2006, at A9 (“For former Enron
Corp. executives Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, overturning yesterday’s [(May 25,
2006)] guilty verdicts will be a long shot, legal specialists say.”). The Wall Street
Journal further reports that:
Mr. Lay was found guilty in a Houston federal court of conspiracy, securities
fraud and wire fraud. He was also found guilty of bank fraud and misrepresentation in
personal loans in a separate trial. Mr. Skilling was found guilty of conspiracy,
securities fraud, making false statements and insider trading. Mr. Skilling was
acquitted of some other insider-trading counts.
Sentencing was set for September 11. Mr. Lay, 64 years old, faces a maximum
penalty of 45 years in prison in the main trial, and he could get from zero to six
months for each of the four separate bank charges; Mr. Skilling, 52, faces a maximum
penalty of 185 years in prison. However, sentencing experts say that the actual
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However, Kenneth Lay passed away shortly after the guilty verdicts
were handed down. 63 Now Skilling alone faces a long prison sentence. 64
sentences are likely to fall in the 12-to-25 year range.
The two are expected to seek reversals in the Fifth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
in New Orleans, which lawyers say is one of the more pro-government benches in the
nation. It also would likely be the last stop for Messrs. Skilling and Lay, since the
U.S. Supreme Court agrees to hear very few cases.

Id.; Greg Burns, Guilty: Why the Jury Didn’t Believe Lay and Skilling in Fraud Case,
CHI. TRIB., May 26, 2006, at C1
Lay’s charges carry a maximum penalty of 45 years in prison for the corporate trial
and 120 years in the personal banking trial . . . . Skilling’s charges carry a maximum
penalty of 185 years. Much discretion rests with U.S. District Judge Sim Lake, a nononsense jurist who has a history of imposing lengthy terms. The likely sentences
easily could stretch for two decades . . . .

Id.; Bethany McLean, The End of Ken Lay’s Quest, CNN MONEY, July 5, 2006,
available at http://money.cnn.com/2006/07/05/news/newsmakers/enron_blog_lay.
fortune/index.htm (“Both men [(Skilling and Lay)] were expected to serve at least
fifteen years in jail . . . .”); Carrie Johnson, Enron’s Lay, Skilling Face Uphill Battle on
Appeal, WASH. POST, May 27, 2006, at D1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/26/AR2006052601855.html?referrer=emailarticle
(discussing the difficulties of an appeal).
63. See Kurt Eichenwald, Enron Founder, Awaiting Prison, Dies In Colorado,
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2006, at A1 (“Kenneth L. Lay, who as founder of the Enron
Corporation rose to peaks of influence in business and politics, only to fall into disgrace
amid scandal, died early yesterday morning in Aspen, Colo., while awaiting a judge’s
sentencing this fall that could have sent him to prison for decades.”); see also Henry
Allen, Ken Lay’s Last Evasion; To Some, CEO Is Cheating Them One More Time,
WASH. POST, July 6, 2006, at C01 (“But now that he’s died of a heart attack in the
luxury of his Colorado getaway while awaiting sentencing for his crimes, none of his
victims will be able to contemplate that he’s locked away in a place that makes the
Baltimore Harbor Tunnel look like Hawaii . . . .”); Vikas Bajaj & Kurt Eichenwald,
Kenneth L. Lay, 64, Enron Founder and Symbol of Corporate Excess, N.Y. TIMES, July
6, 2006, at C7. The authors report that:
Mr. Lay’s sudden death—family and friends say he did not have a history of heart
disease—came six weeks after he was convicted of 10 charges of conspiracy, fraud
and lying to banks and almost four months before he was to be sentenced for those
crimes. He faced years in prison.

Id.; Editorial, Ken Lay’s Final Act, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2006, at A20; Kurt Eichenwald,
Enron Founder, Awaiting Prison, Dies In Colorado, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2006, at A1;
John R. Emshwiller et al., Lay’s Legacy: Corporate Change—But Not the Kind He
Expected, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2006, at A1; Ashby Jones & John R. Emshwiller,
Moving the Market: Quirk of U.S. Law Exonerates Lay, Possibly Hindering Asset
Seizure, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2006, at C23. Jones and Emshwiller report in the Wall
Street Journal that:
The rule, widely referred to as abatement ab initio, dictates that when a defendant dies
before he has the chance to appeal a conviction, the conviction essentially gets wiped
away. Everything “associated with the case is extinguished, leaving the defendant ‘as
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Seemingly moments after the guilty verdicts were read in Houston,
TX, corporate commentators and pundits immediately began writing and
prognosticating that the Enron guilty verdicts finally put to bed the last
remnants of the corporate scandals that ripped the U.S. capital markets
just five years ago. 65 Some even argued that Skilling and Lay
represented the last of the “bad apple” corporate executives who ran
if he had never been indicted or convicted,’” wrote the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in a 2004 opinion that is a recent articulation of the principle.

Id.; Thomas S. Mulligan & Miguel Bustillo, Death Puts Lay Conviction in Doubt; Since
the Enron Founder Can’t Appeal, Criminal Charges May Be Voided, L.A. TIMES, July
6, 2006, at 1; Reuters, Lay Autopsy Finds Severely Clogged Arteries, WALL ST. J., July
20, 2006, at A11; Simon Romero, A Verdict Interrupted, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2006, at
C1.
64. See Jones and Emshwiller, supra note 63 (“His death isn’t likely to have
tremendous impact on the remaining Enron criminal cases, including Mr. Skilling’s
upcoming sentencing, set for Oct. 23.”); see also; Alexei Barrionuevo, U.S. Wants ExEnron Chief To Pay Lay’s Share, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2006, at C3 (“Federal
prosecutors say Jeffrey K. Skilling, the former Enron chief executive, is liable not only
for his own ill-gotten gains but also for those of the late Kenneth L. Lay.”); Associated
Press, Ex-Enron President Pondered Suicide; Skilling Says Company’s Woes Made Him
Depressed, CBS NEWS, June 17, 2006 (describing how Skilling, then 52, suffered from
depression once he was charged with conspiracy, fraud, and insider trading); John R.
Emshwiller, Skilling Gets 24 Years in Prison, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2006, at C1 (“The
52-year-old Mr. Skilling didn’t show emotion as he stood with his lead attorney . . . in
court yesterday and received the 292-month sentence from Judge Sim Lake . . . .”);
Associated Press, Skilling Bound for Minnesota Prison; Enron’s Former CEO Will
Begin His Term Next Month. His Remaining Assets will Be Liquidated, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2006, at C3 (“The former executive will be eligible to shave as many as 54
days a year off his sentence for good behavior in prison. Skilling also will undergo
alcohol and mental-health counseling. Successful completion of that treatment would
reduce his sentence a year.”); Carrie Johnson, Skilling Gets 24 Years for Fraud, WASH.
POST, Oct. 24, 2006, at A01 (Skilling “was ordered to serve 24 years and four months in
prison . . . after an emotional court hearing in which he watched a series of former
employees blame him for the fraud at the heart of the company’s collapse.”).
65. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text; Associated Press, Guilty as
Charged; Lay, Skilling Convicted in Enron Collapse, supra note 56, at 3 (“‘The jury’s
verdicts help to close a notorious chapter in the history of America’s publicly traded
companies’ said Rep. Michael Oxley, (R-Ohio), co-author of the Sarbanes-Oxley
legislation. ‘Appeals aside, the end of the trial will mark the end of a dark era.’”);
Emshwiller, McWilliams & Davis, supra note 61, at A1 (“Its fall marked a dramatic
end to the stock-market boom and the beginning of a wave of corporate and regulatory
reforms, including the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley law.”); Allen Sloan, Laying Enron to Rest,
NEWSWEEK, Jun. 5, 2006, at 30 (“The convictions of Lay and Skilling write finis to that
delusional era. The convictions have a feeling of closure about them (even though you
never know what will happen on appeal.”).
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wild in the go-go 1990s. 66
While blaming the 2002 market crash on a few corporate
wrongdoers is enticing and simple, engaging in such a blame game is
dangerous. If U.S. investors and workers are convinced that guilty
verdicts in the WorldCom and Enron trials mark a successful conclusion
to the scandal investigations undertaken in the wake of the market
collapse, then careful examination into the myriad other causes and
reasons for the collapse will be ignored or undervalued. To wit,
Congressional passage of the Telecommunications Act must be
examined to determine what blame lay rightfully at the feet of Congress
and the telecom industry for the market crash of 2002, and what actions
Congress should or should not take to ensure that U.S. investors,
consumers, and employees are protected.
Perhaps even more dangerous than the attempt to pass off the
market crash as the work of a few corporate wrongdoers is the current
temperament at the Department of the Treasury and the SEC. New pleas
are emanating from SEC leadership and the Treasury Department calling
again for increased deregulation. 67 In November 2006, a committee of
66. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text; Not Just Bad Apples, supra note
25, at A20 (“In the wake of Enron’s bankruptcy, some argued that the problems of
corporate America were the work of a few bad apples.”); Editorial, Accounting
Scandals and Bankruptcies, NPR NEWS, July 23, 2002, available at
http://www.rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/dunnweb/rprnts.NPR.html (“We need to keep in
mind that we’re talking about a small number of more than 17,000 publicly traded U.S.
companies. We very much believe that it’s a few bad apples but one is too many.”);
Masters & Johnson, supra note 27, at D01. The Wall Street Journal reports:
The convictions of Enron founder Kenneth L. Lay and former chief executive Jeffrey
K. Skilling cap the Justice Department’s five-year battle to hold top executives
responsible for a flood of accounting fraud and corporate failures that undermined
investor confidence, put tens of thousands of people out of work and hit the savings of
millions of ordinary people.

Id.
67. See supra note 49 and accompanying text; see also Greg Ip, Kara Scannell, and
Deborah Soloman, Panel Urges Relaxing Rules For Oversight, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30,
2006, at C1. The Wall Street Journal reports:
The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation’s report, to be released publicly today,
is one of the most high-profile efforts to date to address concerns that excessive
regulation—much of it a response to recent corporate scandals—is adding to
corporate costs, stifling the public securities markets and causing the U.S. markets to
lose business to foreign competitors. . . . Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson is likely
to welcome the report; the former chief executive Goldman Sachs already is
advocating many of its recommendations and recently called for a broad reexamination of regulations and laws . . . . The report makes 32 recommendations, of
which six relate to easing the application of Section 404 of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley
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Wall Street insiders supported by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson
issued a voluminous report finding that capital formation is dwindling in
the United States because U.S. regulation is so stringent that
corporations are fleeing to foreign markets to raise capital. 68 This
Act governing internal company-financial controls.

Id.; Floyd Norris, Panel of Executives and Academics to Consider Regulation and
Competitiveness, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2006, at C3. The N.Y. Times reports:
A committee filled with business leaders and academics was created yesterday to
consider changes in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other laws and regulations governing
securities markets and companies, with the intention of improving competitiveness for
American markets . . . The group, called the Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation, has no official standing but the announcement of its creation included
praise from Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr., who said that the issue of
American competitiveness “is important to the future of the American economy and a
priority for me.”

Id.; David Reilly, Panel Seeks Cap on Liability Of Accounting Firms, WALL ST. J., Nov.
30, 2006, at C3. Reilly argues that:
Congress should consider curtailing the liability accounting firms face from auditing
public companies either by capping their potential courtroom damages or by creating
special protections for some auditing activities, according to a report due today from a
committee weighing the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets . . . . The report . . .
is also calling for U.S. authorities to curb contentious audit requirements related to
checks on companies’ internal controls as called for by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

Id.
68. See Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, supra
note 49. The committee report asserts that a growing number of companies are
choosing to raise capital in foreign markets in part because of higher U.S. regulatory
compliance costs:
The capital markets are important to the nation’s economic growth and the
creation of well-paying jobs, both across the country and in regional financial centers.
But the evidence presented here suggests that the United States is losing its leading
competitive position as compared to stock markets and financial centers abroad. A
key measure of competitiveness, one particularly relevant to the growth of new jobs,
is where new equity capital is being raised—that is, in which market initial public
offerings (IPOs) are being done. The trend in so-called “global” IPOs, i.e., IPOs done
outside a company’s home country, provides evidence of a decline in the U.S.
competitive position. As measured by the value of IPOS, the U.S. share declined
from 50 percent in 2000 to 5 percent in 2005. Measured by the number of IPOs, the
decline is from 37 percent in 2000 to 10 percent in 2005.
The loss of U.S. public market competitiveness compared to global public
markets results from a number of factors: foreign markets have closed the technology,
investor confidence, and liquidity gaps that traditionally favored U.S. markets;
significant pools of capital around the world have developed (more money is now
raised outside than inside the United States); and the ease with which investors can
invest abroad has increased. Even so, certainly one important factor contributing to
this growing trend is the growth of U.S. regulatory compliance costs and liability risks
compared to other developed and respected market centers.
Stated a bit differently, for much of the 60 years since the end of World War II,
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development necessitates, according to the Committee Report, a
stripping of the securities markets of even further regulation, beyond the
already dramatic deregulation perpetuated by the PSLRA. 69 Subsequent
reports indicate that the findings of the unofficial Committee Report are
overstated and politically motivated. 70
Without so much as
firms raising capital did not so much choose to come to the United States, they came
naturally. Today, the forces at work are increasingly different. Firms must choose to
come to the United States to raise capital: they do not have to come. U.S. financial
markets need to attract business that has a choice, and therefore how our markets are
regulated by rules and laws really does matter today.

Id. (emphasis in original); see also Editorial, Capital Flight, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2006,
at A8. Opining on the information contained within the interim report, the Wall Street
Journal notes:
Mr. Niemeier [Public Company Accounting Oversight Board member] also argued
that U.S. capital costs are lower than elsewhere in the world, implying that investors
are still willing to pay a premium for companies that subject themselves to U.S.
regulations. And U.S. capital costs are lower than elsewhere. But as the new report
documents, that premium has been shrinking. What’s more, it’s been shrinking faster
vis-à-vis other developed countries—such as Japan and the U.K.—than it has against
developing-world markets. This suggests that it is stiff competition from relatively
well-regulated markets, not from shifty, nontransparent Third World markets, that is
taking the biggest toll. This could mean that overseas regulation is improving, not
that U.S. regulation is getting more onerous. But even if this were the case, it would
not change the main point: Global capital markets are becoming more competitive,
and the U.S. is now more likely to be punished for over-regulation than it was in the
past.

Id.
69. See supra notes 13, 23, 30, 33-35, 38 and accompanying text; see also Floyd
Norris, Winds Blow for Rollback of Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2006, at C1
(“[M]any business leaders are hopeful that at least some of what they see as post-Enron
excesses can be rolled back, with a battle cry of making America more competitive.”).
Norris reports that U.S. “[c]ompanies complain that auditors spend too much money
and time auditing internal controls. Wall Street argues that it is such rules—and not
higher investment banking or listing fees—that keep foreign stocks from listing in New
York.” Id.
70. See Jenny Anderson, Sharply Divided Reactions to Report on U.S. Markets,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2006, at C8. Anderson reports:
Response to the report fell along predictable lines: state regulators and consumer
advocates characterized the report as a one-sided attempt to roll back regulation at a
time when corporate scandals like the backdating of stock options abound, while probusiness groups either praised the findings or suggested that they did not go far
enough.

Id.; see also Greg Farrell, Group: Sarbanes-Oxley Needs to Loosen up; Today’s Plea to
Focus on USA’s Ability to Compete, USA TODAY, Nov. 30, 2006, at 1B (“Jack Coffee,
an expert in securities law at Columbia who consulted on the project, doesn’t think
over-regulation has scared away foreign issuers. Instead, he says, the threat of getting
sued in U.S. courts is more of a concern.”); Carrie Johnson, Report on Corporate Rules
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acknowledging the academic literature criticizing the deregulation and
problems perpetuated by the PSLRA, corporate insiders 71 are once
again 72 loudly demanding governmental “assistance.” 73
As the Committee Report drew support and criticism, the SEC and
Department of Justice quietly filed an amicus brief in a pending
securities class action lawsuit urging the adoption of an even stricter
pleading standard for securities fraud complaints than was adopted in the
PSLRA. 74
Commissioner Cox, citing “fraudulent lawsuits” and
Is Assailed; Panel’s Business Ties Spark Outcry, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2006, at D01
(“SEC commissioner Roel Campos, a Democrat, warned yesterday that rolling back a
system of regulation that has protected U.S. investors for decades could have profound
and costly consequences if it went too far.”); Jonathan Peterson, Market Panel Issues
Call for Relaxing Rules; Post-Enron Regulation Has Hurt Competitiveness of U.S.
Firms, a Business and Academic Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2006, at C1 (“The
combination of developments has become a concern for shareholder-rights activists
who have applauded an array of post-Enron measures and until now have been able to
rely on bipartisan congressional support to uphold them.”).
71. See Andrew Stoltmann, We Risk Another Enron if Investor Protections Are
Removed: The Proposals Would Invite Future Corporate Implosions, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Dec. 25, 2006, at 27 (reporting on the Interim Committee members’ Wall Street insider
status). Stoltmann indicates that:
As for the committee, it consists of 22 corporate chieftains, including the chief legal
officer of a brokerage firm, the head of a hedge fund, the CEO of an accounting firm,
and the former chairman and CEO of the NASD. This lineup of industry insiders,
touted as disinterested and objective, deserves serious scrutiny. Barbara Roper,
director of investor protection at the Consumer Federation of America, accurately
asserted that the committee preordained its conclusions and carefully selected
statistics to make its case that more companies were listing their stocks on foreign
markets because of burdensome U.S. rules.

Id.; see also Deborah Soloman and Kara Scannell, Financial-Rule Overhaul Hits a
Nerve, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2006, at C3 (detailing the political funding of the Interim
Committee). The Wall Street Journal reports:
The committee was financed with about $500,000 from the Starr Foundation, a
wealthy nonprofit chaired by Maurice R. ‘Hank’ Greenberg, former chairman of
American International Group Inc. Mr. Greenberg resigned from AIG amid a state
and federal investigation into improper accounting at the insurance giant. . . . Another
initial contribution of about $500,000 came from Wilbur Ross, a private investor who
is also a committee member, and Kenneth Griffin, who heads Citadel Investment
Group LLC, a large hedge-fund group. Mr. Ross, who has made a fortune buying
distressed businesses on the cheap, restructuring them and then selling the companies
off at a premium, said he decided to back the committee because he believes some
regulation has gone too far and he wanted to help spark debate.

Id.
72.
73.
74.

See cummings, supra note 4, at 1033-40.
See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
See supra note 47; see also Associated Press, SEC Backs Raising Bar in
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“professional plaintiffs,” argues that the Seventh Circuit should adopt
the strictest possible pleading standard making it more difficult for a
plaintiff to survive summary judgment in a class action securities fraud
case. 75 Cox’s argument mirrors identically the same argument posited
during legislative debate when the PSLRA was being contemplated and
ultimately passed. 76
Apparently, despite strong evidence to the
contrary, 77 corporations in the U.S. are still being unacceptably
tormented by “strike suits” and “professional plaintiffs” and cannot
survive in the current regulatory environment. 78 While securities class
action lawsuits have decreased significantly in recent years, due
arguably in part to the PSLRA, Cox, Paulson and CEOs nationwide
continue to agitate for a less regulated market. 79 In light of significant

Shareholder Suits, NEWSDAY, Feb. 14, 2007. Newsday reported that:
The SEC filed a brief last Friday in a case before the Supreme Court . . . supporting
the adoption of more stringent legal hurdles for shareholders to win in litigation
alleging securities fraud and seeking damages from companies and executives. . . .
The SEC’s brief in the case refutes a January 2006 ruling by a federal appeals court,
maintaining that it set the legal bar too low for the investors in terms of demonstrating
the company’s intent to violate securities laws.

Id.; Peterson, supra note 37, at 1 (“The SEC early this month filed a brief in a Supreme
Court case arguing that a stricter standard should have been used to decide whether a
manufacturer of fiber-optic equipment had knowingly broken the law . . . .”). Peterson
states that:
The SEC and the Justice Department submitted their brief in a Supreme Court case
. . . . The agencies said the 1995 law required a ‘strong inference’ that the defendant
company knowingly intended to break securities laws and deceive shareholders, rather
than the weaker test that ‘a reasonable person could infer’ that executives had such an
intent. . . . Under the higher threshold supported by the SEC, judges have broad
latitude to consider matters that exonerate the defendant company, lawyers said.

Id.
75. See supra note 47 and accompanying text; see also Labaton, supra note 46, at
C1 (noting that after the SEC filed a brief in a Seventh Circuit securities fraud case and
after the agency’s chief accountant told a conference that the SEC was considering
ways to shield accounting firms from large damage awards, “Christopher Cox, the
chairman of the [SEC], said . . . that both efforts were in the best interests of investors
because they aimed at preventing the accounting industry from further consolidation
and at limiting what he called ‘fraudulent lawsuits,’ including some he said were filed
by ‘professional plaintiffs’”).
76. See Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. On Securities of the Senate Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
103d Cong. 104-05 (1993).
77. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
78. See Grundfest, supra note 37.
79. See supra notes 47, 74; see also Peter Lattman, As the Regulatory Pendulum
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studies suggesting otherwise, this Congress may yet again debate the
merits of further deregulation. Indeed, arguments abound that the
corporate corruption of the early 2000s is at an end, case and chapter
closed. This is dangerous terrain. Dangerous because the last time that
corporate interests, lobbyists and Wall Street insiders called upon
Congress to deregulate, the resulting legislation was the PSLRA, the
Telecommunications Act, SLUSA and the CFMA. As will be unpacked
below, both the CFMA and the Telecommunications Act, enacted in
response to the deregulatory call, led to consumer injury, industry
concentration, higher rates, investor damage, emboldened corporate
malfeasants and deregulated industries in shambles.
III. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996
According to Congress, the 1996 Telecommunications Act was
enacted “[t]o promote competition and reduce regulation in order to
secure lower prices and higher quality services for American
telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of
new telecommunications technologies.” 80 In an effort to stimulate
Swings . . ., The Wall Street Journal Online, WSJ.com, available at http://blogs.wsj.
com/law/2007/03/01/as-the-regulatory-pendulum-swings-2/ (last visited on March 8,
2007). Observing SEC Chairman Cox’s recent anti-regulatory agitations, Lattman
reports:
Investor advocates and some securities law experts point to several Cox
initiatives that indicate a more pro-business stance: (1) his not pushing for tighter
regulation of hedge funds; (2) urging the Supreme Court to adopt a tougher
standard for investors in lawsuits; and (3) his decision to appear at the Chamber
of Commerce in two weeks just as it is to issue a report criticizing the Bush
administration and the SEC for being too hard on companies.
Id. (emphasis in original).
80. See 142 CONG. REC. S.652 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1996). The actual language of the
statute promotes the Telecommunications Act, as enacted in 1934, as a tool
promulgated:
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by
wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the
United States, without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national
origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio
communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for the purpose
of the national defense, for the purpose of promoting safety of life and property
through the use of wire and radio communications, and for the purpose of securing a
more effective execution of this policy by centralizing authority heretofore granted by
law to several agencies and by granting additional authority with respect to interstate
and foreign commerce in wire and radio communication, there is created a
commission to be known as the ‘Federal Communications Commission’, which shall
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competition in the telecommunication services sector, the Act ended
restrictions on the Bell companies: permitting entry into the longdistance, manufacturing and entertainment-video distribution businesses,
deregulating the cable television industry, freeing cable television from
severe price controls, and deregulating the telecom industry to such a
degree that any company would be able to compete freely.81
“The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was the first major overhaul
of communications legislation in the U.S. since the passage of the
Communications Act of 1934.” 82 At its core, Congress’s vision for the
1996 Act was “to provide for a pro-competitive, deregulatory national
policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector
deployment of advanced telecommunications and information
technologies and services to all Americans by opening all
telecommunications markets to competition.” 83
Of course, the
motivation for the new provisions of the Act was deregulation. 84 The
Telecommunications Act was established to encourage low rates for
consumers and to promote “creativity and innovation in the industry.
The new telecommunications law abandons virtually all of the federal
regulations that have traditionally defined and directed activity in the
communications industry.” 85
Congressional statements “made in support of the 1996 Act very
much mirrored the deregulatory rhetoric preceding the trucking, air, and
be constituted as hereinafter provided, and which shall execute and enforce the
provisions of this chapter.

47 U.S.C. § 151 (2002).
81. See Lawrence Gasman, Regulation: The Telecommunications Act of 1996, THE
CATO REVIEW OF BUS. AND GOV., available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/
reg19n3d.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2007) (“Of course the act was more than due for an
overhaul. In 1934 there was no television, telephones were scarce, and technological
wonders such as the World Wide Web had not been dreamed of by even the most
speculative science fiction writers.”).
82. Johannes M. Bauer et al., The State of Telecom: Realities, Regulation,
Restructuring, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REV. 531, 531-32 (2003).
83. Id. at 539; see also Nicholas Economides, The Telecommunications Act and Its
Impact, N.Y.U. Center for Law and Business 2 (1998), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=81289.
84. See Catherine Cook, Legislative Summary: The Telecommunications Act of
1996, 6 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & Pol’y 237 (1996).
85. Id. at 237 (“Specifically, the Act provides ‘that the Commission shall forbear
from applying any regulation or any provision of this Act to a telecommunications
carrier or telecommunication service’ so long as the activity is just and reasonable, the
consumer is protected and the public interest is maintained.”) (citing § 401 (a)(1)(2)(3)).
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railroad statutes, and Congress drew explicitly on these precedents and
on the earlier development of competition in long-distance.” 86 The
House Report declared that the bill “promotes competition and reduces
regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for
American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid
development of new telecommunications technologies.” 87
Since its inception, the Telecommunications Act has drawn
significant academic attention both in infancy 88 and in recent years.89
86. See James B. Speta, Deregulating Telecommunications in Internet Time, 61
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1063, 1091 (2004).
87. See id. at 1091 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-204, at 47 (1996), as reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 11).
88. See generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996,
29 CONN. L. REV. 123 (1996); see also Thomas W. Hazlett, Explaining the
Telecommunications Act of 1996: Comment on Thomas G. Krattenaker, 29 CONN. L.
REV. 217 (1996); Michael I. Meyerson, Ideas of a Marketplace: A Guide to the 1996
Telecommunications Act, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 251 (1997); John D. Podesta, Unplanned
Obsolescence: The Telecommunications Act of 1996 Meets the Internet, 45 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1093 (1996); Charles Bierbauer, How Will the Telecommunications Bill and the
Information Superhighway Affect America?, 41 S.D. L. REV. 502 (1996); Kenneth L.
Parker & Tania A. Hricik, A Selected Bibliography on the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 771 (1997).
89. See generally Speta, supra note 86, at 1091; J. Gregory Sidak, The Failure of
Good Intentions: The WorldCom Fraud and the Collapse of American
Telecommunications After Deregulation, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 207 (2003); Michael T.
Osborne, The Unfinished Business of Breaking Up “Ma Bell:” Implementing Local
Telephone Competition in the Twenty-First Century, 7 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 4 (2000);
Richard D. Cudahy, Whither Deregulation: A Look at the Portents, 58 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 155 (2001); Reza Dibadj, Competitive Debacle in Local Telephony: Is the
1996 Telecommunications Act to Blame?, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (2003); Jim Chen,
Standing in the Shadows of Giants: The Role of Intergenerational Equity in
Telecommunications Reform, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 921 (2000); Mark C. Bannister,
Virginia Cellular and Highland Cellular: The FCC Establishes a Framework for
Eligible Telecommunications Carrier Designation in Rural Study Areas, 57 FED.
COMM. L.J. 511 (2005); Ray G. Besing, The Intersection of Sherman Act Section 2 and
the Telecommunications Act of 1996: What Should Congress Do?, 13 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 1 (2005); Kyle D. Dixon & Philip J. Weiser, Digital Age Communications
Law Reform: A Digital Age Communications Act Paradigm for Federal-State Relations,
4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 321 (2006); Nicholas Economides, Vertical
Leverage and the Sacrifice Principle: Why the Supeme Court Got Trinko Wrong, 61
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 379 (2005); Jerry Ellig, Costs and Consequences of Federal
Telecommunications Regulations, 58 Fed. Comm. L.J. 37 (2006); Jerry Ellig & James
Nicholas Taylor, What Did the Unbundled Network Element Platform Cost?, 14
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1 (2005); Douglas C. Sicker, The End of Federalism in
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Since 1996, legal academics, politicians and other commentators have
debated whether the Telecommunications Act would be successful in
spurring competition, and whether deregulating the telecom industry
would prove ultimately successful. 90 Wildly divergent views debating
whether the Telecommunications Act has in fact been an abject failure 91
or mildly successful with the potential for some upcoming success have
been forwarded and printed in recent years. 92 Perhaps most famously,
the U.S. Supreme Court weighed in on the disappointing side by writing
the following about the Telecommunications Act:

Telecommunication Regulations?, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 130 (2005); Henry
E. Smith, Governing the Tele-Semicommons, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 289 (2005); Rachel
M. Stilwell, Which Public? Whose Interest? How the FCC’s Deregulation of Radio
Station Ownership Has Harmed the Public Interest, and How We Can Escape from the
Swamp, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 369 (2005/2006); Ross Wecker, The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Internet: Reciprocal Compensation or
Irreconcilable Compensation?, 6 J. HIGH TECH. L. 291 (2006).
90. See supra notes 88-89.
91. See Stephen Labaton, Phone Start-Ups Win the Latest Round in Court, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 2002, at C1. Labaton explains in the New York Times that:
While experts agree that the telecommunications act has failed to fulfill its promise of
leading to more vibrant and competitive markets, there is widespread disagreement as
to the causes. Some have attributed the failure to the problems of the law and the way
it has been applied. Critics have also said it has promoted a wave of corporate
consolidation that is anticompetitive. And some have attributed the failure of
deregulation to the regional Bell companies, which have moved slowly in opening
their markets and repeatedly challenged provisions and regulations and created a
climate that has discouraged greater investment by challengers.

Id.; see also Seth Schiesel, At F.C.C. Confirmation Hearings, Emphasis Will Be on
Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1997, at D1 (“The telecommunications reform act
has been over-all a failure . . . . ‘We’ve got rising cable rates, rising long-distance rates,
mergers instead of competition, failure of parts of the telecommunications industry to
get into others.’”) (statement by Senator John McCain).
92. See Dibadj, supra note 89, at 54-55 (claiming that the failures in the
Telecommunications Act have come because of poor FCC rulemaking rather than
Congressional ambiguity or short-sightedness); see also Speta, supra note 86, at 1108
(“Lest I be thought too harsh on Congress, let me be clear that there is much that is
good in the 1996 Act, and indeed, some features of the Act do advance intermodal
competition.”); T. Randolph Beard, et. al., Pursuing Competition in Local Telephony:
The Law and Economics of Unbundling and Impairment, Telepolicy Working Paper,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=422525 (“The Telecommunications Act of 1996 is
an ingenious piece of legislation, incorporating specific mandates that address the
underlying economics of the local exchange market into its pro-competition framework
for the purpose of ‘uprooting the monopolies’ presently serving that market.”) (citations
omitted).
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It would be gross understatement to say that the 1996 Act is not a
model of clarity. It is in many important respects a model of
ambiguity or indeed even self-contradiction.
That is most
unfortunate for a piece of legislation that profoundly affects a crucial
93
segment of the economy worth tens of billions of dollars.

Despite the academic and pundit debate that continues to simmer
regarding the propriety and value of the Telecommunications Act, one
point seems beyond debate: the Telecommunications Act led to a
destabilized industry, enabling a precarious bubble to form and then
implode, causing severe injury to investors and employees alike. 94
Whatever intent Congress had in proudly passing the
Telecommunications Act swiftly on the heels of the PSLRA, the
outcome of this legislative enactment has been controversial and
damaging. 95
While the Revolution Congress’s leadership must have been
energized by previous PSLRA deregulation opponents President Clinton
and Vice President Gore joining them in supporting passage of the
Telecommunications Act, none seemed able to foresee the demoralizing
consequences passage would bring:
Before the ink was even dry on the Telecommunications Act of
1996, a telecom bubble larger than that of its dot-com sister was
quickly beginning to form. With the deregulation of the telecom

93.
94.

AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999).
See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text; see also Dionne Searcey &
Peter Lattman, Ex-Telecom CEO Fields ‘Black Box’ Trial Defense, WALL ST. J., March
16, 2007, at A1 (detailing the ongoing insider trading case against former Qwest CEO
Joseph Nacchio). The Wall Street Journal describes:
Qwest sprang up in the mid-1990s formed by railroad magnate Philip Anschutz, who
in 1997 put Mr. Nacchio in place as CEO to take the business public. Qwest soon
took over a Baby Bell, US West, and set out to build a fiber-optic network to carry
Internet traffic world-wide. But many others had the same idea, spending billions to
string fiber, and when demand didn’t match their dreams, the telecom bubble burst
and start-ups hit hard times.
Amid their woes, they sometimes pumped up revenue by swapping fiber-optic
capacity and interpreting accounting rules so they could recognize revenue for the
capacity they swapped. Amid exposure of this maneuver and the general telecom
slump, Qwest nearly slipped into bankruptcy court. Mr. Nacchio resigned in 2002 and
the next year Qwest restated two years of results, eliminating $2.48 billion of revenue
for 2000 and 2001.

Id. at A10; infra Part III.A-B.
95. See supra notes 10, 89, 91 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 96-99,
132 and accompanying text.
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industry finally complete, the race was on; and what ensued was
nothing less than a financial hit and run, which left the
telecommunications industry in shambles and investors broke—but
made the broadbandits who led this charge rich beyond their wildest
96
dreams.

Indeed, what ensued was not the competition that proponents had
trumpeted, but the creation of an environment ripe for fraud: an
environment that generated a powerful temptation for entrepreneurs to
create telecommunication companies that would rise and fall with little
consumer interest, flush with the fraudulently-induced cash of investors
duped by projections containing no real value. 97 Passage of the
Telecommunications Act enabled the rise and calamitous falls of
WorldCom, Adelphia, and Global Crossing, amongst dozens of others.
It can now be said that the birthday of the telecom bubble was
February 8, 1996. On that day, with the stroke of a pen, President
Bill Clinton turned the normally staid world of telecommunications
into the Wild West. The new Telecommunications Act—the
handiwork of, among others, a Democratic vice president, Al Gore,
96. OM MALIK, BROADBANDITS: INSIDE THE $750 BILLION TELECOM HEIST (2003).
Om Malik, in Broadbandits, exposes the causes and motivations behind the 2002
collapse of the telecom industry, and describes the net effect of the collapse as
precipitated by the Telecommunications Act:
Poof—$750 billion gone! With over 100 companies bankrupt and an equal number
that have shut shop, as many as 600,000 telecom workers are now without a
paycheck. WorldCom is bankrupt, Global Crossing is decimated, PSINet has been
sold for peanuts, and Genuity, a company as old as the Internet, sold its assets for a
mere $250 million, a fraction of its one time worth. These are the staggering numbers
for an industry that accounts for a sixth of the U.S. economy.

Id. at ix.
97. See Sidak, supra note 89, at 227-33 (describing WorldCom’s breathtaking
deceit in misleading investors, government regulators and competitors by fraudulently
projecting massive growth in connection with future fiber-optic capacity needs).
Professor Sidak reports that “WorldCom’s claim that Internet traffic was doubling every
one hundred days misled government officials and the business press” so much so that
competitors such as Qwest, Global Crossing, Sprint and eventually even Enron
redoubled efforts to build up fiber-optic networks to supply expected demand. Id. at
228; see also infra notes 200, 262 (indicating sources detailing Enron’s eventual
entrance into telecommunications fiber-optic network capacity competition); see
generally MALIK, supra note 96, at xii-xiv, 10-16, 18-22, 27-30, 51-61, 132-36, 164-71,
173-77, 179-80 (describing creation of an environment that caused CEOs, CFOs,
analysts, bankers, lawyers and the media to create, empower, report and engage in
fraudulent valuations and potential earnings of worthless companies, thereby duping the
U.S. investing public).
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and a Republican house speaker, Newt Gingrich—promised to
unleash competition in the erstwhile closed phone industry, help
create new phone companies, and create a world in which high-speed
98
Internet access would be a norm, not an anomaly.

These promised benefits never fully materialized. 99 But an
implosion of the telecom industry can be identified as one byproduct of
the Telecommunications Act.
A. How the Telecommunications Act Changed the Industry
The Telecommunications Act abolished many of the cross-market
barriers that had prohibited dominant telecom players from one
communications industry, such as cable, from providing services in
other industry sectors, such as telephone. 100 The Act made “sweeping”
changes to the previous federal regulatory scheme of the telephone
industry. Most notably, the Act lifted restrictions on the regional Bells,
thus allowing each to begin to offer long-distance telephone service for
the first time since the break up of AT&T. 101 Further, the Act allowed
long-distance companies and cable operators to provide local exchange
98.
99.

MALIK, supra note 96, at 163-64.
See Jim Chen, The Echoes of Forgotten Footfalls: Telecommunications
Mergers at the Dawn of the Digital Millennium, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1311, 1316 (2007)
(“A decade after comprehensive legislative reform of telecommunications, all three
significant segments of the industry are highly concentrated.”); see also Nicholas
Economides, Telecommunications Regulation: An Introduction, NET INSTITUTE, THE
NETWORKS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS INSTITUTE Working
Paper No. 04-20, at 31-35 (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=465020
(describing the failure of the Telecommunications Act to spur competition and instead
leading to a frenzy of merger activity); see U.S. Policy: Telecommunications Act of
1996, The Museum of Broadcast Communications (on file with author); MALIK, supra
note 96, at x-xv, 116, 164, 176-79.
100. See U.S. Policy: Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 99, at 2.
Proponents of the new Telecommunications Act trumpeted that:
New mergers and acquisitions, consolidations and integration of services previously
barred under FCC rules, antitrust provisions of federal law, and the ‘Modified Final
Judgment,’ the ruling governing the 1984 ‘break-up’ of the AT&T telephone
monopoly, will be allowed for the first time, illustrating the belief by Congress that
competition should replace other regulatory schemes as we enter a new century.

Id. This proved to be a tragic belief.
101. See id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 271(b)(2) (2000) (“(2) Out-of-region services: A
Bell operating company, or any affiliate of that Bell operating company, may provide
interLATA services originating outside its in-region States after February 8, 1996,
subject to subsection (j) of this section.”).
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services in direct competition with the regional Bell operating
companies. 102 The Act decisively preempted all regulations in the
Telecommunications Act of 1934 (and subsequent amendments) that
restricted or limited competition in telephone services for long-distance
and local services. 103
In order for the regional Bells to qualify to provide long-distance
service outside its regional areas, they had to implement a series of
reforms that were designed to open competition in the local areas. 104
Also, local exchange carriers (“LEC’s”) had to interconnect new
telecom service providers and “unbundle” their networks to provide
access by other carriers seeking to gain entry into the local exchange
market. 105
LEC’s, when unbundling to open competition, were
mandated to provide number portability, essentially allowing its
customers to maintain their telephone numbers when switching to a
different local provider. 106 The regional telephone companies were
allowed to enter the telephone equipment manufacturing market, but
only after the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) approved
the company as a provider of long-distance services. 107
The Telecommunication Act, in the context of telephone services,
acted to eliminate barriers that had been in place since 1934—barriers
that prohibited companies in one telecom industry, like telephone, from
providing services in another industry, like cable. 108
Mergers,
acquisitions, consolidations and integrations, carefully prohibited prior

102.
103.

See generally U.S. Policy: Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 99.
See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000) (“§ 253. Removal of barriers to entry. (a) In
general. No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal
requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to
provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.”).
104. See U.S. Policy: Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 99. In order to
break up the regional Bell’s stranglehold on local telephony, the Telecommunications
Act removed all barriers that prohibited the Bell’s from entering long distance
telephony. See id. To incentivize this transition, Congress mandated that local service
carriers open or “unbundle” their lines allowing lease of those lines to competitors
hoping to enter local competition. Once unbundled to the FCC’s satisfaction, the local
carriers could enter long distance competition. Id. Thus, Congress and the FCC hoped
to spur competition by removing barriers but at the same time maintaining some
regulatory control over how and when such competition could be entered.
105. See id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
106. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(2) (2000).
107. See U.S. Policy: Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 99.
108. See id.
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to passage of the Telecommunications Act, were now freely available
under the justification that competition would replace government
regulation. 109 Thereafter, a wild merging, acquiring, and consolidating
spree of integrating and combining was entered into by most major
telecommunication giants as well as those that aspired to such status,
and the industry caved in upon itself, as described below. 110
The Telecommunications Act also dramatically changed rate
structures and oversight in connection with the cable television industry,
in an attempt to provide new opportunities and flexibility, as well as new
competition for cable service providers. 111 The Telecommunications
Act mandated that uniform rate structures for cable operators would no
longer be required once effective competition had arrived from other
109.
110.

Id.; see also Chen, supra note 99, at 1318, 1322, 1357.
See Chen, supra note 99, at 1313 (describing the merger flurry following
enactment of the Telecommunications Act). Professor Chen, describing the whirlwind
of merger activity in the telecom industry following enactment of the
Telecommunications Act, quotes Senator John McCain:
In announcing 1999 hearings on “why the Act has promoted mergers instead of
competition,” Senator John McCain treated the record of telecommunications mergers
as conclusive evidence of the Act’s failure: “The 1996 Telecommunications Act has
failed miserably and has left us with results that are the exact opposite of what was
intended . . . . Rather than promoting competition in the industry, the Act has led to a
flood of megamergers.

Id.; see also infra Part III.B. In his book Broadbandits, Malik describes the preimplosion build up of the telephone industry as follows:
In 1996, telecommunications was the new Wild West, thanks to a booming stock
market and a series of coincidences.
The Telecommunication [sic] Act of 1996 had just been approved. It was a
million-word-long piece of legislation that promised to unleash competition in the
once-closed telephone industry and helped create new AT&Ts. This would result in
an excess of bandwidth, where high-speed Internet access would be the norm, not an
anomaly. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) wanted to break the
chokehold of the Baby Bells on the local market. Deregulation provided new
opportunities for entrepreneurs—and so did the Internet.

MALIK, supra note 96, at xii. Despite this brave new telecom world, deregulation and
the leaders of the major telecom companies at the time of the 1996 deregulation
marched the industry straight into its now historic melt down:
In stark contrast to the dot-com bust and the implosion of Enron, which
unraveled with alarming speed, the disaster in the telecommunications industry
arrived stealthily. What seemed like an endless demand for bigger and faster
networks created a buildup of excessive proportions and a glut of capacity, the result
being 600,000 jobs eventually evaporating into thin air. All this from an industry that
at one point had a value of $2 trillion!

MALIK at x.
111. See U.S. Policy: Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 99, at 4.
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service providers, such as the telephone company, multi-channel video,
direct broadcast satellites and wireless cable systems. 112 Further, state
and local franchise authorities were barred under the
Telecommunications Act from “setting technical standards, or placing
specific requirements on customer premise equipment and transmissions
equipment.” 113
Congress attempted to “spur competition” between LEC’s and
cable operators by providing incentives for cable operators to compete
with local telecommunications companies. 114 “Under the act, cable
systems operators are not required to obtain additional franchise
approval for offering telecommunications services.” 115 These efforts to
deregulate the cable television industry and motivate competition within
the local telephone industry have failed spectacularly. 116

112.
113.

See id. at 5; see also 47 U.S.C. § 543(a) (2000).
See U.S. Policy: Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 99, at 5.
(“Common carriers and other operators that utilize radio communications to provide
video programming will not be regulated under cable rules if the services are provided
under a common carriage scheme.”).
114. See id. at 5; see also 47 U.S.C. § 572 (2000).
115. U.S. Policy: Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 99, at 5.
116. See cummings, supra note 4, at Part IV.B.; see also Lessons from 1996
Telecommunications Act:
Deregulation Before Meaningful Competition Spells
Consumer Disaster, Consumers Union: Publisher of Consumer Reports, Feb. 2001,
available at http://www.consumersunion.org/telecom/lessonsdc201.htm [hereinafter
Lessons from the 1996 Telecommunications Act]. The publisher of Consumer Reports
stated that:
[i]t is evident that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 has failed to produce the
consumer benefits policy makers promised because competition has failed to take
hold across the communications industry. The Act’s failure is not because, as some
have suggested, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was overly
regulatory in seeking to create conditions ripe for competition. The fundamental
problem is that the huge companies that dominate the telephone and cable TV
industries prefer mergers and acquisition to competition. They have refused to open
their markets by dragging their feet in allowing competitors to interconnect, refusing
to negotiate in good faith, litigating every nook and cranny of the law, and avoiding
head-to-head competition like the plague.

Lessons from 1996 Telecommunications Act at 1; Jim Chen, The Magnificent Seven:
American Telephony’s Deregulatory Shootout, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1503, 1521 (1999).
The most vociferous critics of telecommunications deregulation argue that the Act has
produced nothing but a cascade of megamergers. . . . Implicit in this cry is the
assumption that the telecommunications mergers that have occurred since 1996 have
done little or nothing to reduce prices, spur innovation, or otherwise enhance
consumer welfare.

Id.; supra notes 99, 110 and accompanying text.
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The Telecommunications Act also sought to provide broadcasters
with substantial regulatory relief by incorporating numerous changes to
the rules dealing with radio and television ownership.117
The
Telecommunications Act also lifted broadcast ownership limits on
television stations, whereby group owners were empowered to purchase
television stations with a maximum service area cap of 35 percent of the
U.S. population as compared to the previous cap of 25 percent. 118
Limits on the number of radio stations that may be commonly owned
were lifted completely, although restrictions remained on the number of
licenses that may be owned within specific markets or geographical
areas. 119 The loosening of ownership limits on television and radio
stations, and new rules regarding station affiliations and cross
ownership, have proven to be highly controversial since the inception of
the Telecommunications Act. 120
117. See 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2000); see also U.S. Policy: Telecommunications Act of
1996, supra note 99, at 2 (“Notably broadcasters have substantial regulatory relief from
old and sometimes outmoded federal restrictions on station ownership requirements.”).
118. See 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2000).
119. See U.S. Policy: Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 99, at 2.
120. See Critics Want New Media Rules Delayed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2003,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/ap-media-ownership.html
(“Critics of new broadcast ownership rules said the Federal Communications
Commission should have studied how stations can best serve their local communities
before allowing companies to buy more radio and television stations.”) (emphasis
added). Responding to former FCC Chairman Michael Powell’s initiative aimed at
ensuring broadcasters serve the communities in which they operate, Senator Byron
Dorgan, D. North Dakota, claimed: “It’s a curious approach to pass a rule that’s going
to allow much more concentration in broadcasting and then decide the effect this will
have on the localism . . . . It’s a classic case of putting the cart before the horse.” Id.
Recent evidence has shown that greater concentrations of media ownership hurts local
stations and television new coverage. See John Dunbar, Lawyer Says FCC Ordered
Study Destroyed, FREEPRESS, Sept. 14, 2006, available at http://www.
freepress.net/news/17682. According to several sources, the FCC sought to hide these
findings from the public. See id. Freepress reports:
The Federal Communications Commission ordered its staff to destroy all copies of a
draft study that suggested greater concentration of media ownership would hurt local
TV news coverage, a former lawyer at the agency says . . . . In a letter sent to [FCC
Chairman Kevin] Martin Wednesday, [Sen. Barbara] Boxer said she was “dismayed
that this report, which was done at taxpayer expense more than two years ago, and
which concluded that localism is beneficial to the public, was shoved in a
drawer” . . . . The report, written by two economists in the FCC’s Media Bureau,
analyzed a database of 4,078 individual news stories broadcast in 1998 . . . . The
analysis showed local ownership of television stations adds almost five and one-half
minutes of total news to broadcasts and more than three minutes of “on-location”
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With respect to radio and television broadcasting ownership rights,
the Telecommunications Act allowed broadcasters to own cable
television systems for the first time in the long regulation of the telecom
industry. 121 However, television licensees were still prohibited from
owning newspapers in those same markets. 122 Although radio and
television broadcasters won new freedoms with the Telecommunications
Act regarding licensing and ownership, the broadcasters were also
required to develop a ratings system to classify violent, sexual and
indecent or other objectionable material in programming. 123 The
Telecommunications Act originally included Title V, called the
Communications Decency Act of 1996; however, this portion of the
Telecommunications Act was eventually deemed unconstitutional. 124
Nevertheless, some members of the broadcast industry voluntarily
developed and implemented a ratings system. 125
The
Telecommunications Act, in an effort to shield objectionable material
from minors, required that all televisions larger than thirteen inches have
a V-chip installed in them, such V-chip being programmable to block

news. The conclusion is at odds with FCC arguments made when it voted in 2003 to
increase the number of television stations a company could own in a single market. It
was part of a broader decision liberalizing ownership rules.

Id.; see also Stilwell, supra note 89, at 369. Stilwell argues:
The Federal Communication Commission’s (“FCC”) laissez-faire policies toward
deregulation of radio station ownership have led to oligopolistic control over radio
since 1996. In turn, consolidated corporate radio has paved the way for payola-like
practices, killed off local programming, stifled viewpoint and programming diversity,
and on occasion, endangered public safety. The current law governing these issues
remains in disarray.

Id.
While this particular debate over broadcast ownership rights and the
appropriateness of the Telecommunications Act’s deregulation of Radio and Television
broadcasting, coupled with the appropriateness of new FCC rules dealing with Radio
and Television broadcasting ownership rights, is as divisive as ever, analysis of such is
beyond the scope of this Article.
121. See U.S. Policy: Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 99, at 3 (“The act
affirms the continuation of local marketing agreements (LMAs) and waives the
previous restrictions on common control of radio and television stations in the top fifty
markets, the one-to-a-market rule.”).
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 501
(repealed 1997); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (finding the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 unconstitutional).
125. See U.S. Policy: Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 99, at 3.
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broadcasts that include inappropriate material. 126
In connection with Internet and online computer services, the
Telecommunications Act refused to establish common sense regulation
over a market that promised to burgeon, but instead attempted to
regulate objectionable and obscene material transmitted through
cyberspace with specifically aimed provisions of the Communications
Decency Act. 127 Certain provisions of the Communications Decency
Act, as they pertain to Internet and on-line computer services, have been
struck down as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, while the
internet in general was left wholly unregulated by an oblique Revolution
Congress. 128

126. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(x) (2000). The Section provides:
(x) Require, in the case of an apparatus designed to receive television signals that are
shipped in interstate commerce or manufactured in the United States and that have a
picture screen 13 inches or greater in size (measured diagonally), that such apparatus
be equipped with a feature designed to enable viewers to block display of all programs
with a common rating, except as otherwise permitted by regulations pursuant to
Section 330(c)(4) of this title.

Id.; see also U.S. Policy: Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 99, at 3 (“In
conjunction with the establishment of a ratings system, the Telecommunications Act
requires television set manufacturers to install a blocking device, called the V-chip, in
television receivers larger than 13 inches in screen size by 1998.”).
127. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 230-231 (2000) (consisting of § 230(a)-(f) Protection for
Private Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material and § 231(a)-(e) Restriction of
Access by Minors to Materials Commercially Distributed by Means of World Wide
Web that are Harmful to Minors); see also Chen supra note 116, at 1511. Chen
describes Congress’s lack of foresight:
The Act took little or no account of a new telecommunications medium that was only
beginning to take shape in 1996: the Internet. Beyond passing the Communications
Decency Act, Congress had little to say about the Internet, but soon even that
legislative effort lay in ruins.
The early stages of implementing the
Telecommunications Act have exposed Congress’s shortsightedness in this regard.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
128. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, supra note 124, at § 501; see also
Chen supra note 116, at 1360. In detailing the Revolution Congress’s failures, Professor
Chen notes:
Legislative shortsightedness bears much of the blame. The 1996 Act notoriously
ignored the Internet, except as a transmission vector for pornography. . . . Having
failed to anticipate “the fastest growing medium of all time” and “the information
medium of first resort for its users,” the Telecommunications Act gave the FCC no
tools for responding cogently to VoIP or any other Internet application that might
affect the traditional work of the Common Carrier Bureau.

Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In depth analysis of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 and the constitutionality of its provisions is beyond the scope of
this Article.
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Staunch supporters of the Telecommunications Act ironically hailed
the legislation as a federal law that would spur immense job creation and
would overwhelmingly lower telecommunications costs. 129 These hopes
eventually faded following passage of the Act, as promised job creation
and lower costs never materialized. 130
That the Telecommunications Act failed to protect consumers is
clear. Just months after its passage, telecom providers began merging,
acquiring and concentrating in a way that served to hurt consumers, raise
costs and benefit corporate interests to the detriment of the public good.
The way that the Telecommunications Act facilitated the market crash of
2002 is less obvious, but just as deleterious. As described above, the
Telecommunications Act refused in any recognizable way to regulate
the Internet or regulate the prophesied exponential “rise” of Internet
traffic. Internet use and traffic then, remained carefully unregulated
under the Telecommunications Act. This decision by the Revolution
Congress to refuse to regulate internet traffic was the origin and the
temptation that felled the industry.
Immediately following passage of the Telecommunications Act,
WorldCom executives began floating fraudulent statistics describing the
projected explosion of Internet growth and traffic. This breathtakingly
false information was relied upon by telecom competitors and the FCC
itself in decisions as to how much fiber optic network to build and what
types of policies to implement. Following an astonishing five year
build-up of fiber optic network and a frenzy of telecom mergers and
acquisitions to meet the fraudulently projected explosion, capacity
demand did not even come close to meeting the projections that
telecommunications giants spent billions building up to meet. A bubble
formed in the telecom industry based on breathless investors pouring
millions of dollars into telecom companies based on hollow capacity
promises by both upstart and traditional telecom corporate executives.
With a bubble firmly in place and with billions of dollars of unused fiber
optic capacity sitting idle, corporate executives at firms like WorldCom,
Qwest, Global Crossing and Adelphia began scrambling to cover
projected revenue and growth. This scramble led directly to the
129.
130.

See U.S. Policy: Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 99, at 3.
Hundreds of thousands of jobs have been lost in the telecom industry in 2002
and 2003 alone. See MALIK, supra note 96, at ix. Telecom costs, particularly in the
cable television and the Internet industry have skyrocketed since passage of the
Telecommunications Act. See Lessons from 1996 Telecommunications Act supra note
116, at 1.
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fraudulent swap transactions engaged in by telecom malfeasors. In
2002, leveraged, desperate and panicked, the telecommunications bubble
burst forcing WorldCom, Qwest, Global Crossing, and Adelphia,
amongst other, to disclose illegal swap transactions, restate billions of
dollars of fraudulently booked revenue and declare bankruptcy in many
cases. Employees, investors and consumers were decimated by this
fraud as detailed below.

B. Telecommunications Act’s Effect on the Industry
In 2002, the Los Angeles Times reported:
The telecommunications industry is awash in red ink and tens of
thousands of jobs have been lost. Some analysts believe that
bankruptcy filings of WorldCom and Global Crossing, two of the
most aggressive new companies to arise during deregulation, presage
more to come. Since their peak in March 2000, telecommunication
stocks, as measured by the American Stock Exchange index of 16
North American companies, have fallen more than 74%.
The meltdown has occurred under the legal structure set up by
131
the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

Many economists, investors and scholars agree that “[t]elecom
deregulation from ‘96 until now has been an abysmal failure.” 132
131. Michael A. Hiltzik & James E. Peltz, Did Telecom Reformers Dial the Wrong
Number?: Deregulation: A 1996 Landmark Law May be at the Root of the Industry’s
Meltdown, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 2002, at 1-1 (“As the wreckage of once-highflying
telecommunications companies such as WorldCom Inc. and Global Crossing Ltd. piles
up, attention is turning to whether the root of the disaster lies in the sweeping
deregulation set in motion in the mid-1990s that was expected to usher in a golden age
of competition.”).
132. Id. (quoting Gene Kimmelman, director of the Washington office of Consumers
Union, publisher of Consumer Reports magazines). Economists and legal scholars have
been particularly biting in their criticism of the Telecommunications Act. See Nicholas
Economides, Vertical Leverage and the Sacrifice Principle: Why the Supreme Court
Got Trinko Wrong, NET INSTITUTE, THE NETWORKS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INSTITUTE, Working Paper No.05-05, at 10, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=797142 (“[T]he Telecommunications Act failed miserably to
create competition in local telecommunications. Additionally, as a result of the poor
implementation of the Act, existing competition in long distance is likely to diminish.”);
see also George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Set It and Forget It? Market Power
and the Consequences of Premature Deregulation in Telecommunications Markets,
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Not only did the Telecommunications Act set the stage for the
staggering corporate collapses of WorldCom, 133 Adelphia, 134 Global
PHOENIX CENTER POLICY PAPER SERIES, Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal &
Economic Public Policy Studies, No. 18 (2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=487464 (arguing that the FCC began using an “abstract” approach to its deregulatory
policies since the 1996 Act rather than a grounded, realistic consumer welfare model,
noting that “[indeed], policies implemented by relying exclusively on textbook notions
of competition and regulation in an industry with traits incompatible with such naïve
theories fails to satisfy the Commission’s statutory mandate”); Jonathan E. Nuechterlein
& Philip J. Weiser, First Principles for an Effective Rewrite of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, JOINT CENTER: AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR REGULATORY STUDIES,
Working Paper No. 05-03 (2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=707124 (“The
problem with the 1996 Act, moreover, is not just that it hedges on the topics it
addresses, but that it fails to address the central telecommunications policy challenge of
our time: how to rationalize the regulatory treatment of different communications
platforms in an age of radical technological advances.”); Sidak, supra note 89, at 227
(“The government thus contributed to the hype that caused tens, if not hundreds, of
billions of dollars to be invested in long-distance fiber optic networks that go unused.”);
Chen, supra note 116, at 1504 (“The Telecommunications Act of 1996 promised the
world. It has delivered considerably less.”); Stilwell, supra note 89, at 384. Stilwell
notes:
This hypocrisy was indoctrinated over a span of twenty years, and by the late 1990s,
massive radio oligopolies began to form. Examination of the FCC’s policies behind
the deregulation of media ownership . . . demonstrates that the FCC systematically
created and relied upon false premises, which today continue to result in an unsound
rationale favoring the deregulation of media ownership.

Id.; Chen, supra note 99, at 1314 (“Among the gauges by which critics have weighed
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and found it wanting, the record of mergers
among telecommunications firms since the law’s passage figures prominently as
evidence of the legislative failure.”). Economist Economides concludes:
In summary, the Telecommunications Act failed miserably in two of its main
objectives. First, it failed to create competition in local telecommunications. Second,
the Telecommunications Act was supposed to guard against RBOCs leveraging their
monopoly power in local telecommunications to the long distance market. It
completely failed in this too. The failure of the Act was mainly in its implementation.
The Act did not impose punishments and penalties for delays in implementation; it
harbored the seeds of its own destruction.

Economides, supra at 18-19.
133. See Davies & Scannell, supra note 13, at A1 (“Messrs. Lay and Skilling now
join a list of once-high-flying executives brought low. Among them: . . . former
WorldCom Inc. CEO Bernard Ebbers.”); see also The Enron Verdicts . . ., supra note
28, at A10 (explaining that “WorldCom CEO Bernie Ebbers is now facing 25 years”);
see also Morgenson, supra note 28, at 1 (“Some C.E.O. sinners from previous years got
ready for their close-ups in 2005. L. Dennis Kozlowski, formerly of Tyco International,
and Bernard Ebbers, late of WorldCom, sat for mug shots, donned orange jumpsuits and
toddled off to jail.”).
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Crossing, 135 and Qwest, 136 amongst dozens of others, 137 but the Act
failed to bring about the promised competition, opening of markets,
134. See also The Enron Verdicts . . ., supra note 28, at A10 (comparing “John and
Timothy Rigas of Adelphia Cable [who face] 15 and 20 years [in prison] respectively”);
see also Bloomberg News, Bank Seeks to Foreclose on a Rigas Condo, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 2, 2004, at C8; see also Chad Bray, Executives on Trial: Adelphia Ex-Executive
Avoids Jail for False Report, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2006, at B4; see also Peter Grant &
Christine Nuzum, Adelphia Founder And One Son Are Found Guilty—Jury Remains
Deadlocked On Second Son, Acquits Former Assistant Treasurer, WALL ST. J., July 9,
2004, at A1.
135. See Almar Latour & Dennis K. Berman, Global Crossing, SEC Deal Expected,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2004, at A8 (“A $325 million securities class-action settlement
for former shareholders and employees of Global Crossing Ltd. helps pave the way for
a settlement deal between the telecom company and the Securities and Exchange
Commission over alleged accounting fraud.”). The Wall Street Journal reports that
Global Crossing’s executives:
Under the settlement announced Friday [March 19, 2004], shareholders and
employees who lost billions in the troubled telecommunications company will receive
$325 million from Global Crossing’s former officers, directors and outside lawyers.
Company founder and former Chairman Gary Winnick will pay a total of $55 million,
while insurance companies for former officers and directors agreed to pay roughly
$280 million. The company’s former law firm, Simpson, Thatcher & Bartlett LLP,
which was not a defendant and did not admit to any wrongdoing, agreed to pay $19.5
million.

Id.; see also Lynnley Browning, U.S. Says Tax Shelter Client May Be Paying Ex-KPMG
Partner’s Legal Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2006, at C4.
136. See Searcy and Lattman, supra note 94; see also Shawn Young et al., Qwest
Engaged in Fraud, SEC Says—Regulator Claims Misdeeds Were Led by Top Officials;
Firm to Pay $250 Million, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 2004, at A3 (“Qwest Communications
International, Inc. engaged in pervasive fraud led by top management that extended to
almost every part of its business, according to a complaint by the Securities and
Exchange Commission.”). The Wall Street Journal reports that the SEC alleges:
[T]he telecommunications company was riddled with accounting fraud between 1999
and 2002. The fraud included generating phony revenue through sham transactions,
booking inflated results from its phone-directory business and even the way Qwest
accounted for employee vacation time, according to the complaint. The SEC said
Qwest fraudulently recognized more than $3.8 billion in revenue and excluded $231
million in expenses as part of a multifaceted accounting scheme.

Id.; see also Tom Zeller Jr., Qwest Goes From the Goat to the Hero, N.Y. TIMES, May
15, 2006, at C5 (This article indicates that former Qwest CEO Joseph Nacchio has been
charged with 42 counts of insider trading, and is currently awaiting trial. Further, Quest
“settled a Securities and Exchange Commission fraud inquiry in 2004 for $250 million.
An additional $400 million was agreed to in October as partial settlement with angry
investors.”).
137. See generally Jacob M. Schlesinger, The Deregulators: Did Washington Help
Set Stage for Current Business Turmoil?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2002, at A1.
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creation of jobs and furtherance of the projected growth explosion of
“The Information Superhighway.” 138 In reality, in light of the ten years
that have passed since the Telecommunications Act was enacted, and in
light of the Crash of 2002, each of the projected Telecommunications
Act benefits have proven false or failed to fully materialize.
Competition has never genuinely materialized in any of the sectors
predicted, jobs that may have been created in the telecom industry have
now been lost and then some, and the growth explosion has simply not
mushroomed as widely prophesied. 139
Competition in the telecom industry has failed to materialize.140
Although provisions of the Telecommunications Act were earmarked
specifically to promote competition, these provisions have instead
contributed to a continued monopolistic hold on the industry by
powerful telecom players. 141 New cable television companies have been
able to gain only one percent of the market since the passage of the
Telecommunications Act, as the major cable providers have refused to
“invade each others’ service areas.” 142 Through the use of timely
mergers, acquisitions and consolidations, the major cable companies
have caused cable television rates to burst upward to almost three times
138. See Chen, supra note 99, at 1313-17; see also MALIK, supra note 96, at 161. In
President Bill Clinton’s remarks at the signing ceremony of the Telecommunications
Act on February 28, 1996, the President touted the new legislation as groundbreaking:
Today, with the stroke of a pen, our laws will catch up with out future. We will help
to create an open marketplace where competition and innovation can move as quick as
light. An industry that is already one-sixth of our entire economy will thrive. It will
create opportunity, many more high-wage jobs and better lives for Americans.
The Interstate Highway Act literally brought Americans closer together. That
same spirit of connection and communication is the driving force behind the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. The Vice President [(Al Gore)] in many ways is
the father of this legislation because he’s worked on it for more than 20 years, since
he first began to promote what he called, in the phrase he coined, “The Information
Superhighway.”

Id.
139.
140.

See generally infra notes 140-57, 159-70.
See Economides, supra note 99, at 46-47. But see Speta, supra note 86, at
1097-1108 (describing a few emerging competitive telecom fields).
141. See Lessons from 1996 Telecommunications Act, supra note 116, at 1; see also
Ken Belson, Justice Dept. Approves Two Big Telecom Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28,
2005, at C4 (“SBC and Verizon will together control 56 percent of that $135 billion
market, according to Yankee Group estimates. The next largest competitor will be
Qwest Communications with 7 percent, followed by BellSouth and Sprint with 6
percent each.”); supra notes 99, 116 and accompanying text.
142. See Lessons from 1996 Telecommunications Act, supra note 116, at 1.
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the rate of inflation. 143 Further defeating competition in the cable
television industry, these newly merged, acquired and consolidated cable
television conglomerates have effectively closed down broadband
Internet to competition because they refuse to provide nondiscriminatory
access to independent providers, as called for in the
Telecommunications Act. 144
Local telephone competition has also failed to appear because of
the Regional Baby Bell’s refusal to appropriately open their networks to
small entrepreneurial companies forced to rely upon the monopolies to
provide local service. 145 The Regional Baby Bells have combined forces
via mergers, acquisitions and consolidations which have created a “small
number of dominant national firms with regional monopolies,” making it
difficult, if not impossible, for new companies to compete. 146
Several systems that Congress projected would seize portions of the
communications markets have failed to develop. First, wire-to-wire
competition for cable television service has failed to fully materialize. 147
The open video systems that were supposed to challenge the cable
companies have not been developed, nor has satellite television been
able to compete as seriously as expected with basic cable television
service. 148 In local telephone service, wire-to-wire competition has also
143. See id. (indicating that when cable television rates were completely
deregulated, the rates increased by 71 percent over a seven-year period, about 2.6
percent the rate of inflation).
144. See id.; see also Chen, supra note 116.
145. See Lessons from 1996 Telecommunications Act, supra note 116; see also
supra note 104 and accompanying text.
146. See id.; see also Bauer et al., supra note 82, at 550. Bauer et al. note that:
Since the passage of the Act, several major mergers have reduced the number of
potential and actual competitors. Mergers between SBC, Pacific Telesis and
Ameritech, as well as between Bell Atlantic and NYNEX to form Verizon, reduced
the seven RBOCs established after the break-up of AT&T to four. Verizon also
merged with the largest independent telephone company GTE. SBC incorporated
several smaller telephone companies such as Southern New England Telephone
(SNET). U.S. West merged with Qwest Communications, an upstart carrier’s carrier.
The now bankrupt WorldCom expanded market share through a strategy of aggressive
takeovers and mergers, most visibly with MIC Communications.

Id.; Economides, supra note 99, at 48.
147. See Lessons from 1996 Telecommunications Act, supra note 116, at 1.
148. Id. Satellite television continues to cost more than cable and thus is still only a
small competitor, holding just 16 percent of the market. See id. Even then, a large
number of satellite subscribers still also subscribe to cable television, so satellite only
households only make up 12 percent of the market. See id. Rather than enter into the
satellite television market to continue to compete, cable television purveyors simply
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failed. Local exchange carriers have gained less than seven percent of
the local telephone lines in the United States. 149
Wire-to-wire
competition has been able to account for about one percent of the total
number of telephone lines in the U.S., which makes it clear that the
monopolist companies still have a stranglehold on local telephone
service. 150
It is clear that the aim of true competition has failed badly in the
local telephone industry and the cable television industry. Additionally,
the monopoly model still in place for cable television and telephone
companies, despite passage of the Telecommunications Act, is now
being felt in other telecom industries, such as Internet access. 151 In
2000, cable television companies held a market share of cable Internet
service of at least 75 percent in the residential market. 152 Just as cable
television consumers are paying large fees for service, Internet users
have also been affected by “abusive practices.” 153 Any aim for true
competition in the Internet access arena has failed dismally as well. One
key to solving the problems the Telecommunications Act has foisted
upon the telecom industry is “ensur[ing] that the local market[s] [are]
effectively open to competition.” 154
Job creation has not been realized in any meaningful way since
inception of the Telecommunication Act. The bold proclamations that
the Telecommunications Act would create both incredible job growth
and jobs with higher-wages have been flatly ameliorated by the Crash of
2002 and the complete disappearance of more than 600,000 jobs in the
telecom industry. 155 In many instances, while investors have lost
billions of dollars because of the collapse of the telecommunications

increase prices on their services. See id. Since passage of the Telecommunications Act,
revenue gained by cable companies from existing customers exceeds the revenue lost to
all satellite subscribers by almost three to one, and to new satellite-only subscribers by
almost four to one. See Editorial, Latest Step in Deregulation, SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 7,
2003, at 16A.
149. See Lessons from 1996 Telecommunications Act, supra note 116, at 1.
150. See id.
151. See id.; see also Chen, supra note 99.
152. See Lessons from 1996 Telecommunications Act, supra note 116.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See MALIK, supra note 96, at ix (“With over 100 companies bankrupt and an
equal number that have shut shop, as many as 600,000 telecom workers are now
without a paycheck.”).
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industry, 156 it is the employees of these fraudulent companies that have
suffered, and will likely suffer, the most. 157
Now, it is clear that Congress, its advisers, lobbyists, and the FCC
made serious tactical blunders and erroneous assumptions in drafting,
debating,
conferencing,
passing
and
rulemaking
the
158
Telecommunications Act.
The principal blunder Congress committed
156. See id. (“Poof—$750 billion gone . . . . WorldCom is bankrupt, Global
Crossing is decimated, PSINet has been sold for peanuts . . . .”).
157. See id. Malik describes the challenges facing former employees of the telecom
industry:
These are staggering numbers for an industry that accounts for a sixth of the U.S.
economy.
But they aren’t as staggering as the amounts of money that hardworking
employees at these companies have lost. After 31 years of relentless work, Lenette
Crumpler, a former employee of Rochester, New York-based Frontier
Communications, is without a job. As much as $86,000 of her 401(k) money went up
in flames, through no fault of her own. Garry Winnick’s Global Crossing bought
Frontier and ruined most of Frontier employees’ saving like Crumpler’s savings. Or
take the case of Paula Smith, who worked most of her life at US West and then lost
her entire life’s savings of $400,000 after Qwest took over US West and, by
extension, her 401(k) retirement plan. How will Kelsey and Ali, her daughters, go to
college? And what about the 50-plus-year-old former telecom engineers who are now
working part-time at Home Depot selling drills?
Even as they were cashing out their own holding, the executives at these
broadband companies encouraged employees to put their 401(k) dollars into company
stock. And since the employees had nary a clue about these shenanigans, they
complied and are now ruined. Now Crumpler, Smith and the almost 600,000 other
people in their situation face the figurative dole, while the robber barons of the
information age sit in their Florida mansions, their Bel-Air palaces, and enjoy life on
board their multimillion dollar yachts. The robber barons of a century ago at least
created industries of lasting value. But the modern-day robber barons used
bankruptcy protection laws, lined their pockets, and walked into the sunset—just like
two-bit bandits.

Id.
158. See Hiltzik & Peltz, supra note 131, at 1-1. The Los Angeles Times reports
that Congress made at least three “fundamentally wrong” assumptions that “underlay”
the Telecommunications Act:
Three key assumptions underlay the law. The first was that the lucrative prize
for most competitors would be long-distance service. The drafters reasoned that local
phone companies—General Telephone and the seven Baby Bells created by the 1984
breakup of AT&T—would be so eager to move into long-distance that they would
willingly open their local monopolies to competition to earn the right to offer it to
customers.
The drafters also assumed that the Baby Bells would jump at the chance to
compete for local customers in one another’s markets, triggering even more consumer
savings. Finally, they assumed that falling prices would lead to an explosion in
telecommunications traffic.
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was assuming that all telecommunications traffic, including cable,
Internet, and telephone, would expand and mushroom to previously
unheard of levels. 159 This assumption has proven to be fundamentally
All these assumptions turned out to be fundamentally wrong.
The long-distance market, which had been deregulated earlier, was already
experiencing ferocious price competition, with per-minute rates dropping and profit
margins shrinking by the day. Instead of the Baby Bells wanting to get into longdistance, companies such as MCI and AT&T were desperate to start providing local
service. But the local phone companies, often supported by their state public utilities
commissions, resisted opening their markets . . . .
Instead of invading one another’s turf as expected, the Baby Bells simply
merged with each other. Within a year after the act’s passage, Texas-based SBC took
over Pacific Telesis, the California-based Baby Bell. Even more disturbing to
observers, however, was the 1997 merger of Philadelphia-based Bell Atlantic with
Nynex, the Baby Bell serving neighboring New York and New Jersey . . . .
The deal’s approval by the Justice Department’s antitrust division and the
Federal Communications Commission heralded a trend of consolidating local Bell
companies. The country had eight local phone companies in 1996; today [(July
2002)] it has four—SBC Communications Inc., Verizon Communications Inc.,
BellSouth Corp. and Qwest Communications International Inc.
Before 1996, the largest four local companies served 48% of all the phone lines
in the country; today these four companies serve more than 85% according to a study
by Consumers Union.

Id. (emphasis added); see also Dibadj, supra note 70, at 47, 54-55 (detailing all of the
poor regulatory rules enacted by the FCC following passage of the Telecommunications
Act).
159. See Hiltzik & Peltz, supra note 131, at 1-1 (“Still in retrospect the most
dangerous assumption behind the deregulation bill [(Telecommunications Act)] by far
was that communications traffic would mushroom at unprecedented rates.”); see also
MALIK, supra note 96, at xii-xiv, 9-16 (detailing the communications traffic myths that
were being perpetuated by certain telecom insiders and that were responsible for the
unrealistic expectations that communications traffic would explode in the near future).
Malik painstakingly describes the genesis of what he calls the “urban legend” of
“Internet traffic doubling every 100 days” that perpetuated and supported the telecom
run up of the late 1990s and was relied upon by Congress in developing the
Telecommunications Act:
On May 1, 1996, UUNet was sold. Sidgmore and O’Dell still had solid reputations.
They had become the gurus of the broadband world, and their words—“Internet traffic
is doubling every 100 days”—became the gospel of the new economy. Even the U.S.
government quoted their line in its reports.
Think of “Internet traffic doubles every 100 days” as an urban legend . . . [one
that] convinced executives, analysts, venture capitalists, and retail investors to pour
billions of dollars into telecom companies. The belief in this legend resulted in the
mad rush of money into new start-ups, be they makers of telecom equipment, cable
modems, broadband service providers, or even book retailers such as Amazon.com.
Even otherwise conservative venture capitalists poured billions into broadband
companies. Wall Street also got into the act and sold bad business ideas to the
unsuspecting masses . . . .
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wrong, and ultimately irreversibly damaging.
The telecom highway is now littered with the failures of
telecommunications corporations, as their shareholders and employees
have been wronged by (a) the Telecommunications Act, (b) the
dishonest dealings of investment bankers, stock analysts, lawyers and
investment bankers, and (c) the reprehensible behavior of dozens of
corporate executive malefactors. These include WorldCom, 160 Global
Crossing, 161 Adelphia, 162 Qwest, 163 Lucent, 164 Dynegy, 165 Genuity,166
But Andrew Odlyzko, a research scientist for AT&T Labs in Florham Park, New
Jersey, didn’t buy it. In 1997, Odlyzko and his colleague, Kerry Coffman, decided to
undertake an academic exercise to analyze data available from AT&T and other major
Internet providers such as MCI and BBN Planet. Odlyzko and Coffman spent almost
a year analyzing the traffic patterns on the Internet and wrote a paper, “The Size and
Growth of the Internet,” which was released to the public in October 1998. Their
finding proved that the whole notion of Internet traffic doubling every 100 days was
hogwash. The duo found that Internet traffic was only about doubling each year, or,
more precisely, that it was growing at between 70 and 150 percent a year.

Id. at 12-14 (emphasis added). While the report was received poorly, Odlyzko set about
trying to track down the inflated rumors of “Internet traffic doubling every 100 days”
and reported that:
[o]ver the years, every time I tried to trace the rumors of “Internet traffic is doubling
every three or four months” to their source, I was always pointed at folks from
WorldCom, typically [Bernie] Ebbers or [John] Sidgmore. They, more than anyone
else, seemed to be responsible for inflating the Internet bubble [until it collapsed on
them].

Id. at 14. Unbelievably, executives at WorldCom were setting the pace and establishing
the playing field for Internet traffic delusions and the unrealistic assumptions that
Congress, Wall Street, analysts and the U.S. investing public were relying. See Sidak,
supra note 89, at 227-33.
160. See supra note 133.
161. See supra note 135.
162. See supra note 134.
163. See supra note 136.
164. See Associated Press, Judge Orders Lucent to Pay $224 Million, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 2005, at C10; see also Ken Belson, S.E.C. Considers Suing Ex-Lucent Officers,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2004, at C4; Simon Romero, Lucent Reaches Accord With S.E.C.
to End Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2003, at C4; Andrew Ross Sorkin & Ken Belson,
Talks for Lucent May Signal End For 90’s Symbol, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2006, at A1;
Shawn Young & Dennis K. Berman, SEC Staff Recommends Penalty Against Lucent of
$25 Million, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2004, at B5.
165. See Associated Press, Executives on Trial: Two Linked to Dynegy Scheme Are
Given Shorter Prison Terms, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2006, at C3; see also David Barboza,
Dynegy to Pay $3 Million In Settlement With S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2002, at C6;
Paul Beckett & Jathon Sapsford, Size and Timing Of Dynegy Trades Draw Scrutiny—
SEC Widens Its Probe Of Big Energy Company; ‘Not the Same as Enron,’ WALL ST. J.,
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PSINet 167 amidst so many others.
Attempting to open the telecom market to competition has turned
out to be a painful process: “[i]n the past two years, telecom [share]
prices have plummeted. WorldCom’s bankruptcy filing in July [of
2002] was only the most recent of two dozen by publicly traded telecom
firms this year [(2002)].” 168 Based on the false assumptions that growth
would meet wild expectations, as inflated by the very purveyors of the
fraud, “the financial community anticipated a huge increase in demand
that would be never-ending.” 169 This projection has proven to be false.
Worse, Congressional reliance on foolish and unsupported telecom
growth expectation reports; on similarly unfounded expectations that
May 9, 2002, at A1; Peter Behr, 2 Plead Guilty to Fraud in Dynegy Case, WASH. POST,
Aug. 6, 2003, at E03; Bradley Keoun, Dynegy Settles Shareholders’ Suit; Houston
Power Wholesaler Agrees to Pay $468 Million, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2005, at E02;
Jonathan Weil & Jathon Sapsford, Leading the News: Dynegy to Pay $3 Million Fine to
Settle SEC Civil-Fraud Case, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2002, at A3.
166. See Associated Press, GENUITY INC.: Bankruptcy filed; Level 3 to take over,
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 28, 2002, at 2; Saul Hansell, Technology Briefing E-Commerce:
Genuity To Seek Bankruptcy Protection, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2002, at C3; Seth
Schiesel & Simon Romero, Genuity Faces Bankruptcy As Verizon Ignores an Option,
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2002, at C2.
167. See Dina ElBoghdady, PSINet Consulting Unit Files Chapter 11; Firm Was
Acquired For $2 Billion, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2001, at E05; Ellen McCarthy, After
the Glamour, A Modest Return; Schrader, Like Tech Industry, Is Focused on Profits,
WASH. POST, July 18, 2005, at D01; Yuki Noguchi, PSINet Sales to Recover Millions
for Creditors, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2002, at E05; Henny Sender, Telecom Special: In
Bankruptcy, PSINet Gets ‘90% Off’ Tag, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2001, at C1.
168. See Schlesinger, supra note 137 at A1; see also Celia Viggo Wexler, The
Fallout From the Telecommunications Act of 1996, COMMON CAUSE EDUCATION FUND,
May 9, 2005, at 3, available at http://www.commoncause.org/atf/cf/%7bfb3c17e2cdd1-4df6-92be-bd4429893665%7d/fallout_from_the_telecomm_act_5-9-05.pdf
(“Industries supporting the new legislation predicted it would add 1.5 million jobs and
boost the economy by $2 trillion. By 2003, however, the telecommunications’
companies’ market value had fallen by about $2 trillion and they had shed half a million
jobs.”).
169. See Hiltzik & Peltz, supra note 131, at 1. The authors quote Reed E. Hundt,
FCC Chairman from 1993-1997, and now consultant at McKinsey & Co:
[T]hose rates inspired a historic investment spree. From 1996 to 2000, telecom
companies assumed more than $1.5 trillion in bank debt and issued $600 billion in
bonds. “There were too many people throwing too much essentially free money at the
industry,” said Tom Evslin, chief executive of ITXC Corp., a wholesaler of
international phone capacity.

Id.; see also Sidak, supra note 89, at 227-34 (describing the enormous negative impact
the WorldCom fraud had on the telecom industry and the capital markets).
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new competition would drive the freshly deregulated telecom markets
rather than self preservation and the frenzied blocking of competition by
market players; and on the testimony and word of telecom insiders who
have proven fraudulent and fallacious, was thoroughly misguided and
ill-advised.
Deregulation proponents have begrudgingly recognized that the
Telecommunications Act was problematic: noted Cornell University
economist Alfred Kahn has flatly stated that “deregulation deserves a
good deal of the blame for the telecommunications problems.” 170
As unpacked above, the Telecommunications Act facilitated the
market crash specifically in at least two ways. First, the Act failed to
regulate the internet and its growth. This led to WorldCom's audacious
fraud in connection with internet growth and the frenzied fiber optic
network build out that wasted billions and tempted telecom giants into
fraudulent swap transactions and the need to hide losses based on
unused capacity. Second, the Act removed barriers to competition in
local and long distance telephony, but required unbundling by the
regional bells in order to enter long distance competition. This led to a
frenzy of merger activity where rather than unbundle local lines to spur
competition, the local telecom companies preferred to merge with long
distance carriers, leading to the period of megamerger activity and
serious concentration. Because many of the companies engaging in this
merger frenzy (Adelphia, Qwest, WorldCom) could not sustain the debt
each had undertaken in its rapid-fire merger activity, bankruptcy and
disaster followed.
Congress, in its rush to deregulate, again whiffed badly with the
Telecommunications Act, just as it had with the PSLRA and its federal
securities deregulation. 171 Following an unprecedented five-year run up
of the capital markets (1995 to 2000), the bubble burst in a spate of

170. Jay Hancock, Deregulation Pioneer Kahn Still Favors It But Sees Its Warts,
BALT. SUN, Oct. 20, 2002, at 1C. Professor Kahn claimed that government attempts to
thoroughly deregulate the telecom industry were unwise because “you have to have a
regulated transmission network which plays a crucial role in balancing demand, in
getting prices right, in ensuring system reliability.” Id.
171. See cummings, supra note 4, at 1041 (“Passage of the Telecommunications
Act, following hotly on the heals of the passage of the PSLRA, further deregulated
segments of corporate America, creating an environment ripe for corruption and easy
deception of the investing public.”).
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malfeasance, fraud and deceit. 172
One enduring legacy of the
Telecommunications Act and 1990s Revolution Congress deregulation
will be the market crash of 2002. 173
C. Examination of Legislative History in Opposition
Those opposed to passage of the Telecommunications Act decried
its provisions, predicting that its influence would harm investors and that
its terms were not carefully constructed to meet the changing needs of
the global telecom industry. 174
Critics of the act claim its extensive deregulatory provisions coupled
with relaxed restriction on concentration of media ownership dilute
the public responsibility guarantees built into the Communications
Act of 1934 and tilt the preference in favor of private market forces.
Critics claim that [there are] many areas of the country which are not
likely to see real competition, the cost of telecommunications and
175
video services are likely to rise dramatically.

Many argued in 1996, and now an entire chorus of detractors would
join, that Congress and the President lacked vision and foresight in
enacting the 1996 version of the Telecommunications Act. 176
172.
173.

See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 11, 94-99 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 214-16
and accompanying text.
174. See Warren Sirota, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: A Commentary on
What is Really Going on Here, Westchester Alliance for Telecommunications and
Public Access, at http://www.watpa.org/telcom.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2003). Sirota
correctly predicted following passage of the Telecommunications Act that no real
competition would emerge, rather a “consolidation trend” would emerge and that
“many jobs” would be lost. Id. Further, Sirota correctly predicted that “[c]able TV
rates will rise,” that “[l]ocal telephone rates for consumers will stay the same or rise”
and that “[t]here will be a consolidation among the large players in their traditional
segments.” Id. Sirota concluded:
Beyond that, the crystal ball is clouded by Congress’ lack of vision and obfuscation of
the important issues. The bottom line is that real competition and new innovative
services will not arrive for many years. When they do, very large carriers will be the
only service providers. Innovative services and price competition in the consumer
segment will first occur in markets that are upper and middle class on the socio
economic scale.

Id. (emphasis added).
175. See U.S. Policy: Telecommunications Act of 1996, supra note 99, at 3.
176. See Benjamin Douglas Arden, Competition versus Regulation: “Mediating
Between Right and Right” in the Wireless and Wireline Telephone Industries, 57 FED.
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Admittedly, Congressional opposition to passage of the
Telecommunications Act was not nearly as strong as that in opposition
to the PSLRA. 177 While the Act had prominent critics, 178 few opponents
emerged from the U.S. Congress. 179 The conference version of the
Telecommunications Act was approved by the U.S. Senate on February
1, 1996 by a vote of 91 Yeas, 5 Nays and 3 Not Voting. 180 Most
senators hailed the legislation as landmark. 181 Indeed, most supporters
COMM. L.J. 107, 122-23 (2004). Arden argues:
The existing regulatory framework was ill-equipped to bring about the new policy
goals driving the telecommunications industry. While the government had been able
to ensure the creation of a uniform, reasonably priced system, things like innovation
and maximization of existing resources are typically the fiat of the open market. This
was essentially the contention of the Progressive Era economists; they knew that the
market was quite capable of, if not ideal for, spurring the development of new
products and finding economic efficiency. The market, however, was scarcely able to
take into consideration the social benefit of any particular product.

Id.; see also Gregory M. Prindle, Note, No Competition: How Radio Consolidation Has
Diminished Diversity and Sacrificed Localism, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 279, 305, 322-25 (2003) (“Although the Telecommunications Act of 1996
intended to open up competition, the deregulation of ownership limits has led to an
increased concentration of ownership. This increased concentration resulted in anticompetitive behavior, undermining Congress’ intent for a competitive marketplace.”);
Sirota, supra note 174 (“Beyond that, the crystal ball is clouded by Congress’ lack of
vision and obfuscation of the important issues.”); see generally MALIK, supra note 96;
cummings, supra note 4; Hiltzik & Peltz, supra note 131; Schlesinger, supra note 137;
supra note 132.
177. See generally 142 CONG. REC. S686-721 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996); see also
cummings, supra note 4, at 1033-40 (detailing the vociferous opposition to the PSLRA
by various U.S. Senators prior to its passage).
178. See supra notes 120, 174-76; see also infra notes 184-91 and accompanying
text.
179. See infra notes 184-85, 187, 189 and accompanying text.
180. 142 CONG. REC. S720 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996).
181. 142 CONG. REC. S698 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lott). Senator
Lott stated:
I believe we will pass this conference report overwhelmingly in a few minutes, and I
venture to say right now there will not be a bigger, more important piece of legislation
that passes the Congress this year and probably not one in the last decade in terms of
the impact this is going to have in the creation of jobs and bringing legislation out of
the Edsel era of the 1934 Communications Act into a modern Explorer because that is
what this legislation is going to do—open up tremendous horizons for our people.

Id.; see also 142 CONG. REC. S691 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Stevens).
Senator Stevens explained:
I think this is among one of the most significant days I have been here on the floor of
the Senate. The 1934 Communications Act has served this Nation well. It brought us
from a country with a fledgling communications system to the age of
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of the legislation expected incredible increases in competition and job
creation. 182 Despite such widespread congressional optimism, the
Telecommunications Act has proved to be a disappointment, both in
competition and job creation, as carefully outlined above. 183
A few congressional leaders, clearly in the minority, stood out in
their criticism of the Telecommunications Act by forecasting its
shortcomings. 184 Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND) argued on the Senate
Floor that the elimination of television ownership caps would have a
deleterious effect on television competition:
I do not want to oversell this piece of legislation either. There are
deficiencies in it. There is one which gives me enormous pause and
almost persuaded me to continue voting against it. This report
makes some serious steps toward concentration in broadcasting by
eliminating the television ownership cap.
We now say you can own no more than 12 television stations
covering no more than 25 percent of the population of the country.
This report says, “By the way, we’ve changed that; you can own as
many television stations as you want covering up to 35 percent of the
population of this country.” I guarantee you, if that stands, a dozen
years from now we will have six, maybe eight major companies
owning most of the television stations in America. That is not a
march toward competition: that is a march backwards towards
185
concentration. It makes no sense.

While Senator Dorgan argued that the new rules would concentrate
television ownership instead of inspiring competition, he nevertheless
telecommunications. And now, with the advent of digital communications becoming
universal, this bill is absolutely necessary to assure the expansion of these industries
that depend upon telecommunications.

Id.
182.
183.

See supra notes 179, 181 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 140-157, 159-175 and accompanying text. But see Lawrence J.
Spiwak, The Creeping Tide of the Gathering Storm, Perspectives: Phoenix Center for
Advanced Legal and Economic Public Policy Studies, Nov. 2004, at 1-2 (noting that
while “de-regulation is always a tricky business” that over time the
Telecommunications Act has led to some consumer savings and job growth).
184. 142 CONG. REC. S686-721 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statements of Sen. Dorgan,
Sen. Kerrey, Sen. Wellstone).
185. 142 CONG. REC. S690 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Dorgan).
Senator Dorgan claimed that he “almost voted against the bill because of that defect.”
Id. Recent evidence indicates that, in fact, concentration has increased in radio and
television ownership, to the detriment of the consuming public. See Stilwell, supra note
89; see also Dunbar, supra note 120.
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relied upon the same erroneous assumptions that the rest of Congress did
in voting to enact the Telecommunications Act. Namely, Congress
anticipated substantial growth of the Internet, and that the Regional
Bells would eagerly enter the long distance markets. 186
Perhaps in a prescient moment, Senator J. Robert Kerrey (D-NE)
recognized that the clarion call for reformation of the communications
laws were not U.S. citizens, but in fact corporations—companies
complaining bitterly of the intensely restrictive nature of the
telecommunication regulations:
I will observe, as I did on a number of occasions during the debate
earlier on the bill, that this is a very unusual piece of legislation in
that the demand for it is not coming from the citizens; it is really
coming from corporations, the whole range of corporations—I do not
mean the RBOC’s; I mean RBOC’s, long-distance, cable, broadcast;
all of them are in this business—that feel the current law, which does
not allow them to do a variety of things, is too restrictive. And they
say, if you change the law and allow us to do these things, you are
going to generate a lot of new economic activity and create new
jobs. We have heard all kinds of representations about all the good
187
things that are going to happen.

186.
187.

See supra Part III.B.
142 CONG. REC. S696-697 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kerrey)
(emphasis added). Senator Kerrey continued in his warning that relying too much on
the representations of corporate interest could come back and haunt the enacting
congressional leaders:
It must be said, Mr. President, that that requires a substantial amount of courage
at the beginning. It is not my intention to come here and say that Members who are
enthusiastic about this change are under the influence of special interest money. That
is not my point at all. I am not trying to say that any Member has been bought out or
anything like that. The problem, though, when you once cross the line, is saying OK,
we are going to try to do something that is good for the people. It seems to me that
you have to do, in an irrationally cold-blooded way, an analysis of what the impact is
going to be . . . . So, when we radically alter the landscape, as we are with this
legislation, it seems to me appropriate to sort of ask ourselves: What is the consumer
going to get out of it?

Id.; see also Chen, supra note 99, at 1337. Chen, in discussing the damaging
concentration that has entered the telephony industry since passage of the
Telecommunications Act, quoted Congressman Henry Hyde as warning against
adoption:
During the legislative debates leading to passage of the 1996 Act, Congressman
Henry Hyde asserted that “public interest review by the FCC simply is not a strong
enough tool to prevent [telecommunications] giants from destroying competition and
recreating a monopoly system through a series of megamergers.
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Apparently, Senator Kerrey was very uncomfortable foisting an allinclusive, comprehensive, sweeping telecommunications reform bill
upon the U.S. public when corporate interests, not the public, were
clamoring for such change. In hindsight, Senator Kerrey’s concerns
were well-placed and warranted, as major telecom industry players have
subsequently used the new laws and the deregulated telecom arena to
foist spectacular frauds upon both the U.S. investing public and their
own employees. 188
Senator Paul Wellstone (D-MN) harshly criticized Congress for
adopting legislation that did not offer concrete consumer protections and
relied solely upon the telecommunications corporations to keep promises
to operate fairly and protect consumers in a newly deregulated world:
What disappoints me the most is that this bill did not go far enough
to assure competition and therefore does not go far enough to protect
consumers . . . . I was hoping that at least we could build in more
protection for consumers and more guarantees that there would in
fact be the competition that we all talk about.
I ask my colleagues, after you remove the protections against
huge rate increases, against monopoly, against service just for the
privileged, what would you replace them with? Words, Mr.
President.
Promises, guarantees, reassurances that this time,
although many of these companies have misbehaved in the past, and
have been fined repeatedly for violating promises to protect
consumers, that this time the corporations promise to behave
themselves and to conduct themselves in the consumer’s best
interest.
Mr. President, I have said it before, and I will say it again. I do
189
not buy it.

Clearly, little credence was given to Senator Wellstone’s warnings
back in 1996. Recall these were heady days—when deregulation
hysteria gripped the Revolution Congress upon the launch of its Contract
with America. 190
Id.
188.
189.

See supra Part III.B.
142 CONG. REC. S700-701 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Wellstone).
190. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (detailing how Congressional
leaders such as Tom DeLay (R-TX) and Newt Gingrich (R-GA) drafted and passed
deregulation legislation that was startlingly drafted by lobbyists and industry insiders
while sitting in Congressional offices); see also Molly Ivins, There Are Reasons for
Regulation, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Sept. 1, 2001, at P4A. Ms. Ivins states:
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Senator Wellstone offered a solution that would have made him far
more comfortable with the Telecommunications Act:
I would rather put my trust in solid protections, written in law, to
make sure that rates remain affordable, services are available for
everyone, and no one is left behind in the stampede for corporate
profits. Protections that ensure affordability, fairness, and access in
local and long distance phone service and cable TV.
Mr. President, the need for continuation of consumer protections
and antitrust circuit breakers is clear . . . . I think we are making a
mistake if we pass this piece of legislation. I will therefore, vote
191
against it.

Unfortunately, neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives
heeded Senator Wellstone’s calls for protections and demands that
honorable corporate behavior be written into the law. Senator Wellstone
tried to look into the future in 1996, and the future that he saw was not
nearly as attractive as the one seen by many of his colleagues on both
sides of the Congressional aisle. 192 Senator Wellstone was able to
correctly guess that the telecommunications companies would not keep
their promises “to behave themselves and to conduct themselves in the
consumer’s best interest.” 193
The Revolution Congress miscalculated badly in passing many
provisions of the Telecommunications Act. Looking back over the
carnage that was the telecom industry in 2001-2004 and its investors and
former employees, the message is crystal clear: There can be no glory in

Telecommunications deregulation: As per usual, we were promised lower rates,
greater choice, the magic of the marketplace, and milk and honey for all. What we
got was more telephone marketers calling during dinner. Cable rates have risen 33
percent, three times the inflation rate, since the 1996 telecom dereg debacle . . . .
Scholars will recall the [Telecommunications] bill was heavily influenced and indeed
partly written by the industry’s lobbyists, part of the pattern with dereg. Cable
customers continue to be gouged by local monopolies; there is almost no head-to-head
competition. Ditto local phone competition. Prices are up 12 percent, not down at all;
the companies that were supposed to compete against the regional Bells are in bad
shape, as is competition in the long distance field. Calls for re-regulation already
abound.

Id.
191.
192.

142 CONG. REC. S701 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Wellstone).
See supra note 181 and accompanying text (detailing the hailing of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 as landmark legislation by many Congressional
leaders).
193. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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so much pain. 194
194. This reference is specifically targeted at the Senators that spent page after page
of Senate floor time congratulating each other about the wisdom, foresight, magnitude
and direction of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. See generally 142 CONG. REC.
S686-721 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996); see also id. at S706 (statement of Sen. Helms).
Senator Helms boasted:
Mr. President, I am pleased that the Senate finally is going to pass this important
telecommunications bill . . . . There have been many attempts down through the years
to reform the telecommunications law, and I am happy that the Republicans have been
able to get the job done this year.

Id. So much congressional glorying has subsequently led to so much pain. See
generally supra notes 3, 135, 157 (describing the tragic economic consequences that
have befallen former employees and stockholders of the corporate malfeasors). But see
Editorials, Telecom Reform—Now, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at A22 (opining that
the movement in the telecom industry since 1996 has been “impressive” and calling on
Congress to further deregulate the telecommunications industry). The Washington
Times editorializes:
Although decried by consumer advocates, the announcements that SBC
Communications had bought AT&T . . . and Verizon had acquired MCI have opened
up one of the first real opportunities [to further deregulate]. Since 2000, for example,
SBC and other Bell giants like Verizon have been pushing for elimination of a
provision in the telecom act that prohibited them from offering long-distance service
until they opened up their regional phone markets. . . . Now, with AT&T out of the
game, industry insiders are looking keenly on longtime AT&T Republican loyalists to
join with their conservative peers to support deregulation. . . .
Despite the gridlock, it’s impressive how far the telecom industry has advanced
since 1996. Consumers now have options that were unthinkable 10 years ago. But
more needs to be done on the federal front. With major political obstacles now
removed, it’s up to Congress to get to the business of reform.

Id.; but see Karen Alexander, The Perils of Your Company’s Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
12, 2005, at G8 (statement of Stephen Vivien, lead plaintiff in lawsuit against
WorldCom) (“I thought it was a good investment and I believed in the future of the
company . . . . I was in disbelief. I was torn between trying to take action, being busy
at work, hoping for the best and thinking that my retirement was many years away.”);
Associated Press, Explaining the Enron bankruptcy, CNN.COM, Jan. 13, 2002, available
at http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/01/12/enron.qanda.focus. The Associated Press
noted:
Enron, which had 20,000 employees, barred them from selling Enron shares from
their retirement accounts last fall as the stock price plunged, saying the accounts were
being switched to a new plan administrator. Many longtime employees, including
those who worked for energy and utility companies that Enron acquired, had their life
savings wiped out.

Id.; John R. Emshwiller, Skilling Gets 24 Years in Prison—Enron Ex-CEO Faced
Longer Term For Fraud, Conspiracy Conviction; Victims Fund to Get $45 Million,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2006, at C1. The Journal reported that:
Judge Lake allowed several former Enron employees and shareholders to speak,
sometimes tearfully, about the damage they suffered as a result of Enron’s collapse.
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The market crash of 2002 has undoubtedly curbed any merriment
that was attendant in the corporate world and amongst the Revolution
Congress at the time the Telecommunications Act was enacted.
Unfortunately
for
U.S.
investors
and
employees,
the
Telecommunications Act, the PSLRA and the SLUSA were not the only
deregulatory efforts undertaken by the Revolution Congress. Soon after
passing the PSLRA, the Telecommunications Act, and the SLUSA,
Congress turned its deregulation attention toward the energy, electricity
and derivatives industries, once again acting improvidently.
IV. THE COMMODITIES FUTURES MODERNIZATION ACT
Essentially, under the CFMA, over-the-counter derivatives trading
in most cases will not be subject to any type of regulation. 195 For the
first time in the history of commodity futures trading, the CFMA made it
permissible to trade outside the regulated markets under certain

They talked of lost jobs, lost retirement savings and a loss of faith in a company they
loved. Some urged that Judge Lake give Mr. Skilling a very long prison sentence.

Id.; Kathryn Kranhold & Mitchell Pacelle, About Those Big Enron Bonuses, WALL ST.
J., June 12, 2002, at C1; Gretchen Morgenson, Outrage Is Rising as Options Turn to
Dust, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2002, at C1. Ms. Morgenson described the plight of one
worker:
Ms. [Kimberly] Smith, who is now 37, did not know it at the time, but her dream was
about to become a nightmare. Less than two years later, she had lost her $1.1 million
nest egg. A stock market neophyte, she said she was pushed by a Salomon Smith
Barney broker in an Atlanta office to exercise her options, hold her WorldCom stock
and borrow from the firm to pay for the transactions. When WorldCom and other
technology stocks collapsed in 2000, she was left with margin loans and taxes that had
destroyed her life savings.

Id.; Eve Samples, Ex-Enron Employees Feel Vindicated By Guilty Verdicts, PALM
BEACH POST, May 26, 2006, at 1D; L. M. Sixel, Playing The Employment Game;
Looking for a job is hard work; Ex-Enron employees hit upon a few offers, but at lower
salaries, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 15, 2001, at 1; Howard Witt, Lay says he is much
poorer—and misunderstood, CHI. TRIB., July 9, 2004, at 18; Allen Sloan, Laying Enron
to Rest, NEWSWEEK, June 5, 2006, at 25-26 (describing “crying Enron employees whose
jobs and life savings both vaporized when Enron melted down, taking their 401(k)
accounts with it” during the trial).
195. See Schlesinger, supra note 137, at A1; see also Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate
Regulatory Schemes For Parallel Activities: Securities Regulation, Derivatives
Regulation, Gambling and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 388-95
(2005) (describing the significant deregulatory changes the CFMA effectuated in the
commodities and derivatives trading markets).
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conditions, essentially providing no regulation for commodity futures
trading. 196 The CFMA’s legislative enactment was controversial and
ultimately reckless:
In the wake of the breakdown of Congressional efforts to deregulate
the electric power industry, Brooksley Born, the then-head of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) proposed in
1998 that she “explore whether more regulation was needed for overthe-counter derivatives.”
The value of the over-the-counter
derivatives market “had grown fivefold to $29 trillion in the six
years since [federal] regulators had last considered regulating the
financial instruments” in 1992. While Director Born met with early
resistance from the Treasury Secretary and the Federal Reserve
Board Chairman, she feared that “leaving the derivatives unregulated
. . . carried huge risks.” Director Born’s fears were justified in that:

Over-the-counter derivatives were traded directly between
companies, away from regulated futures exchanges.
Because they weren’t subject to rules that applied to other
securities, little was disclosed about the transactions. That
made it easier for traders to take big risks, or fraudulently
manipulate deals. Derivatives had contributed to some
spectacular blowups, including the bankruptcy of Orange
County, California, and the demise of 233-year-old Barings
PLC, which went belly up in 1995 after a rogue trader lost
$1 billion in unauthorized derivativestrades.

Determined to provide a safe haven for investors and
shareholders, Director Born and the CFTC conducted and released a
study, styled a ‘concept release,’ that raised questions as to the
integrity of the over-the-counter derivatives trading market and the
lack of federal regulation appurtenant thereto. U.S. financial
leadership, together with the SEC, “rushed out a statement” within
hours of the release of the CFTC’s ‘concept release’ that expressed
“grave concerns” about the study.

Ultimately, Director Born was quashed by Congress. Under a
dizzying lobbyist barrage, led by energy giant Enron, amongst
others, the corporate interests convinced Congress in 2000 to pass
the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (“CFMA”). The CFMA
196. See DAVID L. RATNER & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION: IN A
NUTSHELL 96 (7th ED. 2002).
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introduced the most dramatic and sweeping changes in commodity
futures market regulation since the trading phenomenon began
seventy-eight years earlier, but it failed therein to regulate over-thecounter derivatives trading. Such failure to regulate over-the-counter
derivatives trading allowed an environment to exist whereby energy
and telecom companies such as Enron and Global Crossing were
able engage in wildly speculative over-the-counter trading of
197
derivatives.

In light of the Enron debacle, the California energy crisis and the
frontal assault upon shareholders and employees of energy companies,
particularly those trading in over-the-counter derivative markets, one
legacy of the CFMA will be the market crash of 2002.
A. How the CFMA Changed the Industry
Certain provisions of the CFMA essentially enabled Enron to trade
in speculative energy derivatives left unregulated under the CFMA—
thereby allowing Enron to deftly hide, manufacture and fraudulently
disguise various expenditures in sham corporate structures. 198 Under the
newly enacted CFMA:
[t]here is virtually no regulation for off-exchange principal-toprincipal transactions between sophisticated and wealthy investors
that fall within the statutory concept of eligible contract participants
(“ECPs”), consisting of institutional and highly accredited
customers. ECPs include financial institutions, insurance companies,
registered investment companies; corporations, partnerships, trusts,
and other entities having total assets exceeding $10,000,000,
employee benefit plans subject to ERISA that have total assets
exceeding $5,000,000; governmental entities, as well as some
categories of investors . . . .
The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, abolished
the former contract market monopoly for commodities futures and
options contracts, which prohibited the trading of those contracts
other than on an organized exchange. The Act thus permits for the
first time over-the-counter markets for commodities futures and
options. The Act also introduced a new category of futures markets
for certain commodities-based products. This new category of
commodities market is open not to retail investors generally (unless
participating through a registered futures commission merchant) but
197.
198.

See cummings, supra note 4, at 1042-44.
See Hazen, supra note 195, at 440-41; see also cummings, supra note 4, at 99899, 1044-48.
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rather is only to specified qualified investors or other investors who
199
trade through a futures commission merchant.

Following its expensive lobbying campaign to ensure that over-thecounter commodity derivative trading remained unregulated, the Enron
executives went to work creating myths of value and earnings by
fraudulently trading in energy derivatives. 200 Enron was not alone in
using the over-the-counter derivatives market to consummate
controversial transactions that seriously injured investors and
employees. 201
The Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”), 202 enacted in 1974 and
substituting the title “Commodity Exchange Act” in place of “The Grain
Futures Act,” was amended by the CFMA in 2000. Section 103 of the
199.
200.

See HAZEN & RATNER, supra note 196, at 96 (emphasis added).
See Frank Partnoy, Enron and Derivatives, Testimony Before the United States
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Jan. 24, 2002, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=302332 (last visited March 17, 2007). Professor Partnoy, while
testifying before the U.S. Senate told Senators:
And, let me repeat, the OTC derivatives markets are largely unregulated. Enron’s
trading operations were not regulated or even recently audited, by U.S. securities
regulators, and the OTC derivatives it traded are not deemed securities. OTC
derivatives trading is beyond the purview of organized, regulated exchanges. Thus,
Enron—like many firms that trade OTC derivatives—fell into a regulatory black hole.
. . . [I]n March 1997, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission began considering
whether to regulate OTC derivatives. But its proposals were rejected, and in
December 2000 Congress made the deregulated status of derivatives clear when it
passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act. As a result, the OTC derivatives
markets have become a ticking time bomb, which Congress thus far has chosen not to
defuse.

Id. (emphasis added); see also cummings, supra note 4, at 1044-48; Richard D.
Cudahy, Judges’ Forum No. 2: Whither Deregulation: A Look At The Portents, 58
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 155 (2001); Hon. Richard D. Cudahy & William D.
Henderson, From Insull to Enron: Corporate (Re)regulation After The Rise And Fall of
Two Energy Icons, 26 ENERGY L.J. 35, at 87 (2005) (noting that Enron “embarked upon
a lavish public relations effort designed to educate consumers (and voters) on the
virtues of electricity deregulation”).
201. See infra notes 258-61 and accompanying text.
202. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000). The CEA has been described as:
The principal legislation governing the trading of commodities and futures in the
United States. This act, as amended, establishes the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission [“CFTC”]; sets out the circumstances under which the CFTC regulates,
or can exempt from regulation, transactions in physical commodity and financial
futures contracts; and incorporates the Shad-Johnson Agreement which describes the
division of authority and responsibility for regulation of financial contracts between
the CFTC and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
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CFMA 2000 adds Section 2(d) to the CEA and serves to exclude from
most provisions of the CEA certain transactions in “excluded
commodities.” 203 The term “excluded commodity” is generally defined
in the 1933 Securities Act as a financial commodity, index or
contingency. 204
Futures and commodity options transactions in
excluded commodities are traditionally regulated under the CEA “unless
they are traded on an unregulated exchange or in an unregulated OTC
transaction.” 205 The 1933 Securities Act provides that the CEA does
not apply to transactions “in an excluded commodity if the parties to the
contract are eligible contract participants and if the contract is not
executed or traded on a ‘trading facility.’” 206
A ‘trading facility’ is defined in Section 1a(33) of the CEA, to be ‘a
person or group of persons that constitutes, maintains or provides a
physical or electronic facility or system in which multiple
participants have the ability to execute or trade agreements,
contracts, or transactions by accepting bids and offers made by other
participants that are open to multiple participants in the facility or
system.’ The definition excludes: simple systems that enable
participants to negotiate and enter bilateral transactions; trading by a
government securities broker or dealer in government securities; and
facilities in which bids and offers and the acceptance of bids and
207
offers are not binding.

Simply stated, when Congress enacted the CFMA, it carefully and
particularly refused to regulate the over-the-counter derivatives trading
market, despite pleas and warnings from the Director of the CFTC, 208 by
safely removing from regulation futures and commodity option
transactions that are “traded on an unregulated exchange or in an
unregulated OTC transaction.” 209 Further protecting Enron and a dozen
Glossary: Commodity Exchange Act, Riskinstitute.ch: IFCI Risk Management,
available at http://risk.ifci.ch/00010807.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2003).
203. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(d) (2000); see also CHARLES EDWARDS ET AL., COMMODITY
FUTURES MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2000: LAW AND EXPLANATION 26 (CCH) (2001).
204. See CHARLES EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 203, at 24.
205. Id. at 24, 26 (emphasis added).
206. Id. at 26.
207. Id.
208. See cummings, supra note 4, at 1042-44 (detailing the attempts of
Commodities Futures Trading Commission Director Brooksley Born to introduce
needed regulation into the over-the-counter derivatives trading market).
209. See id.; see also CHARLES EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 203, at 26; Jerry W.
Markham, Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and Derivatives
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other fraudulent energy traders, Congress ensured that derivative energy
trading would remain unregulated if the contract is not executed or
traded on a “trading facility.” 210
The CFMA also provided enabling legislation for Global Crossing
and Qwest Communications, when Congress excluded “swap
transactions” from regulatory protections of the CEA under certain
conditions. 211 “An agreement, contract or transaction in a commodity
other than an agricultural commodity is excluded if it is entered into
between eligible contract participants, is subject to individual
negotiation by the parties, and is not executed or traded on a trading
facility.” 212 Global Crossing and Qwest Communications liberally used
unregulated “swap transactions” to trade valueless access to certain of its
cable and infrastructure, thereby recording income and value for
worthless swaps and trades. 213
Regulation in the United States, The United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOKLYN J.
INT’L L. 319 (2003) (“Among other things, the [CFMA], through what in part is
sometimes called the ‘Enron amendment,’ exempted most over-the-counter derivatives
from regulation as long as the parties were large institutions or wealthy individuals.”).
210. CHARLES EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 203, at 26. Edwards, et al. state that:
The Act provides that the CEA does not apply to transactions in an excluded
commodity if the parties to the contract are eligible contract participants and if the
contract is not executed or traded on a ‘trading facility.’ This exclusion is designed to
allow financially sophisticated institutions and individuals to enter into transaction in
financial instruments on the over-the-counter market.

Id. The CFTC retained authority to take action against individuals who manipulated or
attempt to manipulate the market price of a commodity or who willfully make false or
misleading statements in any registration application filed with the CFTC. See Allan
Horwich, Warnings to the Unwary: Multi-Jurisdictional Federal Enforcement of
Manipulation and Deception in the Energy Markets After the Energy Policy Act of
2005, 27 ENERGY L.J. 363, 375 (2006). To date, the CFTC has taken action against El
Paso, Enron and Dynegy amongst others. See id. at 376-78.
211. See CHARLES EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 203 at 27-28; see also 7 U.S.C.
§ 2(g) (2001).
212. See CHARLES EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 203, at 27.
213. See cummings, supra note 4, at 1000; see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35
CONN. L. REV. 915, 932-34 (2000). Cunningham notes that:
Qwest teamed up with, among others, Global Crossing to create gimmick
transactional accounting during the telecom boom. Both were providers of local
telephone services in the United States. Capacity swaps were a leading trick used by
Qwest. The companies developed telecommunications capacity, incurring costs. Each
then swapped that capacity with capacity of other telecom companies, including each
other.

Id.
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B. CFMA’s Effect on Energy Industry and Economy
Unregulated over-the-counter energy derivatives trading ended up
being the primary culprit for Enron’s massive deception against the U.S.
investing public. “Enron used derivatives to mask balance-sheet
problems.” 214 In truth, Enron’s deceit and subsequent revelations that
rival energy traders used similar derivatives schemes in controversial
transactions have prompted investors and shareholders to lose
confidence in the largely unregulated energy trading sector, causing
losses of more than $200 billion in the total market value of a dozen
energy companies over the past several years. 215 Massive market value
was lost, shareholders lost billions, and numberless jobs disappeared, yet
most of this damage could have been prevented: “Ms. Born [former
Director of the CFTC], these days practicing law in Washington, [D.C.],
says that if she had succeeded four years ago, regulators would have
been more likely ‘to detect misuse of derivatives by entities such as
Enron.’” 216
Most reports and commentators agree that Enron stunned corporate
America and initiated the market crash of 2002, and that WorldCom and
Global Crossing clarified that Enron was not one “bad apple” in a bushel
of good, as corporate executives countrywide came under new fire. 217
214.
215.
216.

See Schlesinger, supra note 137, at A1.
Id.
Id. at A1 (“But Mr. Greenspan still believes in the value of an unregulated
derivatives market. Those instruments, he said in a speech in September [(2002)],
‘have effectively spread losses from defaults by Enron, Global Crossing’ and others,
cushioning the blow to the economy.”).
217. See generally Greg Hitt, Bush Takes Cues From a Bull Moose: President
Echoes Teddy Roosevelt’s Tough Tone on Corporate Ethics, but Keeps Reaganite Faith,
WALL ST. J., July 8, 2002, at A4. Hitt reported in 2002:
The battery of corporate scandals during the past year is forcing an evolution in
Mr. Bush’s presidency. The Texas Republican rode into the White House as a
philosophical heir to Ronald Reagan, promising tax cuts, less regulation and limited
government. He embraced big business – raising more in campaign contributions
than any American politician in history and filling several cabinet seats with chief
executives. But circumstances (Enron Corp., WorldCom, Global Crossing Ltd.) are
forcing Mr. Bush to sound more like Teddy Roosevelt, the progressive Republican
president who took on corporate America a century ago . . . .
Of course, this apparent metamorphosis goes only so far. Mr. Bush’s
administration is still decidedly friendly to business concerns and business executives.
His heightened rhetoric seems designed at least in part to sound tough enough so he
can defuse calls for new regulations.

Id.
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Enron’s fraud was the precursor to the market tumble of 2002.
Furthermore, a deregulating Congress that imprudently passed the
CFMA enabled Enron’s fraud. Enron stood ready to take advantage of
Congress’s lapse in judgment—a lapse in judgment that failed to protect
U.S. investors. 218

C. Examination of Legislative History in Opposition to the CFMA
The CFMA was passed in 2000 as part of an omnibus
appropriations bill. 219 The Republican Congress has been accused of
burying major commodity deregulation legislation in an appropriations
bill that was introduced during “the chaotic days after the Supreme
218. See Mark Mills & Peter Huber, Deregulation Will Survive Enron, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 6, 2001, at A20. Mills and Huber describe Enron’s movement from a traditional
energy provider to a sophisticated (and fraudulent) derivatives trading machine:
Enron got one thing right. New technology is dramatically changing the energy
business, especially electricity. Unfortunately for its investors, the new technology
isn’t the one Enron championed.
In fact, Enron didn’t champion energy technology at all. To be sure, it was once
an energy company that pumped real gas to real customers. But Enron’s genius, while
it lasted, was to get out of the still-regulated market for energy and into the largely
deregulated market for contracts.
The company moved into commodities trading—gas in 1989, electrons in 1994,
and bandwidth in 1999. The profits on the trades—of cubic feet of gas it didn’t
extract or burn, of kilowatt-hours it didn’t generate, and of fiber-optic lines it didn’t
light—sent Enron’s revenues soaring. The company extended its trading operation
into pulp and paper, plastics and metals, too. Dynegy was interested in buying Enron
mainly for what it saw as the company’s ‘crown jewel’—EnronOnline.
EnronOnline’s trading floor was a sophisticated dot-com, basically, engaged in
commodity barter and arbitrage. It was a trading house, a mercantile exchange, a
broker, and a part-time bank. But as such institutions sometimes do, it ended up
writing new paper faster than it inspired new trust.

Id.
219. See Richard A. Gephardt, Drive to Deregulate: GOP Congress Paved the Way
for Enron and Other Corporate Misdeeds, Special Report, DEMOCRATIC POLICY
COMMITTEE, July 11, 2002, at 8. Referring to enactment of the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act, Representative Gephardt wrote:
In 2000, as part of the omnibus appropriations bill, Republicans included the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Modernization bill that
deregulated energy trading. Specifically, the bill expanded and codified the CFTC
decision to exempt energy contracts from oversight while also exempting online
trading. According to the Wall Street Journal, this “provision was sometimes referred
to by Capitol Hill staff as the ‘Enron Point.’”

Id. (citations omitted).
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Court issued its ruling sealing George W. Bush’s victory in the disputed
2000 presidential election.” 220 The legislative history of the CFMA
certainly indicates that precious little debate was held prior to the
passage of a federal legislation that made sweeping changes to the
regulation of commodities trading, derivatives trading, and swap
transactions. 221 The stated purpose of the CFMA was to:
[R]eauthorize appropriations for the CFTC for five additional years
and would reform the CEA in three primary ways. First, it would
incorporate the unanimous recommendations of the President’s
Working Group . . . . Second, it would codify the regulatory relief
proposal of the CFTC to ensure that futures exchanges are
appropriately regulated and remain competitive.
Third, this
legislation would reform the Shad-Johnson jurisdictional accord,
which sought to establish jurisdictional boundaries between the
agencies and banned the trading of single stock futures 18 years
222
ago.

The CFMA did so much more (and so much worse) than Congress
had hoped and predicted. For instance, in the Senate Committee Report
recommending passage of the CFMA, and in compliance with paragraph
11(b) of Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the
recommending committee issued the following evaluation of the impact
of the CFMA:
The entire futures industry in the United States would be directly
affected by this legislation. Its impact would be one of lower cost
both to the businesses and to the individuals in the futures markets
due to the expanded market opportunities opened under the bill and
the decrease in the cost of implementing the regulations under the
legislation. As for the record keeping requirements under the bill,
the records that futures exchanges are required to keep are less
circumscribed and therefore the cost will be lower for the futures
exchanges. This cost savings will result in lower transaction costs to
individuals and businesses trading on the exchanges.
The securities industry would likewise be affected as they
would have new business opportunities opened to them with the
repeal of the ban on single stock futures. Firms in the financial
services business would experience a growth in opportunities as
would individuals trading futures on these markets. Individuals and

220.
221.
222.

Id. (citing Public Citizen, a public interest group).
S. REP. NO. 106-390 (2000).
Id. at 1-2.
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businesses in the securities markets would be better situated to
223
manage their risk.

Clearly, the enacting Congress held a far brighter prediction for the
positive impact the CFMA would have on the Nation’s economy than it
actually did. Enron’s use of the CFMA to collapse the energy market
and devastate the economy certainly blindsided this deregulating
Congress.
V. PROPOSALS FOR RE-REGULATION
The picture of malfeasance painted above is certainly bleak and
gloomy. Undoubtedly, the “deregulators” of the Revolution Congress
believed that the corporate executives and industry insiders would
behave in a fundamentally fair and honest fashion when given the reins
to the most deregulated modern economy and industry in U.S. history.
Unfortunately for the “deregulators,” massive fraud, astonishing
dishonesty and economic misfortune were the waiting rewards for
hastily deregulating crucial U.S. industries.
Federal regulation in several sectors and industries must be returned
in order to once again protect the U.S. consumer and investor. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act simply does not provide enough meaningful
regulatory protections. 224
A. Re-regulation Must Occur to Protect Investors and Ensure the
Integrity of the Capital Markets
1. The 1996 Telecommunications Act
Repairing the damage done by the Telecommunications Act will be
extremely difficult.
As outlined above, because of severe
miscalculations in technology growth and corporate desire for
competitive entrance into the long distance telephone markets, Congress
created a law that was and continues to be largely unworkable. 225 While
223.
224.

Id. at 16.
See cummings supra note 4, at 1059-64 (“In truth, SOX, which has been
criticized as doing little more than attempting to assuage the conscience of U.S.
investors, has accomplished little or nothing where investor protections are
concerned.”).
225. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 49 FED.
COMM. L.J. 1, 34-49 (1996); see also supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
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complete repeal of the PSLRA is appropriate to mend the enormous
problems in corporate governance, 226 simple repeal of the
Telecommunications Act will not effectuate the necessary re-regulation
that must occur in the telecom industry. Congress miscalculated when it
deregulated a telecom industry where no competition existed in certain
sectors, and competition would not emerge for a significant period of
time. 227
Many consumer advocates and economists believe that reregulation must occur before any further deregulation should be
attempted, such that true competition is well established. 228 Professor
Eli Noam, an economics professor at Columbia University, recognized
that deregulation of the telecom industry led to unfortunate results. 229
Professor Noam has proposed that Congress “regulate today in order to
deregulate tomorrow.” 230 Noam believes that the best approach toward
repairing the negative effect of the Telecommunications Act is to hope
for an oligopoly and “seek replacement” of the Telecommunications Act
with other ideas. 231
Professor Krattenmaker, while providing a useful analysis of the Telecommunications
Act shortly after it was enacted in 1996, proclaims the legislation to be good, bad and
ugly—with the ugly component prominently displayed:
First, I think it is downright shameful to pretend to enact a procompetition policy,
while continuing to preserve the worst features of our old spectrum allocation
policies; while exacerbating the anticompetitive, antiefficiency effects of universal
service policy; and while steadfastly refusing to ask (or require the FCC to ask) real
questions about real competitive conditions in real markets. My objection is not
simply to the inelegance or intellectual shallowness of these policies, but to the real
harms they threaten to the goal of competition: serving consumers efficiently. No one
of these failings is likely to cause ‘pretend competitive’ markets to perform badly, but
in combination they may do much harm.

Id. at 48.
226. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
227. See Hancock, supra note 170, at 1C (quoting deregulation pioneer Alfred Kahn
as criticizing Congress for initiating the Telecommunications Act without ensuring that
“potentially effective competition” existed before it deregulated the telecom industry).
228. See Lessons from 1996 Telecommunications Act: Deregulation Before
Meaningful Competition Spells Consumer Disaster, supra note 116, at 1; see also Eli
Noam, Regulating in Order to Deregulate, FIN. TIMES, May 22, 2002, available at
http://www.ft.com (last visited Mar. 14, 2007).
229. See generally Noam, supra note 228.
230. See id.
231. See id. In 2002, economist Eli Noam wrote:
The 1996 Telecom Act was built on the fundamental assumption that competitive
markets will emerge. Today it seems the best we can hope for is an oligopoly. Given
this and similar lessons, it is perhaps time to take a realistic look at the Act (and
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If re-regulation is in fact the answer to the Telecommunications
Act’s failures, then several lessons have undoubtedly been learned, and
must now be heeded when seeking re-regulation: (1) “unregulated
monopolies (like the cable industry) abuse consumers”; (2) “effective
competition can produce substantial benefits”; and (3) “regulators must
force the monopolists to open their markets if consumers are ever to
benefit from competition.” 232
With these lessons in mind, Congress should take immediate action
and seek to enact common sense regulation that will repair the telecom
industry, protect investors and employees involved in the telecom
industry, and learn from its mistakes in seeking to deregulate industries
prior to genuine competition being inevitable.
Several factors must be addressed when considering re-regulating
the telecom industry: (a) the telecom industry is organized around two,
non-competing networks (telephone and cable); (b) wire-to-wire
competition has failed because the major industry players have
consolidated and merged to continue control over core markets; (c)
wireless technology, as of today, has failed to be able to compete for
communications services; and (d) high speed Internet service is fast
becoming its own “telecommunications product space,” which must
soon be regulated. 233
First, Congress must recognize and legislate with the understanding
that telecommunications technology is converging. 234 Citizens of the
global economy are “witnessing a convergence of devices accompanied
by a plethora of transmission paths. The telecommunications receiver is
a radio, computer, television, telephone, VCR, and fax machine all
rolled into one. We can get information to such devices by broadcast,
microwave, satellite, tape or disk, copper wire, or optic fiber.” 235
Congress must legislate in a forward thinking manner, regulating
telecom industries that require regulation and promoting competition in
similar laws elsewhere) and seek its replacement by other approaches.

Id.
232. See Lessons from 1996 Telecommunications Act: Deregulation Before
Meaningful Competition Spells Consumer Disaster, supra note 116; see also Eli

Noam, Too Weak To Compete, FIN. TIMES, July 17, 2002, available at
http://www.ft.com (last visited Mar. 14, 2007) (“A stench of scandal is hanging
over the Telecommunications industry.”).
233. See Lessons From 1996 Telecommunications Act: Deregulation Before
Meaningful Competition Spells Consumer Disaster, supra note 116.
234. See Krattenmaker, supra note 225, at 6.
235. Id.
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telecom industries that allow such. 236
When the 1934
Telecommunications Act was passed, it likely seemed sensible to allow
carefully regulated monopolies to provide telephone service, as only
“one wire” was needed to go into each subscribing home. 237
The cable industry, ostensibly deregulated in the 1990s with little
positive attendant deregulatory results such as greater competition and
lower costs to consumers, 238 may well be an industry suited to the
concept of a “natural monopoly.” 239 Krattenmaker, when examining the
Telecommunications Act, specifically in connection with the cable
television provisions, contended:
Here, too, I believe Congress labored mightily and brought forth a
mouse. I think there is some, but not much reason to believe that
cable can be provided competitively. Probably, it is a natural
monopoly, so consumers are unlikely to be able to protect
themselves by switching to another cable company in their
240
neighborhood.

As discussed above, the deregulation of cable television has failed
236.
237.

See generally id.
See id. at 5. Professor Krattenmaker explains:

Thus, when Morse, Bell and Marconi invented the telegraph, telephone, and
wireless transmitter, respectively, each pushed us further along a path already trod.
What they added to the process of information transfer was the use of electrical
energy to drive the system.
All this was comparatively new when Congress wrote the Communications Act
of 1934. Everything seemed much simpler then. Electronic communications moved
through either the air or wires. The market for communications through wires was a
natural monopoly—who ever heard of two communications wires going into the same
house?—and so the telephone and telegraph (after which the monopolist AT&T was
named) were to be regulated as common carriers.

Id. (citation omitted). Krattenmaker further explains that in many instances when a
“natural monopoly” exists, it should be allowed to exist in a carefully regulated
environment. See id. at 32-33. In other instances, removal of regulation in a
monopolistic environment is appropriate when a market can logically permit viable
competition for a consumer’s business. See id.
Perhaps, due to economies of scale and scope, it is cheaper to have just one
telecommunications wire going into each and every home. If so, it might be wise to
let one firm build and operate those wires (and their attendant switches and
interconnection points) without being able to sell services to businesses and
consumers (that is, without having the ability to prey in allied markets).

Id. at 32-33.
238. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
239. See Krattenmaker, supra note 225, at 34.
240. Id. (citation omitted).
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in two major ways: competition has not followed and cable rates have
ballooned. 241 A Denver, Colorado report indicates:
In the Denver area, rates for expanded basic cable service have
increased on average 43 percent since 1996 and 12 percent since
1999, according to numbers supplied by AT&T Broadband . . . .
Competitive pricing was a key goal of the hard-fought
Telecommunications Act. But the Consumers Unions says that
hasn’t happened, in part because cable companies have tried to edge
out competitors like satellite television.
The group, which bills itself as an unbiased consumer service,
called on Congress to shift oversight of cable companies to local
regulators, much like telephone companies.
“When you look at the price hikes and the broken promises to
compete, it is clear that there needs to be stricter public
accountability in the cable industry,” said Gene Kimmelman,
242
director of Consumer Union’s office in Washington.

Congress needs to repair its cable television miscalculation by reregulating the industry; not by returning to the regulatory structure in
place prior to the Telecommunications Act, but by imposing sensible
new regulation in a way that the consumer and investor will once again
be protected. Originally, the FCC imposed rate regulation upon cable
television at Congress’s direction, eschewing the traditional rate-ofreturn regulation 243 in favor of imposing “price caps” 244 on all cable
systems. 245 The “imposition of price caps on cable systems rendered
241. See supra notes 121-35 and accompanying text; Laurie Kellman, Cable TV
Rates Far Outpace Inflation, Activists Report, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, July 25, 2002, at
13B. This report shows that:
Cable rates have shot up far more than inflation despite government’s effort to
deregulate the telecommunications industry and foster competition, consumer and
industry groups say. Consumer Union, which publishes Consumer Reports magazine,
says rates have risen 45 percent since the 1996 passage of the Telecommunications
Act, which ordered the deregulation of the cable industry.

Id.
242.
243.

Kellman, supra note 241, at 13B.
Rate-of-return regulation is in play when a government agency monitors all
costs associated with the regulated industry and chooses an acceptable additional rate of
return. See Krattenmaker, supra note 225, at 31.
244. Price caps are at play when a governmental agency, like the FCC, sets a limit or
cap on the regulated firm’s prices, prohibiting the company from charging a higher
price than the cap. See Krattenmaker, supra note 225, at 3. A firm is, of course, free to
lower prices below the cap as much as it wishes.
245. See Krattenmaker, supra note 225, at 31.
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them almost powerless to increase consumer satisfaction by offering
subscribers better quality, albeit at a higher cost.” 246 In enacting the
Telecommunications Act and deregulating the industry by removing the
price caps, Congress and proponents promised an increase in
competition for the consumer’s business in the cable industry, which
would result in an increase in quality, customer service, and a muchhyped decrease in the costs related to subscribing to cable television.247
These promised benefits have simply not come to pass.
Congress must consider re-regulating the cable television industry
by imposing a new traditional rate-of-return regulation upon those
monopolies currently running the industry. The past ten years have
proven that, given the opportunity to compete and serve customers with
better quality and lower price, the cable television companies hunkered
down, refusing to compete or open their markets to competition, and
have refused the opportunity to provide high quality at low costs by
instead choosing the corporate chase of increasing revenue. 248 “It is
most likely that running a telecommunications wire to the home is a
natural monopoly and so one ought to concentrate on regulating that
monopoly or mitigating its ill effects.” 249
In the period of the deregulation frenzy that followed the
Revolution Congress, dozens of telecom companies, including telecom
giant (and cable provider) Adelphia, used the stage to mislead investors,
burn consumers, bury employees and devastate the economy. 250 The
removal of important portions of federal oversight from the
Telecommunications industry has proved destructive, harmful, and
injurious to the average U.S. consumer, investor, and employee.
Additionally, Internet use, subscription, and growth were left
largely unregulated by the Telecommunications Act. Congress must
address this oversight in a fair and equitable manner by introducing new
regulation into the Internet sector. Again, Internet connectivity, 75
percent of which is provided through cable modem, 251 bumps up against
the category of a natural monopoly. Those industries that appear to be a
natural monopoly need to be regulated by Congress through the
imposition of some form of rate regulation. Otherwise, the monopolists
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id.
See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
See Krattenmaker, supra note 225, at 35.
See supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
See Krattenmaker, supra note 225, at 34.
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will disadvantage the consumer, as was recognized and feared by
opponents of the Telecommunications Act. 252
Congressional action to repair the damage caused by the
Telecommunications Act, and to begin to heal the wounds inflicted upon
U.S. investors by the Revolution Congress, needs to focus clearly on reregulating various industries deregulated by that Congress.
2. The Commodities Futures Modernization Act
As discussed at length above, Congress in 1998 greeted the overthe-counter derivatives trading concerns of CFTC director Brooksley
Born with disdain. 253 Born’s proposal to explore whether regulation was
necessary for the over-the-counter derivatives trading market was met
by a firestorm of disapproval. 254 Director Born worried and feared that
“leaving the derivatives unregulated . . . carried huge risks.”255
Determined to provide safe haven for investors and shareholders, Born
and the CFTC published a “concept release” that raised questions as to
the integrity of the over-the-counter derivatives trading market and the
lack of federal regulation appurtenant thereto. 256 In hindsight, Director
Born was right on track—worrying about the potential manipulation of
the over-the-counter derivatives trading market—while the Congress
that quashed Born was, once again, decidedly off track.
In light of the Enron debacle 257 followed by revelations of similar
fraud at El Paso, 258 Dynegy 259 and Halliburton, 260 and in light of the
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

See supra Part III.C.
See supra notes 197, 208 and accompanying text.
See Schlesinger, supra note 137, at A1.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part V.A; Enron’s Links to Bush Team Raise Questions, CNN.com,
http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/01/11/enron.facts/index.html. This report mentions that:
Facing a possible conflict of interest, Attorney General John Ashcroft and a top aide
withdrew . . . from any connection to the Enron criminal investigation, a move that
came on the same day the White House revealed contacts between two Cabinet
secretaries and the company’s chairman before the giant energy corporation filed for
bankruptcy last year.

Id.
258. See El Paso Corp., California Settle, WASH. POST, June 27, 2003, at E02. The
POST reports:
El Paso Corp., owner of the biggest U.S. natural gas pipeline system, reached a $ 1.6
billion settlement with California, which said the company manipulated natural gas
prices in 2000 and 2001. The deal calls for El Paso, which admitted no wrongdoing,
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to pay $ 78.6 million upon signing. Among other things, El Paso will pay $45 million
a year for 20 years.

Id.; Neela Banerjee, Ex-Executive Of El Paso Is Indicted Over Gas Data, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 5, 2002, at C3 (“A former vice president of the El Paso Corporation, the country’s
largest natural gas pipeline company, has been indicted in Houston on charges of falsely
reporting 48 gas trades last year, according to a statement released yesterday by federal
prosecutors.”); David Barboza, Suit in Texas Says El Paso Contrived Energy Trades,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2002, at C3 (“The lawsuit, filed by Oscar S. Wyatt Jr., one of El
Paso’s largest shareholders, says the company engaged in what are commonly referred
to as wash trades to drive up the value of El Paso’s stake in a new online trading
platform called the Intercontinental Exchange.”); Nancy Rivera Brooks, Former El
Paso Trader Indicted; The Executive is Charged with Reporting Phony Natural Gas
Trades to Boost Prices and Profit, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2002, at 1 (“A former El Paso
Corp. energy trader was indicted for allegedly reporting fictitious natural gas
transactions to an industry publication in an effort to boost prices and company
profit.”); Chip Cummins, Leading the News: El Paso Ex-Trader Indicted Over Energy
Reports, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2002, at A3; Dow Jones, Business Brief—El Paso Corp.:
Former Trader of Natural Gas Pleads Not Guilty to Charges, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10,
2002, at A14; Russell Gold, El Paso Corp. to Pay $20 Million in Settlement—CFTC Is
Still Investigating 25 Other Energy Firms In Price-Fixing Probe, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27,
2003, at C3. The Journal reported that:
El Paso and California officials agreed to a proposed settlement to resolve allegations
the company withheld substantial natural-gas capacity, driving up prices and
contributing to the state’s energy crisis. The company will pay $100 million in cash
and $125 million in stock immediately as part of a settlement package valued at about
$1.1 billion.

Id.; Reuters, Feds Allege Pricing Conspiracy at El Paso Corp.; Prosecutor Says Bogus
Gas Trades Reported for Publication Involved Several Employees, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14,
2003, at 3.
259. See
Ex-Dynegy
Execs
Plead
Guilty,
CNN
Money,
http://money.cnn.com/2003/08/05/news/companies/dynegy.reut/index.htm
(“Two
former executives at energy company Dynegy Inc. pleaded guilty Tuesday [(Aug. 5,
2003)] to one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud in a 2001 scheme dubbed
“Project Alpha” to burnish the company’s finances.”).
260. See SEC Launches Probe Into Halliburton’s Accounting, Dallas Bus. J., May
29, 2002, http://dallas.bizjournals.com/dallas/stories/2002/05/27/daily13.html. The
Dallas Business Journal reported that:
The Securities and Exchange Commission has launched a preliminary investigation of
Halliburton Co’s accounting treatment of cost overruns on construction jobs. The
Dallas-based oil services giant, which was headed by Vice President Dick Cheney
from 1995 to August 2000, said in a press release late Tuesday that it expects to
receive a formal request for documents or a subpoena in the next few days.

Id.; Cheney May Still Have Halliburton Ties, CNN Money, Sept. 25, 2003, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2003/09/25/news/companies/cheney (“A congressional report
concludes that, under federal ethics standards, Vice President Dick Cheney still has
financial interest in Halliburton, the energy services company he used to run.”).
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frontal assault upon shareholders and employees of energy companies—
particularly those trading in over-the-counter derivative markets—one
legacy of the CFMA will be the market crash of 2002. Congress must
correct the mistakes that it made in 1998 and 2000 when it refused to
provide direct regulation over the same market that enabled Enron to run
amok: Congress must strengthen regulation of the over-the-counter
derivative and futures trading markets.
The CFTC is currently in place and regulates the trading of
commodities and futures in various markets with care and caution. The
private trading of commodities between select corporations that
effectuate such trading “off market” must now come within the grasp of
the CFTC and federal oversight. When the 106th Congress enacted the
CFMA, it granted a free regulatory pass to corporations engaging in
“off-exchange principal-to-principal transactions between sophisticated
and wealthy investors that fall within the statutory concept of eligible
contract participants (“ECPs”), consisting of institutional and highly
accredited customers. ECPs include financial institutions, insurance
companies, registered investment companies; corporations, partnerships,
trusts, and other entities having . . . assets exceeding $10,000,000
. . . .” 261 Further, the CFMA essentially “abolished the former contract
market monopoly for commodities futures and options contracts, which
prohibited the trading of those contracts other than on an organized
exchange. The Act thus permits for the first time over-the-counter
markets for commodities futures and options.” 262
Passage of the CFMA also allowed Congress to carefully and
particularly refuse to regulate the over-the-counter derivatives trading
market, despite pleas and warnings from the Director of the CFTC, by
safely removing from regulation futures and commodity option
transactions that are “traded on an unregulated exchange or in an

261.
262.

See HAZEN & RATNER, supra note 196, at 96.
Id.; see also Frank Partnoy, Lessons From Enron, How Did Corporate and
Securities Laws Fail? A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of “May”, 48
VILL. L. REV. 1245, 1264 (2003). Professor Partnoy explains that:
[T]he regulatory exemptions applicable to certain types of derivatives (e.g., the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act) and the limited disclosure requirements
associated with accounting pronouncements related to derivatives . . . will continue to
permit companies to avoid disclosure even in the face of market pressure. There has
not been much pressure since Enron’s collapse to reverse the CFMA exemptions for
OTC derivatives.

Id.
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unregulated OTC transaction.” 263 Congress ensured that derivative
energy trading would remain unregulated if the contract is not executed
or traded on a “trading facility,” further protecting Enron and a dozen
other fraudulent energy traders. 264
Congress, through the CFMA, also provided enabling legislation
for Global Crossing and Qwest Communications by excluding “swap
transactions” executed under certain conditions from regulatory
protections of the CEA. 265 “An agreement, contract or transaction in a
commodity other than an agricultural commodity is excluded if it is
entered into between eligible contract participants, is subject to
individual negotiation by the parties, and is not executed or traded on a
trading facility.” 266 Global Crossing and Qwest Communications
liberally used unregulated “swap transactions” to trade valueless access
to certain parts of its cable and infrastructure, thereby recording income
and value for worthless swaps and trades. 267
Congress must simply grant the CFTC regulatory oversight of those
markets it specifically excluded when enacting the CFMA. Offexchange principal-to-principal (“ECP”) transactions between
sophisticated or wealthy investors must now face governmental
263.
264.

See CHARLES EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 203, at 27.
See id. at 26. Scholars argue that deregulation of derivatives trading led to
Enron’s collapse and warn that re-regulation of the non-securities derivatives markets
are in order. See Hazen, supra note 195, at 440. Professor Hazen reminds that:
Some of the securities law re-regulation [Sarbanes-Oxley] may well be an
overreaction to events in the news. On the other hand, it seems more likely that this
was a necessary wake-up call and that a similar reaction is warranted with respect to
the non-securities derivatives markets . . . . Lest we forget, one of the major corporate
failures was Enron, which resulted not only from aggressive accounting practices that
were addressed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but also Enron’s heavy involvement in
derivatives transactions.
The deregulation of the non-securities derivatives markets leaves gaps that may
provide openings for additional failures. It would be wise to reconsider the
deregulation of the non-securities derivatives markets before having to reactivate reregulation in the wake of new major scandals. There would be obvious opposition to
re-regulation of the derivatives markets from those observers and commentators who
generally favor free unregulated markets.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Partnoy, supra note 200, at 32 (“Congress also must

decide whether, after ten years of steady deregulation, the post-Enron derivatives
markets should remain exempt from the regulation that covers all other investment
contracts. In my view, the answer is no.”).
265. See CHARLES EDWARDS ET AL., supra note 203, at 27.
266. Id.
267. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.

548

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF
CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. XII

regulation. Over-the-counter trading of commodities, like energy or
futures and derivatives, particularly those not executed or traded on a
trading facility, must be confronted with oversight and CFTC regulation.
New regulation will quell the chaos visited upon the U.S. capital
markets by Enron and the host of other corporate energy criminals.
Such regulations will eventually allow the confidence of investors to
return, and once again believe in the integrity of those that govern U.S.
corporations.
Establishing dozens of accounting oversight boards simply does not
address the primary evil of the Enron/Dynegy/Halliburton/El Paso
problem—that of dangerous, unregulated trading of commodities in
over-the-counter derivative transactions. Sarbanes-Oxley simply does
not fully address or resolve the issues and deceptions perpetrated by the
corporate criminals responsible for the crash of 2002.
VI. CONCLUSION
Today, despite improvement in a few key economic areas, deep
wounds still remain from the market crash of 2002.
The Revolution Congress’s clarion call of ‘deregulation’ and reform
that accompanied the revolution class into power in 1995 is nothing
now if not a faint reminder of the abject failure of most of the 104th
Congress’s deregulatory efforts. A stark token of the 104th’s efforts
are: a telecommunications industry in chaos; collapsed U.S. capital
markets that continue to struggle to right themselves, despite five
years of Administration calls that all is well; a derivatives trading
industry that enabled the greatest corporate collapse in U.S. history;
disbelieving investors with no confidence in corporate executives;
disenfranchised U.S. employees; a jobless rate that refuses to
decline; and, absent the tragic distraction of 9/11, a complete
joylessness in corporate, blue collar, and inner-city America.
Despite quick passage of the weak Sarbanes-Oxley Act, despite
a war effort—that has traditionally been a harbinger of better
economic times, despite continued assurance by politicians that the
economy is improving, and despite the arrest and jailing of several of
the corporate criminals implicated in the crash of 2002, things
simply are still amiss. 1990s deregulation must be deserted. The
PSLRA has failed to protect anyone, other than corporate misfeasors.
The Telecommunications Act has failed to provide competition, jobs,
and the promised economic upsurge. The CFMA, in a costly refusal
to regulate has given the U.S. investor ‘Enron’ as a common curse
word for corporate excess and all that is wrong with current
protections for corporations.
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The regulations that were abandoned a decade ago need to be
returned to the citizens of the United States. The PSLRA must be
rejected, so that private investors once again can wield a realistic
sword of an impending class action against offending and offensive
corporate executives. Certain of the repealed regulations under the
Telecommunications Act must be returned—so that true competition
can be generated between those monopolists in the industry—before
any dream of true deregulation can be entertained. The commodity
derivatives trading industry, particularly derivatives trading amongst
private parties, must come under new regulation imposed through the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Perhaps then will the
268
pain of the market collapse of 2002 be averted in the future.

The deregulatory failures of the 1990s teaches that when corporate
interests, business lobbyists and Wall Street insiders aggressively press
the agenda to deregulate, whether it be telecommunications, plaintiff
securities lawsuits or commodities trading, disappointing if not
disastrous consequences can follow. Congress and the executive would
do well to remember that it was corporate insiders, not consumer
advocates or investor protectionists that pushed aggressively for
deregulation of the telecom industry, deregulation of the futures and
derivatives trading markets and fought to make it more difficult for
plaintiff’s to bring lawsuits against corporate miscreants.
As this article goes to press, corporate interests, lobbyists and Wall
Street insiders are, once again, mounting a forceful campaign to
deregulate important areas that serve to protect investors and
consumers. 269 Sarbanes-Oxley protections, just four years old, are
268. cummings, supra note 4, at 1071-72.
269. See Stephen Labaton, Bush Aides and Business Meet on Shift in Regulation,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/13/business
/13regulate.html?ex=1331438400&en=6f5279b249d1ca27&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&
emc=rss. The New York Times reports that:
Bush administration officials began a series of high-level discussions . . . with top
executives from Wall Street, corporations and the major accounting firms . . . . [T]he
executives have urged the rollback of laws passed in the wake of the Enron and
WorldCom scandals as well as limits to liability from . . . shareholder lawsuits.

Id.; see also Kara Scannell, Proposals Seek to Boost Allure of U.S. Market: Private
Panel Urges Revamp of SEC, End to Earnings Guidance, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2007,
at A1; Editorial, Business Leaders, Washington Aim to Fix Wall Street’s Ailment, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 10-11, 2007, at A2 (“Regulation and private litigation are steering
companies away from the U.S., prompting the U.S. to lose its prominence as the
financial capital of the world.”); Deborah Solomon, Regulators’ Hedge-Fund Aproach:
Hands Off, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2007, at C1 (“The group decided against calling for
more hedge-fund disclosure. That is a shift from 1999, when the group—then under the
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subject to calls for repeal while securities class action lawsuits are again
under assault. 270 This article should serve as a cautionary tale to those
that would indiscriminately heed corporate insiders’ calls for less
regulation and greater protections from consumer and investor lawsuit.
The PSLRA, the Telecommunications Act and the CFMA have each
individually caused severe distress for investors, consumers and the U.S.
capital markets. Congress, the SEC, and other rulemaking agencies
must tread lightly and carefully in coming months, as hasty deregulatory
legislation, spurred entirely by corporate interests and lobbyists, can
cause unnecessary injury and damage. The protection of investors and
consumers should be at the forefront of any new deregulatory debate.

Clinton administration—said that ‘more frequent and meaningful information on hedge
funds should be made public.’”).
270
See Labaton, supra note 269 (“The business interests have sought to overhaul the
regulatory system, reduce the impact of the laws and rules adopted after the spate of
corporate scandals, and limit the liability of companies and accounting firms.”); see
also supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text.

